YJYosr Jarraya

Yosr Jarraya

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Yosr Jarraya has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • CapMan: Detecting and Mitigating Linux Capability Abuses at Runtime to Secure Privileged Containers

    by Alireza Moghaddas Borhan, Hugo Kermabon-Bobinnec, Lingyu Wang, Yosr Jarraya, Suryadipta Majumdar

  • Cross-Level Security Verification for Network Functions Virtualization (NFV)

    by Alaa Oqaily, Mohammad Ekramul Kabir, Lingyu Wang, Yosr Jarraya, Suryadipta Majumdar, Makan Pourzandi, Mourad Debbabi, Sudershan L T, Mengyuan Zhang

    Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) is a popular solution for providing multi-tenant network services on top of existing cloud infrastructures in an agile and cost-effective manner. However, as NFV employs multiple levels of virtualization, it also introduces novel security challenges, such as cloud-level security breaches that are invisible to NFV-level tenants. Towards verifying the security of NFV across all the levels (a.k.a. cross-level security verification), existing solutions are mostly insufficient, as each such solution typically only focuses on one specific level (e.g., cloud, SDN, or SFC), and verifying every level separately would be expensive or even infeasible. In this paper, we propose an efficient and practical system, NFVGuard+ , for cross-level security verification for NFV. Particularly, the efficiency of NFVGuard+ is achieved by first performing the costly security verification at one level, and then extrapolating the verification result to other levels through conducting relatively lightweight consistency checks. Additionally, the practicality of NFVGuard+ is ensured by automating the essential steps (e.g., identifying security properties, collecting verification data, and conducting verification) based on a novel Entity-Relationship (ER) model of NFV stack, integrating the approach with OpenStack/Tacker (a popular choice for an NFV deployment), and finally evaluating its effectiveness using both synthetic and real data.


  • ACE-WARP: A Cost-Effective Approach to Proactive and Non-Disruptive Incident Response in Kubernetes Clusters

    by Sima Bagheri, Hugo Kermabon-Bobinnec, Mohammad Ekramul Kabir, Suryadipta Majumdar, Lingyu Wang, Yosr Jarraya, Boubakr Nour, Makan Pourzandi

    A large-scale cluster of containers managed with an orchestrator like Kubernetes are behind many cloud-native applications today. However, the weaker isolation provided by containers means attackers can potentially exploit a vulnerable container and then escape its isolation to cause more severe damages to the underlying infrastructure and its hosted applications. Defending against such an attack using existing attack detection solutions can be challenging. Due to the well known high false positive rate of such solutions, taking aggressive actions upon every alert can lead to unacceptable service disruption. On the other hand, waiting for security administrators to perform in-depth analysis and validation could render the mitigation too late to prevent irreversible damages. In this paper, we propose ACE-WARP, a cost-effective proactive and non-disruptive incident response to address such security challenges for Kubernetes clusters. First, our approach is proactive in the sense that it performs mitigation based on predicted (instead of real) attacks, which prevents irreversible damages. Second, our approach is also non-disruptive since the mitigation is achieved through live migration of containers, which causes no service disruption even in the case of false positives. Finally, to realize the full potential of this approach in containers migration, we formulate the inherent trade-off between security and cost (delay) as a multi-objective optimization problem. Our evaluation results show that ACE-WARP can successfully mitigate up to 81% of the attacks, and our optimization algorithm achieves up to 30% more threat reduction and 7% less delay while being 37 times faster compared to a standard optimization solution.


  • PerfSPEC: Performance Profiling-Based Proactive Security Policy Enforcement for Containers

    by Hugo Kermabon-Bobinnec, Sima Bagheri, Mahmood GholipourChoubeh, Suryadipta Majumdar, Yosr Jarraya, Lingyu Wang, Makan Pourzandi

    Container environments provide cloud native applications with scalability, flexibility, and portable support. As a popular container orchestrator, Kubernetes facilitates automatic deployment and maintenance of a large number of containerized applications. However, potential misconfigurations, vulnerabilities, or implementation flaws may empower attackers to exploit the Kubernetes cluster. Although existing solutions such as runtime security policy enforcement may prevent an attack, they can be inefficient in large scale container environments. In this paper, we propose a performance profiling-based proactive security policy enforcement solution, namely, PerfSPEC. First, we accelerate the proactivization of policies (which typically requires significant manual effort) by proposing to profile and rank existing policies according to their induced overhead. This allows us to better focus our efforts and greatly improve the overall response time (e.g., by 98% in contrast to less than 49%). Then, we address the performance limitations of existing solutions by leveraging learning-based approaches to predict future events and compute their verification results in advance. As a result, PerfSPEC achieves a viable response time (e.g., less than 10 ms in contrast to 600 ms with one of the most popular existing approaches) even for large container environments (up to 800 Pods).


