Robin Dillon-Merrill
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Robin Dillon-Merrill has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Catherine H. Tinsley
McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057
7 shared publications William J. Burns
Department of Operations and Supply Change Management, California State University, San Marcos, California 92096
3 shared publicationsCatherine H. Tinsley
McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Washington, USA
2 shared publicationsEdward W. Rogers
NASA Goddard Space, Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD 20771
2 shared publicationsRichard S. John
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089
2 shared publicationsRobert M. Liebe
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 29 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
Repeated near misses and risk perception in newsvendor decisions
- 29 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
Repeated near misses and risk perception in newsvendor decisions
- 27 February 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 157-170
Overcoming the Near-Miss Bias in High-Risk Industries
Most high-risk industries have succeeded in increasing safety and reducing major accidents but smaller incidents still occur frequently. Learning from these smaller incidents requires recognizing when that same situation could have, under slightly different conditions, resulted in a worse event. Research by the authors has shown that in too many of these smaller incidents something goes awry, but lucky circumstances prevent things from going truly and irreparably wrong. If these near misses have salient features that something ‘almost’ bad happened, individuals and organizations are more likely to learn from the events. These incidents are ‘vulnerable near misses’ because some aspect induces feelings of vulnerability. If, however, these near misses do not come with any warnings that failure nearly happened, these incidents lead to perceptions of systemic resilience, hence they are ‘resilient near misses.’ Naturally, the preferred course of action is for organizations to pay attention to all anomalous incidents and look for lessons for improvement. Yet, in the case of resilient near misses, organizations too often ignore or discount the warnings embedded in the incidents and continue taking risks that may lead to future failures. Good reporting procedures for industry-wide incident management systems will help address this problem.
- 27 February 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 157-170
Overcoming the Near-Miss Bias in High-Risk Industries
Most high-risk industries have succeeded in increasing safety and reducing major accidents but smaller incidents still occur frequently. Learning from these smaller incidents requires recognizing when that same situation could have, under slightly different conditions, resulted in a worse event. Research by the authors has shown that in too many of these smaller incidents something goes awry, but lucky circumstances prevent things from going truly and irreparably wrong. If these near misses have salient features that something ‘almost’ bad happened, individuals and organizations are more likely to learn from the events. These incidents are ‘vulnerable near misses’ because some aspect induces feelings of vulnerability. If, however, these near misses do not come with any warnings that failure nearly happened, these incidents lead to perceptions of systemic resilience, hence they are ‘resilient near misses.’ Naturally, the preferred course of action is for organizations to pay attention to all anomalous incidents and look for lessons for improvement. Yet, in the case of resilient near misses, organizations too often ignore or discount the warnings embedded in the incidents and continue taking risks that may lead to future failures. Good reporting procedures for industry-wide incident management systems will help address this problem.
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 21 (1) , 23-47
Partitioning the Expected Value of Countermeasures with an Application to Terrorism
Benefit–cost analyses are critical to support U.S. agencies’ programmatic decision making. These analyses are particularly challenging when one of the benefits is adversary deterrence. This paper presents a framework for calculating the value of deterrence related to countermeasures implemented to mitigate an attack by an adaptive adversary. We offer an approach for partitioning the benefit of countermeasures into three components: (1) threat reduction (deterrence), (2) vulnerability reduction, and (3) consequence mitigation. The benefit of a countermeasure is measured by the expected value of countermeasure implementation (EVCI) attributable to a specific countermeasure. It is based on the concept of expected value of imperfect control, defined as the difference in the expected values of alternatives with and without countermeasures. The EVCI represents all the benefits of implementing the countermeasure and is derived from three sources: (1) changes in attack probability (threat reduction from deterrence), (2) changes in detection probability (vulnerability reduction), and (3) changes in the distribution of attack outcomes (consequence mitigation). We partition the EVCI and estimate the portion attributable to each of these three sources to quantify the unique benefit of each. We provide two applications of the partitioning methodology using examples from the published literature that examine countermeasures designed to protect commercial aircraft against man-portable air defense systems. The proposed framework provides an approach for explicitly accounting separately for deterrence, vulnerability reduction, and consequence mitigation in benefit–cost analyses. It provides quantifiable insights into how countermeasures reduce terrorism risk. Funding: This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under [Grant Award 22STESE00001-02-00]. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This award was made to Northeastern University and the University of Southern California is a sub-awardee. This work was also supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant 2027296] awarded to Decision Research.
