Wentao Zhan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Wentao Zhan has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Minghui Jiang
School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China
5 shared publications - Beile Feng
School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China
2 shared publications - Peilun Sun
School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China
2 shared publications - Yitong Zhao
School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China
2 shared publications - Chen Liu
School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China
1 shared publication - Chencan Lin
School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Capacity Remuneration Mechanism Versus Renewable Portfolio Standard Under Carbon Emissions Trading: The Role of Source-Storage Synergy
Balancing decarbonization with grid reliability requires managing renewable volatility through Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) or Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRMs) alongside carbon emission trading (CET). However, their comparative systemic impacts remain unclear. This study evaluates the strategic equivalence of CET-RPS and CET-CRM regulations using a Stackelberg duopoly model. We endogenize grid-side storage investment and parameterize source-storage synergy to establish a rigorous equivalence mapping anchored in a unified macroeconomic penetration target. The results reveal that the CRM exhibits dual systemic impacts contingent on technological readiness. Immature conditions necessitate excessive capacity prices, inducing speculative over-investment. Conversely, mature synergy creates a substitution effect that efficiently offsets public compensation budgets. Furthermore, the dynamic policy phase boundary demonstrates that stricter decarbonization targets require higher technological readiness for the CRM to dominate the RPS in social welfare. Additionally, imposing stringent administrative capacity derating factors on storage fails to alter its physical deployment, instead unintentionally transferring wealth to conventional high-carbon generators. Regulators must therefore synchronize capacity market deployment with storage technology maturity and adopt dynamic capacity accreditation to prevent such distributional distortions.
Open AccessCapacity Remuneration Mechanism Versus Renewable Portfolio Standard Under Carbon Emissions Trading: The Role of Source-Storage Synergy
Balancing decarbonization with grid reliability requires managing renewable volatility through Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) or Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRMs) alongside carbon emission trading (CET). However, their comparative systemic impacts remain unclear. This study evaluates the strategic equivalence of CET-RPS and CET-CRM regulations using a Stackelberg duopoly model. We endogenize grid-side storage investment and parameterize source-storage synergy to establish a rigorous equivalence mapping anchored in a unified macroeconomic penetration target. The results reveal that the CRM exhibits dual systemic impacts contingent on technological readiness. Immature conditions necessitate excessive capacity prices, inducing speculative over-investment. Conversely, mature synergy creates a substitution effect that efficiently offsets public compensation budgets. Furthermore, the dynamic policy phase boundary demonstrates that stricter decarbonization targets require higher technological readiness for the CRM to dominate the RPS in social welfare. Additionally, imposing stringent administrative capacity derating factors on storage fails to alter its physical deployment, instead unintentionally transferring wealth to conventional high-carbon generators. Regulators must therefore synchronize capacity market deployment with storage technology maturity and adopt dynamic capacity accreditation to prevent such distributional distortions.
- Open Access
When Do Competing New Energy Vehicle Manufacturers Cooperate Under Supply Disruption Risk? Emergency Procurement, Conversion Costs, and Market Outcomes
Amid increasing upstream raw-material disruptions and battery supply uncertainty, NEV manufacturers may obtain emergency supply from vertically integrated competitors after a disruption, but must incur technology conversion costs. We develop a differentiated Cournot duopoly model with an outsourcing manufacturer and an integrated manufacturer to compare equilibrium, profit, and welfare outcomes with and without emergency procurement cooperation. The results show that cooperation has a clear feasibility boundary jointly determined by market potential, relative costs, and conversion costs, giving rise to competition-only, cooperation-only, and coopetition regimes. The cooperation option reshapes pre-disruption quantity decisions: the outsourcing manufacturer increases regular procurement, while the integrated manufacturer reduces its own-brand output by a larger amount. Within the cooperation region, higher conversion costs continuously reduce the outsourcing manufacturer’s profit, whereas the integrated manufacturer’s profit can be U-shaped. Greater product substitutability makes cooperation more fragile and widens the divergence between private profit incentives and supply-chain resilience. Consumer surplus and social welfare may also move in different directions, depending on the outsourcing manufacturer’s benchmark market share and conversion cost. A Nash-bargaining extension confirms the robustness of the activation condition and pre-disruption quantity-adjustment mechanism, while reducing emergency markups and improving consumer surplus.
