GMGary Qiurui Ma

Gary Qiurui Ma

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Gary Qiurui Ma has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization

    by Luca D'AMico-Wong, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes

  • Open Access

    Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places

    by Alon Eden, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes

    We introduce the theoretical study of a Platform Equilibrium in a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can join a platform and transact with any buyer or remain off-platform and transact with a subset of buyers whom she knows. Given the constraints on trade, prices form a competitive equilibrium and clears the market. The platform charges a transaction fee to all on-platform sellers, in the form of a fraction of on-platform sellers' price. The platform chooses the fraction to maximize revenue. A Platform Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the game where each seller decides whether or not to join the platform, balancing the effect of a larger pool of buyers to trade with, against the imposition of a transaction fee. Our main insights are:(i) In homogeneous-goods markets, pure equilibria always exist and can be found by a polynomial-time algorithm; (ii) When the platform is unregulated, the resulting Platform Equilibrium guarantees a tight Θ(log(min{m, n}))-approximation of the optimal welfare in homogeneous-goods markets, where n and m are the number of buyers and sellers respectively; (iii) Even light regulation helps: when the platform's fee is capped at α ∈ [0, 1), the price of anarchy is (2-α)/(1--α) for general markets. For example, if the platform takes 30% of the seller's revenue, a rather high fee, our analysis implies the welfare in a Platform Equilibrium is still a 0.412-fraction of the optimal welfare. Our main results extend to markets with multiple platforms, beyond unit-demand buyers, as well as to sellers with production costs. A full version of this paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.08781.


  • Open Access

    Platform Behavior under Market Shocks: A Simulation Framework and Reinforcement-Learning Based Study

    by Xintong Wang, Gary Qiurui Ma, Alon Eden, Clara Li, Alexander Trott, Stephan Zheng, David Parkes

    We study the behavior of an economic platform (e.g., Amazon, Uber Eats, Instacart) under shocks, such as COVID-19 lockdowns, and the effect of different regulation considerations. To this end, we develop a multi-agent simulation environment of a platform economy in a multi-period setting where shocks may occur and disrupt the economy. Buyers and sellers are heterogeneous and modeled as economically-motivated agents, choosing whether or not to pay fees to access the platform. We use deep reinforcement learning to model the fee-setting and matching behavior of the platform, and consider two major types of regulation frameworks: (1) taxation policies and (2) platform fee restrictions. We offer a number of simulated experiments that cover different market settings and shed light on regulatory tradeoffs. Our results show that while many interventions are ineffective with a sophisticated platform actor, we identify a particular kind of regulation—fixing fees to the optimal, no-shock fees while still allowing a platform to choose how to match buyers and sellers—as holding promise for promoting the efficiency and resilience of the economic system.