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 21 (1) , 23-47
Partitioning the Expected Value of Countermeasures with an Application to Terrorism
Benefit–cost analyses are critical to support U.S. agencies’ programmatic decision making. These analyses are particularly challenging when one of the benefits is adversary deterrence. This paper presents a framework for calculating the value of deterrence related to countermeasures implemented to mitigate an attack by an adaptive adversary. We offer an approach for partitioning the benefit of countermeasures into three components: (1) threat reduction (deterrence), (2) vulnerability reduction, and (3) consequence mitigation. The benefit of a countermeasure is measured by the expected value of countermeasure implementation (EVCI) attributable to a specific countermeasure. It is based on the concept of expected value of imperfect control, defined as the difference in the expected values of alternatives with and without countermeasures. The EVCI represents all the benefits of implementing the countermeasure and is derived from three sources: (1) changes in attack probability (threat reduction from deterrence), (2) changes in detection probability (vulnerability reduction), and (3) changes in the distribution of attack outcomes (consequence mitigation). We partition the EVCI and estimate the portion attributable to each of these three sources to quantify the unique benefit of each. We provide two applications of the partitioning methodology using examples from the published literature that examine countermeasures designed to protect commercial aircraft against man-portable air defense systems. The proposed framework provides an approach for explicitly accounting separately for deterrence, vulnerability reduction, and consequence mitigation in benefit–cost analyses. It provides quantifiable insights into how countermeasures reduce terrorism risk. Funding: This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under [Grant Award 22STESE00001-02-00]. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This award was made to Northeastern University and the University of Southern California is a sub-awardee. This work was also supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant 2027296] awarded to Decision Research.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 20 (2) , 109-132
Closing the Gap Between Decision Analysis and Policy Analysts Before the Next Pandemic
Decision analysis (DA) is an explicitly prescriptive discipline that separates beliefs about uncertainties from value preferences in modeling to support decision making. Researchers have been advancing DA tools for the last 60 years to support decision makers handling complex decisions requiring subjective judgments. Recently, some DA researchers and practitioners wondered whether the difficult decisions made during the COVID-19 pandemic regarding testing, masking, closing and reopening businesses, allocating ventilators, and prioritizing vaccines would have been improved with more DA involvement. With its focus on quantifying uncertainties, value trade-offs, and risk attitudes, DA should have been a valuable tool for decision makers during the pandemic. To influence decisions, DA applications require interactions with policymakers and experts to construct formal representations of the decision frame, elicit uncertainties, and assess risk tolerances and trade-offs among competing objectives. Unfortunately, such involvement of decision analysts in the process of decision making and policy setting did not occur during much of the COVID-19 pandemic. This lack of participation may have been partly because many decision makers were unaware of when DA could be valuable in helping with the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, decision analysts were perhaps not sufficiently adept at inserting themselves into the policy process at critical junctures when their expertise could have been helpful. Funding: This research was partially supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through the Center for Accelerating Operational Efficiency at Arizona State University.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 20 (2) , 109-132
Closing the Gap Between Decision Analysis and Policy Analysts Before the Next Pandemic
Decision analysis (DA) is an explicitly prescriptive discipline that separates beliefs about uncertainties from value preferences in modeling to support decision making. Researchers have been advancing DA tools for the last 60 years to support decision makers handling complex decisions requiring subjective judgments. Recently, some DA researchers and practitioners wondered whether the difficult decisions made during the COVID-19 pandemic regarding testing, masking, closing and reopening businesses, allocating ventilators, and prioritizing vaccines would have been improved with more DA involvement. With its focus on quantifying uncertainties, value trade-offs, and risk attitudes, DA should have been a valuable tool for decision makers during the pandemic. To influence decisions, DA applications require interactions with policymakers and experts to construct formal representations of the decision frame, elicit uncertainties, and assess risk tolerances and trade-offs among competing objectives. Unfortunately, such involvement of decision analysts in the process of decision making and policy setting did not occur during much of the COVID-19 pandemic. This lack of participation may have been partly because many decision makers were unaware of when DA could be valuable in helping with the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, decision analysts were perhaps not sufficiently adept at inserting themselves into the policy process at critical junctures when their expertise could have been helpful. Funding: This research was partially supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through the Center for Accelerating Operational Efficiency at Arizona State University.