Open AccessWhen Do Competing New Energy Vehicle Manufacturers Cooperate Under Supply Disruption Risk? Emergency Procurement, Conversion Costs, and Market Outcomes
Amid increasing upstream raw-material disruptions and battery supply uncertainty, NEV manufacturers may obtain emergency supply from vertically integrated competitors after a disruption, but must incur technology conversion costs. We develop a differentiated Cournot duopoly model with an outsourcing manufacturer and an integrated manufacturer to compare equilibrium, profit, and welfare outcomes with and without emergency procurement cooperation. The results show that cooperation has a clear feasibility boundary jointly determined by market potential, relative costs, and conversion costs, giving rise to competition-only, cooperation-only, and coopetition regimes. The cooperation option reshapes pre-disruption quantity decisions: the outsourcing manufacturer increases regular procurement, while the integrated manufacturer reduces its own-brand output by a larger amount. Within the cooperation region, higher conversion costs continuously reduce the outsourcing manufacturer’s profit, whereas the integrated manufacturer’s profit can be U-shaped. Greater product substitutability makes cooperation more fragile and widens the divergence between private profit incentives and supply-chain resilience. Consumer surplus and social welfare may also move in different directions, depending on the outsourcing manufacturer’s benchmark market share and conversion cost. A Nash-bargaining extension confirms the robustness of the activation condition and pre-disruption quantity-adjustment mechanism, while reducing emergency markups and improving consumer surplus.
- Open Access
Optimization Decisions with Bounded Rationality in Customer-Intensive Services Under Gumbel Distributions
Customers’ bounded rationality significantly influences the effectiveness of advertising and related decision-making in customer-intensive services. This paper, based on the M/M/1 queuing model and incorporating the characteristics of customers’ bounded rationality, conducts an optimization analysis of the decision-making of customer-intensive service providers. In this optimization process, we use the Gumbel distribution to model the random noise in customers’ bounded rationality, where the scale parameter characterizes the degree of bounded rationality, and customers’ choices follow a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model. We adopt the symmetric Nash equilibrium to prove the uniqueness of equilibrium in the duopoly market. Furthermore, we derive the optimal service rate and corresponding advertising expenditure levels for both monopoly and duopoly markets through optimization analysis. Our findings indicate that, regardless of market structure, an increase in the scale parameter of the Gumbel distribution, which captures customers’ bounded rationality, leads service providers to adopt a lower service rate to attract customers and reduce advertising expenditures. Notably, this strategy paradoxically results in higher profits for service providers. Additionally, we mathematically prove that, in both monopoly and duopoly markets, the proportion of customers choosing to enter the system follows a unimodal function of the service rate, and a unique and stable Nash equilibrium exists. Furthermore, we find that in the duopoly market, service providers, as a competitive strategy, set a lower service rate compared to the monopoly market. However, in the duopoly market, the proportion of customers attracted by each service provider is lower than in the monopoly market. We also confirmed the results through numerical simulation analysis.
Open AccessOptimization Decisions with Bounded Rationality in Customer-Intensive Services Under Gumbel Distributions
Customers’ bounded rationality significantly influences the effectiveness of advertising and related decision-making in customer-intensive services. This paper, based on the M/M/1 queuing model and incorporating the characteristics of customers’ bounded rationality, conducts an optimization analysis of the decision-making of customer-intensive service providers. In this optimization process, we use the Gumbel distribution to model the random noise in customers’ bounded rationality, where the scale parameter characterizes the degree of bounded rationality, and customers’ choices follow a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model. We adopt the symmetric Nash equilibrium to prove the uniqueness of equilibrium in the duopoly market. Furthermore, we derive the optimal service rate and corresponding advertising expenditure levels for both monopoly and duopoly markets through optimization analysis. Our findings indicate that, regardless of market structure, an increase in the scale parameter of the Gumbel distribution, which captures customers’ bounded rationality, leads service providers to adopt a lower service rate to attract customers and reduce advertising expenditures. Notably, this strategy paradoxically results in higher profits for service providers. Additionally, we mathematically prove that, in both monopoly and duopoly markets, the proportion of customers choosing to enter the system follows a unimodal function of the service rate, and a unique and stable Nash equilibrium exists. Furthermore, we find that in the duopoly market, service providers, as a competitive strategy, set a lower service rate compared to the monopoly market. However, in the duopoly market, the proportion of customers attracted by each service provider is lower than in the monopoly market. We also confirmed the results through numerical simulation analysis.
