Mark Kramer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Latest Publications
- 22 December 2025
- Published by Instytut Europy Srodkowej in Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
- Vol. 23 (4) , 19
The Soviet system, the Soviet state, and Western expertise on the USSR before and after 1991
This article provides a brief assessment of the way Western political scientists and international relations scholars analysed and understood the Soviet Union from the 1960s through December 1991. To this end, the article begins with an overview of the nature and basic traits of the Soviet system. Although the article discusses the importance of historical evidence used by political scientists to appraise the nature of Soviet politics and Soviet foreign policy, it does not rehash the once heated (and by now tedious) disputes that arose among Western historians in the late 1970s and 1980s, with so-called “revisionists” lambasting more orthodox historians1. Instead, the focus here is on the quality of Sovietological analyses in the West before December 1991, the new opportunities for archival research that emerged in the former USSR after 1991, and the grave obstacles to scholarship posed by Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine starting in 2022, including the draconian internal clampdown in Russia that accompanied the invasion. As part of this clampdown, the Russian government began arresting innocent foreign citizens and Russian pro democracy activists so they could be held hostage and traded in prisoner swaps for Russian spies and assassins – a policy that was bound to affect the willingness of Western scholars and graduate students to travel to Russia for archival research or any other purpose. The invasion and political crackdown also spurred many leading Russian scholars of Soviet history to go into long-term exile.
- 22 December 2025
- Published by Instytut Europy Srodkowej in Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
- Vol. 23 (4) , 19
The Soviet system, the Soviet state, and Western expertise on the USSR before and after 1991
This article provides a brief assessment of the way Western political scientists and international relations scholars analysed and understood the Soviet Union from the 1960s through December 1991. To this end, the article begins with an overview of the nature and basic traits of the Soviet system. Although the article discusses the importance of historical evidence used by political scientists to appraise the nature of Soviet politics and Soviet foreign policy, it does not rehash the once heated (and by now tedious) disputes that arose among Western historians in the late 1970s and 1980s, with so-called “revisionists” lambasting more orthodox historians1. Instead, the focus here is on the quality of Sovietological analyses in the West before December 1991, the new opportunities for archival research that emerged in the former USSR after 1991, and the grave obstacles to scholarship posed by Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine starting in 2022, including the draconian internal clampdown in Russia that accompanied the invasion. As part of this clampdown, the Russian government began arresting innocent foreign citizens and Russian pro democracy activists so they could be held hostage and traded in prisoner swaps for Russian spies and assassins – a policy that was bound to affect the willingness of Western scholars and graduate students to travel to Russia for archival research or any other purpose. The invasion and political crackdown also spurred many leading Russian scholars of Soviet history to go into long-term exile.
- 27 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Modern European History
- Vol. 23 (2) , 221-245
The End of a Cold War Military Alliance in Europe: The Disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, 1985–1991
When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation – commonly known as the Warsaw Pact – was a robust military alliance that deployed vast numbers of combat forces against the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The Pact not only was capable of waging a large-scale war in Europe but was also an instrument of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, safeguarding loyal Communist regimes. In addition, the alliance over the years had become an effective mechanism of political coordination and consultation. In late April 1985, Gorbachev and the other Warsaw Pact leaders met in Warsaw on the 30th anniversary of the Pact and agreed to renew it for another 30 years. Yet only 6 years later, in mid-1991, the Warsaw Pact was formally disbanded, having been rendered obsolete by the political transformation of Eastern Europe. Drawing on declassified archival documents, memoirs and published sources from the countries of the former Soviet bloc, this article provides a survey of the Warsaw Pact's final years and explains why the organisation ceased to exist in 1991. The article sets this process in the broader context of the reorientation of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. Because major changes in military structures and deployments can often take years to carry out, the Warsaw Pact was still largely intact by the time the upheavals of 1989 in Eastern Europe altered the entire political complexion of the Soviet bloc and undermined the raison d'être of the alliance. Despite Moscow's efforts in 1990 to preserve the Warsaw Pact and to convert it into a mainly political forum, the fate of the organisation was sealed by the events of 1989.
