Xikun Jiang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Xikun Jiang has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yuan Luo
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
8 shared publications - Chenhao Ying
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
6 shared publications - Haiming Jin
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
5 shared publications - Boris Düdder
University of Copenhagen
3 shared publications - Weiting Zhang
Beijing Jiaotong University
3 shared publications Boris Düdder
University of Copenhagen
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 75 (10) , 3629-3642
FedNereus: Incentive-Aware Heterogeneous Federated Learning Under Resource Constraint
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 75 (10) , 3629-3642
FedNereus: Incentive-Aware Heterogeneous Federated Learning Under Resource Constraint
- Open Access
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Computing Surveys
Survey on Verifiable Machine Learning
Verifiable Machine Learning (VML) provides provable guarantees for ML systems and is becoming a foundation for trust in critical applications. This survey organizes 222 papers published between 2010 and August 2026 along a three-axis taxonomy of verification objectives, technique families, and architectural paradigms. Cryptographic proofs of inference, training, and aggregation account for roughly half of the corpus; robustness and safety verification through formal methods accounts for another large fraction; fairness, unlearning, and ownership form smaller but rapidly growing branches. The survey highlights cross-cutting trust assumptions, scalability versus rigor trade-offs, and deployment barriers, and outlines future directions for trustworthy ML.
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Computing Surveys
Open AccessSurvey on Verifiable Machine Learning
Verifiable Machine Learning (VML) provides provable guarantees for ML systems and is becoming a foundation for trust in critical applications. This survey organizes 222 papers published between 2010 and August 2026 along a three-axis taxonomy of verification objectives, technique families, and architectural paradigms. Cryptographic proofs of inference, training, and aggregation account for roughly half of the corpus; robustness and safety verification through formal methods accounts for another large fraction; fairness, unlearning, and ownership form smaller but rapidly growing branches. The survey highlights cross-cutting trust assumptions, scalability versus rigor trade-offs, and deployment barriers, and outlines future directions for trustworthy ML.
- Open Access
- 22 May 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
- Vol. 43 (8) , 2857-2874
Practical Iterative Quantum Consensus Protocol With Sharding Construction
With the development of quantum blockchain, the quantum consensus protocols have garnered increasing attention, which play a crucial role in driving the implementation of quantum blockchains. However, existing protocols, derived from the classical consensus algorithms, face practical application challenges due to current quantum technology limitations. The first challenge is the bottleneck in generating large-scale entangled quantum states. The second challenge arises from the generation of malicious quantum states. The final challenge involves privacy concerns. To address these challenges, we propose a practical iterative QUantum consensus protocol with sharding construction, namely, Q-Union. In fact, Q-Union employs an iterative consensus algorithm where participating nodes are divided into multiple smaller shards, with the consensus process occurring within the current shard, and new shards are involved only if consensus is not achieved. Leveraging Greenberger-Horne- Zeilinge states and Aharonov states, Q-Union harnesses the advantages of quantum mechanics to achieve anonymous consensus, protecting the private information of participating nodes. Additionally, by integrating state verification, Q-Union ensures the correctness of the consensus procedure in the presence of malicious nodes generating adversarial quantum states. Finally, it is proven that Q-Union can also defend against Byzantine attacks from adversarial nodes, maintaining the same security level as traditional non-sharded consensus protocols. Specifically, it consistently outputs the correct consensus when the fraction of adversaries among participating nodes is less than 1/2 with synchronous communication. Both the theoretical analysis and performance illustration demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed Q-Union compared to state-of-the-art protocols.
- 22 May 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
- Vol. 43 (8) , 2857-2874
Open AccessPractical Iterative Quantum Consensus Protocol With Sharding Construction
With the development of quantum blockchain, the quantum consensus protocols have garnered increasing attention, which play a crucial role in driving the implementation of quantum blockchains. However, existing protocols, derived from the classical consensus algorithms, face practical application challenges due to current quantum technology limitations. The first challenge is the bottleneck in generating large-scale entangled quantum states. The second challenge arises from the generation of malicious quantum states. The final challenge involves privacy concerns. To address these challenges, we propose a practical iterative QUantum consensus protocol with sharding construction, namely, Q-Union. In fact, Q-Union employs an iterative consensus algorithm where participating nodes are divided into multiple smaller shards, with the consensus process occurring within the current shard, and new shards are involved only if consensus is not achieved. Leveraging Greenberger-Horne- Zeilinge states and Aharonov states, Q-Union harnesses the advantages of quantum mechanics to achieve anonymous consensus, protecting the private information of participating nodes. Additionally, by integrating state verification, Q-Union ensures the correctness of the consensus procedure in the presence of malicious nodes generating adversarial quantum states. Finally, it is proven that Q-Union can also defend against Byzantine attacks from adversarial nodes, maintaining the same security level as traditional non-sharded consensus protocols. Specifically, it consistently outputs the correct consensus when the fraction of adversaries among participating nodes is less than 1/2 with synchronous communication. Both the theoretical analysis and performance illustration demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed Q-Union compared to state-of-the-art protocols.
