EMEllis Mallett

Ellis Mallett

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Ellis Mallett has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Neoclassical realism, policy paradigms and strategic change: understanding the US rapprochement to Cuba

    by Ellis Mallett, Nicholas Kitchen

    Why do particular foreign policy strategies persist even when they fail to achieve their objectives? And how do such policies eventually come to change? Incorporating policy paradigms as a unifying unit-level intervening variable within a Type II neoclassical realist framework, we account for extended periods of foreign policy continuity despite ongoing policy failure, and theorise the structural conditions necessary to override intervening paradigmatic imperatives. The article illustrates the argument through an analysis of the ‘Obama thaw’, after 50 years of hostile policy towards Havana. Drawing on interviews with key officials, we show that emerging structural pressures in the Western hemisphere brought about the administration’s decision to normalise relations with Cuba.


  • Open Access

    A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Overbalancing

    by Ellis Mallett, Thomas Juneau

    Why do states overestimate threats and, as a result, mount disproportionately strong and therefore costly balancing responses? To answer this question, we build a neoclassical realist theory of overbalancing to argue that unit-level intervening variables help generate a counterforce greater than what a structurally induced ideal response would call for. We identify the factors and conditions that steer states to deviate from realist, optimal policies, pinpoint the consequences of such suboptimal behavior, and provide policymakers with recommendations more suited to an interest-driven foreign policy in line with power considerations. We apply our theory to two distinct case studies: Egypt's costly intervention in Yemen in the 1960s and the American overreaction to the real, but very limited, threat posed by terrorism since 2001.