SSSami Ul Islam Sami

Sami Ul Islam Sami

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Sami Ul Islam Sami has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • POCA: First Power-on Chip Authentication and Key Exchange for Secure Provisioning in System-on-Chip

    by Sami Ul Islam Sami, Amit Mazumder Shuvo, Fahim Rahman, Adam Cron, Dale Donchin, Mike Borza, Farimah Farahmandi, Mark Tehranipoor

    In a horizontal business model, the manufacturing and testing of system-on-chip (SoC) design at offshore facilities has proven to be a cost-effective strategy for fabless design houses. This, however, has led to growing concerns about the security and reliability of chips manufactured by outsourced semiconductor foundries, assembly, and test entities. As such, untrusted entities have access to the entire chip design; they may exploit opportunities for IP piracy, overproduction, cloning, shipping defective or out-of-specification chips, and insecure boot. Design houses must address these concerns by securing the die/packaged chips and their assets in such an untrusted environment. Unfortunately, this cannot be accomplished by any of the current security primitives [e.g., physical unclonable functions (PUFs)] due to their inherent limitations at this stage. Furthermore, provisioning the security assets requires a secure key exchange protocol, which is difficult to accomplish with untrusted entities (tester and software proxies) existing between the die/chip under test and the secure cloud server. This article introduces a novel security primitive and a power-on chip authentication protocol called POCA, which enables the secure provisioning of security assets during wafer sort. POCA incurs a low area overhead and is resilient to any attacks known today.

  • SAFET-HI: Secure Authentication-based Framework for Encrypted Testing in Heterogeneous Integration

    by Galib Ibne Haidar, Jingbo Zhou, Sami Ul Islam Sami, Mark Tehranipoor, Farimah Farahmandi

    System-in-Packages (SiPs) are gaining traction due to their enhanced performance, high yield rates, and accelerated time-to-market. However, integrating chiplets from untrusted sources introduces security risks during post-integration testing. Malicious chiplets within the SiP can intercept, modify, or block sensitive test data intended for specific chiplets. This article presents SAFET-HI, a framework designed to ensure a secure testing environment for SiPs. Within this framework, sensitive test data are accessible only to authenticated chiplets. To counter sniffing and spoofing attacks, SAFET-HI encrypts sensitive test patterns while maintaining minimal timing overhead. During post-integration testing, another major threat arises from outsourcing test patterns to untrusted testing facilities, increasing the risk of overproduction and counterfeiting. To address this, SAFET-HI incorporates a functional locking mechanism that prevents unauthorized production and distribution of defective SiPs. Additionally, scan encryption blocks are implemented to stop untrusted test facilities from generating a golden response database. To further enhance security, a watermark bitstream is embedded within the SiP to prevent remarking attacks by untrusted distributors. Simulation results show that SAFET-HI incurs area and timing overheads of only 1.42–4.27% and 13.7%, respectively, demonstrating its effectiveness in securing the SiP testing process.


  • Open Access

    Advancing Trustworthiness in System-in-Package: A Novel Root-of-Trust Hardware Security Module for Heterogeneous Integration

    by Sami Ul Islam Sami, Tao Zhang, Amit Mazumder Shuvo, Saad Ul Haque, Paul E. Calzada, Kimia Zamiri Azar, Hadi Mardani Kamali, Fahim Rahman, Farimah Farahmandi, Mark Tehranipoor

    The semiconductor industry has adopted heterogeneous integration (HI), incorporating modular intellectual property (IP) blocks (chiplets) into a unified system-in-package (SiP) to overcome the slowdown in Moore’s Law and Dennard scaling and to respond to the increasing demand for advanced integrated circuits (ICs). Despite the manifold benefits of HI, such as enhanced performance, reduced area overhead, and improved yield, this transformation has also led to security vulnerabilities in the SiP supply chain and in-field operations, ranging from chiplet piracy and SiP reverse engineering (RE) to information leakage. Although conventional countermeasures provide the desired robustness for monolithic ICs, they are insufficient for addressing these challenges in the context of HI. To address these concerns, this paper presents a novel root-of-trust architecture, augmenting the process of integration using a centralized chiplet hardware security module (CHSM), aiming to provide comprehensive and robust protection throughout the SiP supply chain and in-field operations. Also, the proposed architecture equipped with the CHSM effectively addresses potential security breaches while providing robust protection against zero-day attacks through its reconfigurable capabilities. Throughout five detailed case studies, this paper performs a comprehensive security analysis to illustrate the resilience of CHSM against contemporary attack scenarios in the HI domain.


  • Open Access

    Heterogeneous Integration Supply Chain Integrity Through Blockchain and CHSM

    by Paul E. Calzada, Sami Ul Islam Sami, Kimia Zamiri Azar, Fahim Rahman, Farimah Farahmandi, Mark Tehranipoor

    Over the past few decades, electronics have become commonplace in government, commercial, and social domains. These devices have developed rapidly, as seen in the prevalent use of system-on-chips rather than separate integrated circuits on a single circuit board. As the semiconductor community begins conversations over the end of Moore’s law, an approach to further increase both functionality per area and yield using segregated functionality dies on a common interposer die, labeled a System in Package (SiP), is gaining attention. Thus, the chiplet and SiP space has grown to meet this demand, creating a new packaging paradigm, advanced packaging, and a new supply chain. This new distributed supply chain with multiple chiplet developers and foundries has augmented counterfeit vulnerabilities. Chiplets are currently available on an open market, and their origin and authenticity consequently are difficult to ascertain. With this lack of control over the stages of the supply chain, counterfeit threats manifest at the chiplet, interposer, and SiP levels. In this article, we identify counterfeit threats in the SiP domain, and we propose a mitigating framework utilizing blockchain for the effective traceability of SiPs to establish provenance. Our framework utilizes the Chiplet Hardware Security Module to authenticate a SiP throughout its life. To accomplish this, we leverage SiP information including electronic chip identification of chiplets, combating die and IC recycling sensor information, documentation, test patterns and/or electrical measurements, grade, and part number of the SiP. We detail the structure of the blockchain and establish protocols for both enrolling trusted information into the blockchain network and authenticating the SiP. Our framework mitigates SiP counterfeit threats including recycled, remarked, cloned, overproduced interposer, forged documentation, and substituted chiplet while detecting of out-of-spec and defective SiPs.


  • Enabling Security of Heterogeneous Integration: From Supply Chain to In-Field Operations

    by Sami Ul Islam Sami, Hadi Mardani Kamali, Farimah Farahmandi, Fahim Rahman, Mark Tehranipoor

    Due to slowdown of Moore’s law and Dennard scaling, modern hardware design has shifted to heterogenous integration (HI) instead of traditional monolithic ICs. However, HI incurs its own security vulnerabilities. In this article, the authors analyze the security issues pertaining to HI and provide defense strategies for the same.