- 10 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
- Vol. 24 (2) , 1212-1229
BIT-FL: Blockchain-Enabled Incentivized and Secure Federated Learning Framework
Harnessing the benefits of blockchain, such as decentralization, immutability, and transparency, to bolster the credibility and security attributes of federated learning (FL) has garnered increasing attention. However, blockchain-enabled FL (BFL) still faces several challenges. The primary and most significant issue arises from its essential but slow validation procedure, which selects high-quality local models by recruiting distributed validators. The second issue stems from its incentive mechanism under the transparent nature of blockchain, increasing the risk of privacy breaches regarding workers’ cost information. The final challenge involves data eavesdropping from shared local models. To address these significant obstacles, this paper proposes a Blockchain-enabled Incentivized and Secure Federated Learning (BIT-FL) framework. BIT-FL leverages a novel loop-based sharded consensus algorithm to accelerate the validation procedure, ensuring the same security as non-sharded consensus protocols. It consistently outputs the correct local model selection when the fraction of adversaries among validators is less than$1/2$ with synchronous communication. Furthermore, BIT-FL integrates a randomized incentive procedure, attracting more participants while guaranteeing the privacy of their cost information through meticulous worker selection probability design. Finally, by adding artificial Gaussian noise to local models, it ensures the privacy of trainers’ local models. With the careful design of Gaussian noise, the excess empirical risk of BIT-FL is upper-bounded by$\mathcal {O}(\frac{\ln n_{\min}}{ n_{\min}^{3/2}}+\frac{\ln n}{n})$ , where$n$ represents the size of the union dataset, and$n_{{\min}}$ represents the size of the smallest dataset. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that BIT-FL exhibits efficiency, robustness, and high accuracy for both classification and regression tasks.- 10 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
- Vol. 24 (2) , 1212-1229
BIT-FL: Blockchain-Enabled Incentivized and Secure Federated Learning Framework
Harnessing the benefits of blockchain, such as decentralization, immutability, and transparency, to bolster the credibility and security attributes of federated learning (FL) has garnered increasing attention. However, blockchain-enabled FL (BFL) still faces several challenges. The primary and most significant issue arises from its essential but slow validation procedure, which selects high-quality local models by recruiting distributed validators. The second issue stems from its incentive mechanism under the transparent nature of blockchain, increasing the risk of privacy breaches regarding workers’ cost information. The final challenge involves data eavesdropping from shared local models. To address these significant obstacles, this paper proposes a Blockchain-enabled Incentivized and Secure Federated Learning (BIT-FL) framework. BIT-FL leverages a novel loop-based sharded consensus algorithm to accelerate the validation procedure, ensuring the same security as non-sharded consensus protocols. It consistently outputs the correct local model selection when the fraction of adversaries among validators is less than$1/2$ with synchronous communication. Furthermore, BIT-FL integrates a randomized incentive procedure, attracting more participants while guaranteeing the privacy of their cost information through meticulous worker selection probability design. Finally, by adding artificial Gaussian noise to local models, it ensures the privacy of trainers’ local models. With the careful design of Gaussian noise, the excess empirical risk of BIT-FL is upper-bounded by$\mathcal {O}(\frac{\ln n_{\min}}{ n_{\min}^{3/2}}+\frac{\ln n}{n})$ , where$n$ represents the size of the union dataset, and$n_{{\min}}$ represents the size of the smallest dataset. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that BIT-FL exhibits efficiency, robustness, and high accuracy for both classification and regression tasks.- Open Access
- 1 August 2024
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 7, 5900-5908
Privacy-Preserving UCB Decision Process Verification via zk-SNARKs
With the increasingly widespread application of machine learning, how to strike a balance between protecting the privacy of data and algorithm parameters and ensuring the verifiability of machine learning has always been a challenge. This study explores the intersection of reinforcement learning and data privacy, specifically addressing the Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) problem with the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm. We introduce zkUCB, an innovative algorithm that employs the Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs) to enhance UCB. zkUCB is carefully designed to safeguard the confidentiality of training data and algorithmic parameters, ensuring transparent UCB decision-making. Experiments highlight zkUCB's superior performance, attributing its enhanced reward to judicious quantization bit usage that reduces information entropy in the decision-making process. zkUCB's proof size and verification time scale linearly with the execution steps of zkUCB. This showcases zkUCB's adept balance between data security and operational efficiency. This approach contributes significantly to the ongoing discourse on reinforcing data privacy in complex decision-making processes, offering a promising solution for privacy-sensitive applications.