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 32 (4) , 1490-1493
Call for Papers—Special Issue of Information Systems Research—Unleashing the Power of Information Technology for Strategic Management of Disasters
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 32 (4) , 1490-1493
Call for Papers—Special Issue of Information Systems Research—Unleashing the Power of Information Technology for Strategic Management of Disasters
- Open Access
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 15 (3) , 154-173
Insights for Critical Alarm-Based Warning Systems from a Risk Analysis of Commercial Aviation Passenger Screening
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently commissioned a risk analysis of the passenger threat vector in which an adversary gains access through the screening checkpoint. The goal of the project was to provide insights to the TSA to improve both safety and resource allocation as they continue to develop new security procedures in a constantly evolving threat environment. The result was a probabilistic risk model to support the TSA as they plan future safety and resource allocations procedures. Because aviation passenger screening involves highly sensitive information, we discuss the insights gained from the study that are applicable for other highly critical security systems that rely on alarm-based warning technologies to detect anomalies.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Decision Analysis
- Vol. 15 (3) , 154-173
Open AccessInsights for Critical Alarm-Based Warning Systems from a Risk Analysis of Commercial Aviation Passenger Screening
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently commissioned a risk analysis of the passenger threat vector in which an adversary gains access through the screening checkpoint. The goal of the project was to provide insights to the TSA to improve both safety and resource allocation as they continue to develop new security procedures in a constantly evolving threat environment. The result was a probabilistic risk model to support the TSA as they plan future safety and resource allocations procedures. Because aviation passenger screening involves highly sensitive information, we discuss the insights gained from the study that are applicable for other highly critical security systems that rely on alarm-based warning technologies to detect anomalies.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-11
Improving the use of risk matrices at NASA
A risk matrix, commonly a 5 × 5 scorecard with dimensions for likelihood of a problem and consequence if the problem occurs, is a popular tool for communicating project risks. The NASA version [1] is a frequently cited reference for risk managers from many application fields. Cells in the 5 × 5 scorecard are colored red, yellow, and green to help project managers quickly prioritize and track significant risks. In 2008, Cox wrote a highly cited journal article articulating flaws with many applications of risk matrices including inconsistencies in risk rankings based on the fundamental characteristics of the matrix such as which cells are colored red, yellow, and green. This paper will review shortcomings of risk matrices identified by the authors from the literature and from experience using the tool at NASA. We will conclude with recommendations for how NASA risk managers can improve their use of risk matrices to continue to realize the benefits and to minimize the shortcomings.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-11
Improving the use of risk matrices at NASA
A risk matrix, commonly a 5 × 5 scorecard with dimensions for likelihood of a problem and consequence if the problem occurs, is a popular tool for communicating project risks. The NASA version [1] is a frequently cited reference for risk managers from many application fields. Cells in the 5 × 5 scorecard are colored red, yellow, and green to help project managers quickly prioritize and track significant risks. In 2008, Cox wrote a highly cited journal article articulating flaws with many applications of risk matrices including inconsistencies in risk rankings based on the fundamental characteristics of the matrix such as which cells are colored red, yellow, and green. This paper will review shortcomings of risk matrices identified by the authors from the literature and from experience using the tool at NASA. We will conclude with recommendations for how NASA risk managers can improve their use of risk matrices to continue to realize the benefits and to minimize the shortcomings.
- 18 November 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment Systems and Decisions
- Vol. 36 (1) , 34-44
Near-miss events, risk messages, and decision making
- 18 November 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment Systems and Decisions
- Vol. 36 (1) , 34-44
Near-miss events, risk messages, and decision making
- 27 October 2015
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 36 (5) , 1054-1066
Airline Safety Improvement Through Experience with Near‐Misses: A Cautionary Tale
In recent years, the U.S. commercial airline industry has achieved unprecedented levels of safety, with the statistical risk associated with U.S. commercial aviation falling to 0.003 fatalities per 100 million passengers. But decades of research on organizational learning show that success often breeds complacency and failure inspires improvement. With accidents as rare events, can the airline industry continue safety advancements? This question is complicated by the complex system in which the industry operates where chance combinations of multiple factors contribute to what are largely probabilistic (rather than deterministic) outcomes. Thus, some apparent successes are realized because of good fortune rather than good processes, and this research intends to bring attention to these events, the near‐misses. The processes that create these near‐misses could pose a threat if multiple contributing factors combine in adverse ways without the intervention of good fortune. Yet, near‐misses (if recognized as such) can, theoretically, offer a mechanism for continuing safety improvements, above and beyond learning gleaned from observable failure. We test whether or not this learning is apparent in the airline industry. Using data from 1990 to 2007, fixed effects Poisson regressions show that airlines learn from accidents (their own and others), and from one category of near‐misses—those where the possible dangers are salient. Unfortunately, airlines do not improve following near‐miss incidents when the focal event has no clear warnings of significant danger. Therefore, while airlines need to and can learn from certain near‐misses, we conclude with recommendations for improving airline learning from all near‐misses.