- 27 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Modern European History
- Vol. 23 (2) , 221-245
The End of a Cold War Military Alliance in Europe: The Disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, 1985–1991
When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation – commonly known as the Warsaw Pact – was a robust military alliance that deployed vast numbers of combat forces against the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The Pact not only was capable of waging a large-scale war in Europe but was also an instrument of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, safeguarding loyal Communist regimes. In addition, the alliance over the years had become an effective mechanism of political coordination and consultation. In late April 1985, Gorbachev and the other Warsaw Pact leaders met in Warsaw on the 30th anniversary of the Pact and agreed to renew it for another 30 years. Yet only 6 years later, in mid-1991, the Warsaw Pact was formally disbanded, having been rendered obsolete by the political transformation of Eastern Europe. Drawing on declassified archival documents, memoirs and published sources from the countries of the former Soviet bloc, this article provides a survey of the Warsaw Pact's final years and explains why the organisation ceased to exist in 1991. The article sets this process in the broader context of the reorientation of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. Because major changes in military structures and deployments can often take years to carry out, the Warsaw Pact was still largely intact by the time the upheavals of 1989 in Eastern Europe altered the entire political complexion of the Soviet bloc and undermined the raison d'être of the alliance. Despite Moscow's efforts in 1990 to preserve the Warsaw Pact and to convert it into a mainly political forum, the fate of the organisation was sealed by the events of 1989.
- 2 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-38
The Soviet Legacy and Moscow’s Disregard of International Humanitarian Law – The Wellsprings of Russian War Crimes in Ukraine 1
- 2 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-38
The Soviet Legacy and Moscow’s Disregard of International Humanitarian Law – The Wellsprings of Russian War Crimes in Ukraine 1
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 3-37
War crimes in Russia's invasion of Ukraine
This chapter discusses the Soviet legacy in Russian military policy and the historical wellsprings of the Russian Federation’s systematic disregard of international humanitarian law (IHL). Russia’s refusal to abide by IHL norms has been starkly evident in the war against Ukraine since February 2022, but the roots of Moscow’s intransigence go back long before that. At the end of 1991, the government of the newly independent Russian Federation pledged to comply with landmark documents of international humanitarian law, including the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols. However, in the years since then, the Russian armed forces have repeatedly committed war crimes and atrocities and have shown no willingness to uphold any of the basic norms of IHL. The Russian army’s disregard of IHL norms in its warfighting, including the invasion of Ukraine, is symptomatic of a larger problem. On many issues, the Russian government has undertaken binding commitments but then reneged on them.
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 3-37
War crimes in Russia's invasion of Ukraine
This chapter discusses the Soviet legacy in Russian military policy and the historical wellsprings of the Russian Federation’s systematic disregard of international humanitarian law (IHL). Russia’s refusal to abide by IHL norms has been starkly evident in the war against Ukraine since February 2022, but the roots of Moscow’s intransigence go back long before that. At the end of 1991, the government of the newly independent Russian Federation pledged to comply with landmark documents of international humanitarian law, including the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols. However, in the years since then, the Russian armed forces have repeatedly committed war crimes and atrocities and have shown no willingness to uphold any of the basic norms of IHL. The Russian army’s disregard of IHL norms in its warfighting, including the invasion of Ukraine, is symptomatic of a larger problem. On many issues, the Russian government has undertaken binding commitments but then reneged on them.
