Hyeonmin Lee
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Hyeonmin Lee has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yixin Sun
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, USA
5 shared publications - Yizhe Zhang
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA
4 shared publications - Hongying Dong
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA
3 shared publications - Shumon Huque
Salesforce, McLean, USA
2 shared publications - Taekyoung Kwon
Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
2 shared publications - Guancheng Tu
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 620-635
Dissecting NSEC and NSEC3 Deployment in the Wild
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 620-635
Open AccessDissecting NSEC and NSEC3 Deployment in the Wild
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 287-299
Revisit DANE for the Web: A Performance Perspective
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 287-299
Open AccessRevisit DANE for the Web: A Performance Perspective
- Open Access
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 909-918
Inside Certificate Chains Beyond Public Issuers: Structure and Usage Analysis from a Campus Network
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 909-918
Open AccessInside Certificate Chains Beyond Public Issuers: Structure and Usage Analysis from a Campus Network
- Open Access
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 814-830
Pave: Information Flow Control for Privacy-preserving Online Data Processing Services
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 814-830
Open AccessPave: Information Flow Control for Privacy-preserving Online Data Processing Services
- Open Access
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 423-440
Exploring the Ecosystem of DNS HTTPS Resource Records: An End-to-End Perspective
The DNS HTTPS resource record is a new DNS record type designed for the delivery of configuration information and parameters required to initiate connections to HTTPS network services. In addition, it is a key enabler for TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) by providing the cryptographic keying material needed to encrypt the initial exchange. To understand the adoption of this new DNS HTTPS record, we perform a longitudinal study on the server-side deployment of DNS HTTPS for Tranco top million domains, as well as an analysis of the client-side support for DNS HTTPS through snapshots from major browsers. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first longitudinal study on DNS HTTPS server deployment, and the first known study on client-side support for DNS HTTPS. Despite the rapidly growing trend of DNS HTTPS adoption, our study highlights challenges and concerns in the deployment by both servers and clients, such as the complexity in properly maintaining HTTPS records and connection failure in browsers when the HTTPS record is not properly configured.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 423-440
Open AccessExploring the Ecosystem of DNS HTTPS Resource Records: An End-to-End Perspective
The DNS HTTPS resource record is a new DNS record type designed for the delivery of configuration information and parameters required to initiate connections to HTTPS network services. In addition, it is a key enabler for TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) by providing the cryptographic keying material needed to encrypt the initial exchange. To understand the adoption of this new DNS HTTPS record, we perform a longitudinal study on the server-side deployment of DNS HTTPS for Tranco top million domains, as well as an analysis of the client-side support for DNS HTTPS through snapshots from major browsers. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first longitudinal study on DNS HTTPS server deployment, and the first known study on client-side support for DNS HTTPS. Despite the rapidly growing trend of DNS HTTPS adoption, our study highlights challenges and concerns in the deployment by both servers and clients, such as the complexity in properly maintaining HTTPS records and connection failure in browsers when the HTTPS record is not properly configured.
- Open Access
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 214-229
Mutual TLS in Practice: A Deep Dive into Certificate Configurations and Privacy Issues
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is widely recognized as the essential protocol for securing Internet communications. While numerous studies have focused on investigating server certificates used in TLS connections, our study delves into the less explored territory of mutual TLS (mTLS) where both parties need to provide certificates to each other. By utilizing TLS connection logs collected from a large campus network over 23 months, we identify over 2.2 million unique server certificates and over 3.4 million unique client certificates used in over 1.2 billion mutual TLS connections. By jointly analyzing TLS connection data (e.g., port numbers) and certificate data (e.g., issuers for server/client certificates), we quantify the prevalent use of untrusted certificates and uncover potential security concerns resulting from misconfigured certificates, sharing of certificates between servers and clients, and long-expired certificates. Furthermore, we present the first in-depth study on the wide range of information included in CommonName (CN) and Subject Alternative Name (SAN), drawing comparison between client and server certificates, as well as revealing sensitive information.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 214-229
Open AccessMutual TLS in Practice: A Deep Dive into Certificate Configurations and Privacy Issues
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is widely recognized as the essential protocol for securing Internet communications. While numerous studies have focused on investigating server certificates used in TLS connections, our study delves into the less explored territory of mutual TLS (mTLS) where both parties need to provide certificates to each other. By utilizing TLS connection logs collected from a large campus network over 23 months, we identify over 2.2 million unique server certificates and over 3.4 million unique client certificates used in over 1.2 billion mutual TLS connections. By jointly analyzing TLS connection data (e.g., port numbers) and certificate data (e.g., issuers for server/client certificates), we quantify the prevalent use of untrusted certificates and uncover potential security concerns resulting from misconfigured certificates, sharing of certificates between servers and clients, and long-expired certificates. Furthermore, we present the first in-depth study on the wide range of information included in CommonName (CN) and Subject Alternative Name (SAN), drawing comparison between client and server certificates, as well as revealing sensitive information.
- Open Access
- 30 April 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2360-2370
ZTLS: A DNS-based Approach to Zero Round Trip Delay in TLS handshake
Establishing secure connections fast to end-users is crucial to online services. However, when a client sets up a TLS session with a server, the TLS handshake needs one round trip time (RTT) to negotiate a session key. Additionally, establishing a TLS session also requires a DNS lookup (e.g., the A record lookup to fetch the IP address of the server) and a TCP handshake. In this paper, we propose ZTLS to eliminate the 1-RTT latency for the TLS handshake by leveraging the DNS. In ZTLS, a server distributes TLS handshake-related data (i.e., Diffie-Hellman elements), dubbed Z-data, as DNS records. A ZTLS client can fetch Z-data by DNS lookups and derive a session key. With the session key, the client can send encrypted data along with its ClientHello, achieving 0-RTT. ZTLS supports incremental deployability on the current TLS-based infrastructure. Our prototype-based experiments show that ZTLS is 1-RTT faster than TLS in terms of the first response time.
- 30 April 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2360-2370
Open AccessZTLS: A DNS-based Approach to Zero Round Trip Delay in TLS handshake
Establishing secure connections fast to end-users is crucial to online services. However, when a client sets up a TLS session with a server, the TLS handshake needs one round trip time (RTT) to negotiate a session key. Additionally, establishing a TLS session also requires a DNS lookup (e.g., the A record lookup to fetch the IP address of the server) and a TCP handshake. In this paper, we propose ZTLS to eliminate the 1-RTT latency for the TLS handshake by leveraging the DNS. In ZTLS, a server distributes TLS handshake-related data (i.e., Diffie-Hellman elements), dubbed Z-data, as DNS records. A ZTLS client can fetch Z-data by DNS lookups and derive a session key. With the session key, the client can send encrypted data along with its ClientHello, achieving 0-RTT. ZTLS supports incremental deployability on the current TLS-based infrastructure. Our prototype-based experiments show that ZTLS is 1-RTT faster than TLS in terms of the first response time.