- Open Access
Research on Regional Collaborative Governance Between Central and Local Governments Under the Background of Green Innovation
In the current context of increasingly severe global environmental problems, green innovation policies have attracted much attention as an important means to promote sustainable economic development, achieve efficient resource utilization, and be environmentally friendly. Since green innovation involves various factors such as technology research and development and policy support, active cooperation and coordination among governments at all levels are required. Therefore, the theoretical analysis of the game strategy of green innovation among regional governments is particularly important. This paper focuses on inter-governmental collaboration, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the central government and different local governments, analyzes the revenue situation of each party under different policy tendencies, and studies the impact of changes in different factors such as local government green innovation revenue and central government tax revenue on the stability of green innovation policy through simulation analysis. The results show that the adoption of punitive policies by the central government is more conducive to the formation of a stable collaborative governance mechanism. In addition to direct governance costs and benefits, the tax coefficient of local governments and the reduction in local enterprise profits are also key factors affecting regional collaborative governance. On this basis, this paper discusses the game strategies of different regional governments in promoting green innovation from the perspectives of the central government and local governments and puts forward policy recommendations to promote regional collaborative green innovation at the mechanism construction and specific operational levels, providing theoretical guidance for inter-governmental green innovation cooperation.
Open AccessResearch on Regional Collaborative Governance Between Central and Local Governments Under the Background of Green Innovation
In the current context of increasingly severe global environmental problems, green innovation policies have attracted much attention as an important means to promote sustainable economic development, achieve efficient resource utilization, and be environmentally friendly. Since green innovation involves various factors such as technology research and development and policy support, active cooperation and coordination among governments at all levels are required. Therefore, the theoretical analysis of the game strategy of green innovation among regional governments is particularly important. This paper focuses on inter-governmental collaboration, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the central government and different local governments, analyzes the revenue situation of each party under different policy tendencies, and studies the impact of changes in different factors such as local government green innovation revenue and central government tax revenue on the stability of green innovation policy through simulation analysis. The results show that the adoption of punitive policies by the central government is more conducive to the formation of a stable collaborative governance mechanism. In addition to direct governance costs and benefits, the tax coefficient of local governments and the reduction in local enterprise profits are also key factors affecting regional collaborative governance. On this basis, this paper discusses the game strategies of different regional governments in promoting green innovation from the perspectives of the central government and local governments and puts forward policy recommendations to promote regional collaborative green innovation at the mechanism construction and specific operational levels, providing theoretical guidance for inter-governmental green innovation cooperation.
- Open Access
Patent Openness Decisions and Investment Propensities of Frontier Enterprises in Asymmetric Competition
The patent openness decisions of frontier enterprises and the consequent investment tendencies of laggard enterprises play a significant role in their profitability. Despite the benefits resulting from directly using open patents, in order to capture market share and surpass frontier enterprises, laggard enterprises must decide whether they are going to invest in R&D or expansion. In this context, based on evolutionary game theory and the operational behaviors of both frontier and laggard enterprises, this study constructed a model of enterprise revenue under asymmetric competition, exploring the impact of patent openness with and without government subsidies on enterprise revenue. This study discovered that: (1) when the industry scale is small, frontier enterprises gain significant social effects through patent openness, while laggard enterprises invest in expansion; (2) as the industry scale gradually expands, frontier enterprises tend to prefer not to open their patents, and laggard enterprises gradually shift from imitation to independent innovation when the return on R&D investment increases more than that on expansion investment; and (3) when the R&D costs of laggard enterprises are high, frontier enterprises usually choose not to open their patents, forcing laggard enterprises to turn to investment in expansion. This allows frontier enterprises to reduce the losses from patent openness while enjoying the benefits of reduced industry production costs. This study provides new perspectives on patent openness and investment tendencies with the help of an evolutionary game mechanism and offers managerial policy recommendations.
