Gary Qiurui Ma
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Gary Qiurui Ma has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David C. Parkes
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
3 shared publications - Alon Eden
Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
2 shared publications - Alexander Trott
Salesforce Research, USA
1 shared publication - Clara Li
Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY USA
1 shared publication - Luca D'AMico-Wong
Harvard University, Cambridge, USA
1 shared publication - Stephan Zheng
Salesforce Research, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 545-546
Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 545-546
Open AccessDisrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 542
Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places
We introduce the theoretical study of a Platform Equilibrium in a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can join a platform and transact with any buyer or remain off-platform and transact with a subset of buyers whom she knows. Given the constraints on trade, prices form a competitive equilibrium and clears the market. The platform charges a transaction fee to all on-platform sellers, in the form of a fraction of on-platform sellers' price. The platform chooses the fraction to maximize revenue. A Platform Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the game where each seller decides whether or not to join the platform, balancing the effect of a larger pool of buyers to trade with, against the imposition of a transaction fee. Our main insights are:(i) In homogeneous-goods markets, pure equilibria always exist and can be found by a polynomial-time algorithm; (ii) When the platform is unregulated, the resulting Platform Equilibrium guarantees a tight Θ(log(min{m, n}))-approximation of the optimal welfare in homogeneous-goods markets, where n and m are the number of buyers and sellers respectively; (iii) Even light regulation helps: when the platform's fee is capped at α ∈ [0, 1), the price of anarchy is (2-α)/(1--α) for general markets. For example, if the platform takes 30% of the seller's revenue, a rather high fee, our analysis implies the welfare in a Platform Equilibrium is still a 0.412-fraction of the optimal welfare. Our main results extend to markets with multiple platforms, beyond unit-demand buyers, as well as to sellers with production costs. A full version of this paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.08781.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 542
Open AccessPlatform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places
We introduce the theoretical study of a Platform Equilibrium in a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can join a platform and transact with any buyer or remain off-platform and transact with a subset of buyers whom she knows. Given the constraints on trade, prices form a competitive equilibrium and clears the market. The platform charges a transaction fee to all on-platform sellers, in the form of a fraction of on-platform sellers' price. The platform chooses the fraction to maximize revenue. A Platform Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the game where each seller decides whether or not to join the platform, balancing the effect of a larger pool of buyers to trade with, against the imposition of a transaction fee. Our main insights are:(i) In homogeneous-goods markets, pure equilibria always exist and can be found by a polynomial-time algorithm; (ii) When the platform is unregulated, the resulting Platform Equilibrium guarantees a tight Θ(log(min{m, n}))-approximation of the optimal welfare in homogeneous-goods markets, where n and m are the number of buyers and sellers respectively; (iii) Even light regulation helps: when the platform's fee is capped at α ∈ [0, 1), the price of anarchy is (2-α)/(1--α) for general markets. For example, if the platform takes 30% of the seller's revenue, a rather high fee, our analysis implies the welfare in a Platform Equilibrium is still a 0.412-fraction of the optimal welfare. Our main results extend to markets with multiple platforms, beyond unit-demand buyers, as well as to sellers with production costs. A full version of this paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.08781.
- Open Access
- 30 April 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3592-3602
Platform Behavior under Market Shocks: A Simulation Framework and Reinforcement-Learning Based Study
We study the behavior of an economic platform (e.g., Amazon, Uber Eats, Instacart) under shocks, such as COVID-19 lockdowns, and the effect of different regulation considerations. To this end, we develop a multi-agent simulation environment of a platform economy in a multi-period setting where shocks may occur and disrupt the economy. Buyers and sellers are heterogeneous and modeled as economically-motivated agents, choosing whether or not to pay fees to access the platform. We use deep reinforcement learning to model the fee-setting and matching behavior of the platform, and consider two major types of regulation frameworks: (1) taxation policies and (2) platform fee restrictions. We offer a number of simulated experiments that cover different market settings and shed light on regulatory tradeoffs. Our results show that while many interventions are ineffective with a sophisticated platform actor, we identify a particular kind of regulation—fixing fees to the optimal, no-shock fees while still allowing a platform to choose how to match buyers and sellers—as holding promise for promoting the efficiency and resilience of the economic system.
- 30 April 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3592-3602
Open AccessPlatform Behavior under Market Shocks: A Simulation Framework and Reinforcement-Learning Based Study
We study the behavior of an economic platform (e.g., Amazon, Uber Eats, Instacart) under shocks, such as COVID-19 lockdowns, and the effect of different regulation considerations. To this end, we develop a multi-agent simulation environment of a platform economy in a multi-period setting where shocks may occur and disrupt the economy. Buyers and sellers are heterogeneous and modeled as economically-motivated agents, choosing whether or not to pay fees to access the platform. We use deep reinforcement learning to model the fee-setting and matching behavior of the platform, and consider two major types of regulation frameworks: (1) taxation policies and (2) platform fee restrictions. We offer a number of simulated experiments that cover different market settings and shed light on regulatory tradeoffs. Our results show that while many interventions are ineffective with a sophisticated platform actor, we identify a particular kind of regulation—fixing fees to the optimal, no-shock fees while still allowing a platform to choose how to match buyers and sellers—as holding promise for promoting the efficiency and resilience of the economic system.