- 27 October 2015
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 36 (5) , 1054-1066
Airline Safety Improvement Through Experience with Near‐Misses: A Cautionary Tale
In recent years, the U.S. commercial airline industry has achieved unprecedented levels of safety, with the statistical risk associated with U.S. commercial aviation falling to 0.003 fatalities per 100 million passengers. But decades of research on organizational learning show that success often breeds complacency and failure inspires improvement. With accidents as rare events, can the airline industry continue safety advancements? This question is complicated by the complex system in which the industry operates where chance combinations of multiple factors contribute to what are largely probabilistic (rather than deterministic) outcomes. Thus, some apparent successes are realized because of good fortune rather than good processes, and this research intends to bring attention to these events, the near‐misses. The processes that create these near‐misses could pose a threat if multiple contributing factors combine in adverse ways without the intervention of good fortune. Yet, near‐misses (if recognized as such) can, theoretically, offer a mechanism for continuing safety improvements, above and beyond learning gleaned from observable failure. We test whether or not this learning is apparent in the airline industry. Using data from 1990 to 2007, fixed effects Poisson regressions show that airlines learn from accidents (their own and others), and from one category of near‐misses—those where the possible dangers are salient. Unfortunately, airlines do not improve following near‐miss incidents when the focal event has no clear warnings of significant danger. Therefore, while airlines need to and can learn from certain near‐misses, we conclude with recommendations for improving airline learning from all near‐misses.
- 28 April 2014
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 34 (10) , 1907-1922
Near‐Misses and Future Disaster Preparedness
Disasters garner attention when they occur, and organizations commonly extract valuable lessons from visible failures, adopting new behaviors in response. For example, the United States saw numerous security policy changes following the September 11 terrorist attacks and emergency management and shelter policy changes following Hurricane Katrina. But what about those events that occur that fall short of disaster? Research that examines prior hazard experience shows that this experience can be a mixed blessing. Prior experience can stimulate protective measures, but sometimes prior experience can deceive people into feeling an unwarranted sense of safety. This research focuses on how people interpret near‐miss experiences. We demonstrate that when near‐misses are interpreted as disasters that did not occur and thus provide the perception that the system is resilient to the hazard, people illegitimately underestimate the danger of subsequent hazardous situations and make riskier decisions. On the other hand, if near‐misses can be recognized and interpreted as disasters that almost happened and thus provide the perception that the system is vulnerable to the hazard, this will counter the basic “near‐miss” effect and encourage mitigation. In this article, we use these distinctions between resilient and vulnerable near‐misses to examine how people come to define an event as either a resilient or vulnerable near‐miss, as well as how this interpretation influences their perceptions of risk and their future preparedness behavior. Our contribution is in highlighting the critical role that people's interpretation of the prior experience has on their subsequent behavior and in measuring what shapes this interpretation.
- 28 April 2014
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 34 (10) , 1907-1922
Near‐Misses and Future Disaster Preparedness
Disasters garner attention when they occur, and organizations commonly extract valuable lessons from visible failures, adopting new behaviors in response. For example, the United States saw numerous security policy changes following the September 11 terrorist attacks and emergency management and shelter policy changes following Hurricane Katrina. But what about those events that occur that fall short of disaster? Research that examines prior hazard experience shows that this experience can be a mixed blessing. Prior experience can stimulate protective measures, but sometimes prior experience can deceive people into feeling an unwarranted sense of safety. This research focuses on how people interpret near‐miss experiences. We demonstrate that when near‐misses are interpreted as disasters that did not occur and thus provide the perception that the system is resilient to the hazard, people illegitimately underestimate the danger of subsequent hazardous situations and make riskier decisions. On the other hand, if near‐misses can be recognized and interpreted as disasters that almost happened and thus provide the perception that the system is vulnerable to the hazard, this will counter the basic “near‐miss” effect and encourage mitigation. In this article, we use these distinctions between resilient and vulnerable near‐misses to examine how people come to define an event as either a resilient or vulnerable near‐miss, as well as how this interpretation influences their perceptions of risk and their future preparedness behavior. Our contribution is in highlighting the critical role that people's interpretation of the prior experience has on their subsequent behavior and in measuring what shapes this interpretation.