Open AccessPatent Openness Decisions and Investment Propensities of Frontier Enterprises in Asymmetric Competition
The patent openness decisions of frontier enterprises and the consequent investment tendencies of laggard enterprises play a significant role in their profitability. Despite the benefits resulting from directly using open patents, in order to capture market share and surpass frontier enterprises, laggard enterprises must decide whether they are going to invest in R&D or expansion. In this context, based on evolutionary game theory and the operational behaviors of both frontier and laggard enterprises, this study constructed a model of enterprise revenue under asymmetric competition, exploring the impact of patent openness with and without government subsidies on enterprise revenue. This study discovered that: (1) when the industry scale is small, frontier enterprises gain significant social effects through patent openness, while laggard enterprises invest in expansion; (2) as the industry scale gradually expands, frontier enterprises tend to prefer not to open their patents, and laggard enterprises gradually shift from imitation to independent innovation when the return on R&D investment increases more than that on expansion investment; and (3) when the R&D costs of laggard enterprises are high, frontier enterprises usually choose not to open their patents, forcing laggard enterprises to turn to investment in expansion. This allows frontier enterprises to reduce the losses from patent openness while enjoying the benefits of reduced industry production costs. This study provides new perspectives on patent openness and investment tendencies with the help of an evolutionary game mechanism and offers managerial policy recommendations.
- Open Access
Default Prediction with Industry-Specific Default Heterogeneity Indicators Based on the Forward Intensity Model
When predicting the defaults of a large number of samples in a region, this will be affected by industry default heterogeneity. To build a credit risk model that is more suitable for Chinese-listed firms, which have highly industry-specific default heterogeneity, we extend the forward intensity model to predict the defaults of Chinese-listed firms with information about the default heterogeneity of industries. Compared with the original model, we combine the Bayes approach with the forward intensity model to generate time-varying industry-specific default heterogeneity indicators. Our model can capture co-movements of different industries that cannot be observed based on the original forward intensity model so that the model can flexibly adjust the firm’s PD according to the industry. In addition, we also consider the impact of default heterogeneity in other industries by studying the influence of the level and trends of other industries’ default heterogeneity on a firm’s credit risk. Finally, we compute PDs for 4476 firms from January 2001 to December 2019 for 36 prediction horizons. The extended model improves the prediction accuracy ratios both for the in-sample and out-of-sample firm’s PDs for all 36 horizons. Almost all the accuracy ratios of the prediction horizons’ PDs are increased by more than 6%. In addition, our model also reduces the gap between the aggregated PDs and the realized number of defaults. Our industry-specific default heterogeneity indicator is helpful to improve the model’s performance, especially for predicting defaults in a large portfolio, which is of significance for credit risk management in China and other regions.
Open AccessDefault Prediction with Industry-Specific Default Heterogeneity Indicators Based on the Forward Intensity Model
When predicting the defaults of a large number of samples in a region, this will be affected by industry default heterogeneity. To build a credit risk model that is more suitable for Chinese-listed firms, which have highly industry-specific default heterogeneity, we extend the forward intensity model to predict the defaults of Chinese-listed firms with information about the default heterogeneity of industries. Compared with the original model, we combine the Bayes approach with the forward intensity model to generate time-varying industry-specific default heterogeneity indicators. Our model can capture co-movements of different industries that cannot be observed based on the original forward intensity model so that the model can flexibly adjust the firm’s PD according to the industry. In addition, we also consider the impact of default heterogeneity in other industries by studying the influence of the level and trends of other industries’ default heterogeneity on a firm’s credit risk. Finally, we compute PDs for 4476 firms from January 2001 to December 2019 for 36 prediction horizons. The extended model improves the prediction accuracy ratios both for the in-sample and out-of-sample firm’s PDs for all 36 horizons. Almost all the accuracy ratios of the prediction horizons’ PDs are increased by more than 6%. In addition, our model also reduces the gap between the aggregated PDs and the realized number of defaults. Our industry-specific default heterogeneity indicator is helpful to improve the model’s performance, especially for predicting defaults in a large portfolio, which is of significance for credit risk management in China and other regions.