  • Open Access

    CCSM: Building Cross-Cluster Security Models for Edge-Core Environments Involving Multiple Kubernetes Clusters

    by Mahmood GholipourChoubeh, Hugo Kermabon-Bobinnec, Suryadipta Majumdar, Yosr Jarraya, Lingyu Wang, Boubakr Nour, Makan Pourzandi

    With the emergence of 5G networks and their large scale applications such as IoT and autonomous vehicles, telecom operators are increasingly offloading the computation closer to customers (i.e., on the edge). Such edge-core environments usually involve multiple Kubernetes clusters potentially owned by different providers. Confidentiality concerns could prevent those providers from sharing data freely with each other, which makes it challenging to perform common security tasks such as security verification across different clusters. In this work, we propose a solution for building cross-cluster security models to enable various security analyses, while preserving confidentiality for each cluster. We design a six-step methodology to model both the cross-cluster communication and cross-cluster event dependency, and we apply those models to different security use cases. We implement our solution based on a 5G edge-core environment that involves multiple Kubernetes clusters, and our experimental results demonstrate its efficiency (e.g., less than 8 seconds of processing time for a model with 3,600 edges and nodes) and accuracy (e.g., more than 96% for cross-cluster event prediction).

  • Caught-in-Translation (CiT): Detecting Cross-Level Inconsistency Attacks in Network Functions Virtualization (NFV)

    by Sudershan Lakshmanan, Mengyuan Zhang, Suryadipta Majumdar, Yosr Jarraya, Makan Pourzandi, Lingyu Wang

    As one of the main technology pillars of 5G networks, Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) enables agile and cost-effective deployment of network services. However, the multi-level, multi-actor design of NFV may also allow for inconsistency between the different abstraction levels to be mistakenly or intentionally introduced, as shown in recent studies. Serious security issues, such as man-in-the-middle, network sniffing, and DoS, may arise at one abstraction level without being noticed by the victims at another level. Most existing solutions are either limited to one abstraction level of NFV or reliant on direct access to lower-level data which could become inaccessible when managed by different providers. In this paper, by drawing an analogy between cross-level NFV event sequences and natural languages, we propose a Neural Machine Translation-based approach, namely, Caught-in-Translation (CiT) , to detect cross-level inconsistency attacks in NFV at runtime. Specifically, we first extract event sequences from different abstraction levels of an NFV stack. We then leverage Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) to translate the event sequences from one level to another. Finally, we apply both a similarity metric and a Siamese neural network to compare the translated event sequences with the original ones to detect attacks. We integrate CiT into OpenStack/Tacker, a popular open-source NFV implementation, and evaluate its performance using both real and synthetic data. Experimental results show the benefit of leveraging NMT as CiT achieves AUC≥96.03%, which significantly outperforms traditional SVM-based anomaly detection. We also evaluate CiT in terms of its efficiency, scalability, and robustness for detecting inconsistency attacks in NFV platforms.


  • iCAT+: An Interactive Customizable Anonymization Tool Using Automated Translation Through Deep Learning

    by Momen Oqaily, Mohammad Ekramul Kabir, Suryadipta Majumdar, Yosr Jarraya, Mengyuan Zhang, Makan Pourzandi, Lingyu Wang, Mourad Debbabi

    Data anonymization is a viable solution for data owners to mitigate their privacy concerns. However, existing data anonymization tools are inflexible to support various privacy and utility requirements of both data owners and data users. In most cases, this limitation is due to a lack of understanding of those requirements as well as the non-customizability of the existing tools. To address this limitation, we propose iCAT+ , which is an interactive and customizable anonymization approach. More specifically, we first automate the interpretation of data owners' and data users' textual requirements by deploying a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model for Natural Language Processing (NLP). Second, we introduce the concept of the anonymization space to model possible combinations of per-attribute anonymization primitives based on the level of privacy and utility that each primitive provides. Third, we design an ontology model that maps the translated requirements into their appropriate anonymization primitives in the defined anonymization space corresponding to the plain data. Fourth, we evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of iCAT+ based on both real and synthetic network data. Finally, we assess its usability through a real user study involving participants from industry and research laboratories. Our experiments show the effectiveness and efficiency of our solution (e.g., requirement translation accuracy of 99% at the data owner side and 98% at the data user side, with a computational time of around one minute for the Google cluster dataset).


  • Open Access

    A Tenant-based Two-stage Approach to Auditing the Integrity of Virtual Network Function Chains Hosted on Third-Party Clouds

    by Momen Oqaily, Suryadipta Majumdar, Lingyu Wang, Mohammad Ekramul Kabir, Yosr Jarraya, A S M Asadujjaman, Makan Pourzandi, Mourad Debbabi

    There is a growing trend of hosting chains of Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) on third-party clouds for more cost-effective deployment. However, the multi-actor nature of such a deployment may allow a mismatch to silently arise between tenant-level specifications of VNF chains and their cloud provider-level deployment. Most existing auditing approaches would face difficulties in identifying such an integrity breach. First, relying on the cloud provider may not be sufficient, since modifications made by a stealthy attacker may seem legitimate to the provider. Second, the tenant cannot directly perform the auditing due to limited access to the provider-level data. In addition, shipping such data to the tenant would incur prohibitive overhead and confidentiality concerns. In this paper, we design a tenant-based, two-stage solution where the first stage leverages tenant-level side-channel information to identify suspected integrity breaches, and then the second stage automatically identifies and anonymizes selected provider-level data for the tenant to verify the suspected breaches from the first stage. The key advantages of our solution are: (i) the first stage gives tenants more control and transparency (with the capability of identifying integrity breaches without the provider's assistance), and (ii) the second stage provides tenants higher accuracy (with the capability of rigorous verification based on provider-level data). Our solution is integrated into OpenStack/Tacker (a popular choice for NFV deployment), and its effectiveness is demonstrated via experiments (e.g., up to 90% accuracy with the first stage alone).