- 1 August 2024
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 7, 5900-5908
Open AccessPrivacy-Preserving UCB Decision Process Verification via zk-SNARKs
With the increasingly widespread application of machine learning, how to strike a balance between protecting the privacy of data and algorithm parameters and ensuring the verifiability of machine learning has always been a challenge. This study explores the intersection of reinforcement learning and data privacy, specifically addressing the Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) problem with the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm. We introduce zkUCB, an innovative algorithm that employs the Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs) to enhance UCB. zkUCB is carefully designed to safeguard the confidentiality of training data and algorithmic parameters, ensuring transparent UCB decision-making. Experiments highlight zkUCB's superior performance, attributing its enhanced reward to judicious quantization bit usage that reduces information entropy in the decision-making process. zkUCB's proof size and verification time scale linearly with the execution steps of zkUCB. This showcases zkUCB's adept balance between data security and operational efficiency. This approach contributes significantly to the ongoing discourse on reinforcing data privacy in complex decision-making processes, offering a promising solution for privacy-sensitive applications.
- 18 March 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
- Vol. 17 (3) , 977-989
Incentive Mechanism for Uncertain Tasks Under Differential Privacy
Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) has emerged as an increasingly popular sensing paradigm due to its cost-effectiveness. This approach relies on platforms to outsource tasks to participating workers when prompted by task publishers. Although incentive mechanisms have been devised to foster widespread participation in MCS, most of them focus only on static tasks (i.e., tasks for which the timing and type are known in advance) and do not protect the privacy of worker bids. In a dynamic and resource-constrained environment, tasks are often uncertain (i.e., the platform lacks a priori knowledge about the tasks) and worker bids may be vulnerable to inference attacks. This paper presents an incentive mechanism HERALD*, that takes into account the uncertainty and hidden bids of tasks without real-time constraints. Theoretical analysis reveals that HERALD* satisfies a range of critical criteria, including truthfulness, individual rationality, differential privacy, low computational complexity, and low social cost. These properties are then corroborated through a series of evaluations.
- 18 March 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
- Vol. 17 (3) , 977-989
Incentive Mechanism for Uncertain Tasks Under Differential Privacy
Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) has emerged as an increasingly popular sensing paradigm due to its cost-effectiveness. This approach relies on platforms to outsource tasks to participating workers when prompted by task publishers. Although incentive mechanisms have been devised to foster widespread participation in MCS, most of them focus only on static tasks (i.e., tasks for which the timing and type are known in advance) and do not protect the privacy of worker bids. In a dynamic and resource-constrained environment, tasks are often uncertain (i.e., the platform lacks a priori knowledge about the tasks) and worker bids may be vulnerable to inference attacks. This paper presents an incentive mechanism HERALD*, that takes into account the uncertainty and hidden bids of tasks without real-time constraints. Theoretical analysis reveals that HERALD* satisfies a range of critical criteria, including truthfulness, individual rationality, differential privacy, low computational complexity, and low social cost. These properties are then corroborated through a series of evaluations.
- Open Access
Incentive Mechanism for Uncertain Tasks under Differential Privacy
Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) has emerged as an increasingly popular sensing paradigm due to its cost-effectiveness. This approach relies on platforms to outsource tasks to participating workers when prompted by task publishers. Although incentive mechanisms have been devised to foster widespread participation in MCS, most of them focus only on static tasks (i.e., tasks for which the timing and type are known in advance) and do not protect the privacy of worker bids. In a dynamic and resource-constrained environment, tasks are often uncertain (i.e., the platform lacks a priori knowledge about the tasks) and worker bids may be vulnerable to inference attacks. This paper presents HERALD*, an incentive mechanism that addresses these issues through the use of uncertainty and hidden bids. Theoretical analysis reveals that HERALD* satisfies a range of critical criteria, including truthfulness, individual rationality, differential privacy, low computational complexity, and low social cost. These properties are then corroborated through a series of evaluations.
Open AccessIncentive Mechanism for Uncertain Tasks under Differential Privacy
Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) has emerged as an increasingly popular sensing paradigm due to its cost-effectiveness. This approach relies on platforms to outsource tasks to participating workers when prompted by task publishers. Although incentive mechanisms have been devised to foster widespread participation in MCS, most of them focus only on static tasks (i.e., tasks for which the timing and type are known in advance) and do not protect the privacy of worker bids. In a dynamic and resource-constrained environment, tasks are often uncertain (i.e., the platform lacks a priori knowledge about the tasks) and worker bids may be vulnerable to inference attacks. This paper presents HERALD*, an incentive mechanism that addresses these issues through the use of uncertainty and hidden bids. Theoretical analysis reveals that HERALD* satisfies a range of critical criteria, including truthfulness, individual rationality, differential privacy, low computational complexity, and low social cost. These properties are then corroborated through a series of evaluations.
- 6 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Information Sciences
- Vol. 636, 118922
DIVINE: A pricing mechanism for outsourcing data classification service in data market
- 6 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Information Sciences
- Vol. 636, 118922
DIVINE: A pricing mechanism for outsourcing data classification service in data market
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 475-493
Incentive Mechanism Design for Uncertain Tasks in Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems Utilizing Smart Contract in Blockchain
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 475-493
Incentive Mechanism Design for Uncertain Tasks in Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems Utilizing Smart Contract in Blockchain