- 8 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Politics
- Vol. 62 (3) , 588-614
International borders and armed conflicts in Europe and Northeast Asia since 1945: the moral hazard of great-power encroachments
- 8 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Politics
- Vol. 62 (3) , 588-614
International borders and armed conflicts in Europe and Northeast Asia since 1945: the moral hazard of great-power encroachments
- 20 January 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy & Social Criticism
- Vol. 50 (4) , 651-673
Borders, states, and armed conflicts in Europe and Northeast Asia since 1945: The moral hazard of great-power encroachments
This article discusses the significance of international borders in Europe and Northeast Asia during the Cold War (1945–1989) and after. Using the concept of ‘moral hazard’, the article examines what happens when great powers frequently violate the borders of neighboring countries without suffering adverse repercussions. Norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity are viable only if large countries are willing to uphold them most of the time. The Soviet Union used or threatened to use military force against East European countries on numerous occasions (1953, 1956, 1968, and 1980–1981) with impunity. The Russian Federation adopted a broadly similar policy toward neighboring countries that had been republics of the Soviet Union until 1991. Russian forces in Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Belarus, and Ukraine served as instruments of Russian hegemony in those countries. Until 2014, Western governments made little or no effort to deter or counter Russian military encroachments in neighboring republics. By the principle of moral hazard, leaders in the Kremlin came to believe that they could act with a free hand in the former USSR.
- 20 January 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy & Social Criticism
- Vol. 50 (4) , 651-673
Borders, states, and armed conflicts in Europe and Northeast Asia since 1945: The moral hazard of great-power encroachments
This article discusses the significance of international borders in Europe and Northeast Asia during the Cold War (1945–1989) and after. Using the concept of ‘moral hazard’, the article examines what happens when great powers frequently violate the borders of neighboring countries without suffering adverse repercussions. Norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity are viable only if large countries are willing to uphold them most of the time. The Soviet Union used or threatened to use military force against East European countries on numerous occasions (1953, 1956, 1968, and 1980–1981) with impunity. The Russian Federation adopted a broadly similar policy toward neighboring countries that had been republics of the Soviet Union until 1991. Russian forces in Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Belarus, and Ukraine served as instruments of Russian hegemony in those countries. Until 2014, Western governments made little or no effort to deter or counter Russian military encroachments in neighboring republics. By the principle of moral hazard, leaders in the Kremlin came to believe that they could act with a free hand in the former USSR.
- 28 April 2023
- Published by Brill Deutschland GmbH in Russian History
- Vol. 49 (2-4) , 289-335
Official Responses to Ethnic Unrest in the USSR, 1985–1991
The Soviet Union, like the large, multiethnic land empires in Europe that came to an end in the early 20th century (Habsburg, Imperial Russian, Ottoman), consisted of a central government ruling over far-flung regions in which particular ethnic and cultural groups were predominant. For many years, Soviet leaders were able to maintain the internal stability of the multiethnic Soviet state by relying on a mix of extreme coercion and occasional concessions to local demands. Soon after Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985, he adopted sweeping political liberalization and democratization, including the first free elections ever held in the USSR. The loosening of political control in a state that had long been known for brutal repression had far-reaching consequences for social stability. The political opportunities that opened for ethnic groups in the Soviet Union to push for far-reaching change, including independence, created great difficulty for Gorbachev’s attempts to hold the Soviet Union together. Although he could have resorted to the use of large-scale violence as previous Soviet leaders had repeatedly done, he was deeply reluctant to cause mass bloodshed. His aversion to the use of mass repression was one of the key factors that precipitated the unraveling of the USSR. This article presents an in-depth analysis of Gorbachev’s responses to ethnic unrest in the Soviet Union from 1986 through 1991.
- 28 April 2023
- Published by Brill Deutschland GmbH in Russian History
- Vol. 49 (2-4) , 289-335
Official Responses to Ethnic Unrest in the USSR, 1985–1991
The Soviet Union, like the large, multiethnic land empires in Europe that came to an end in the early 20th century (Habsburg, Imperial Russian, Ottoman), consisted of a central government ruling over far-flung regions in which particular ethnic and cultural groups were predominant. For many years, Soviet leaders were able to maintain the internal stability of the multiethnic Soviet state by relying on a mix of extreme coercion and occasional concessions to local demands. Soon after Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985, he adopted sweeping political liberalization and democratization, including the first free elections ever held in the USSR. The loosening of political control in a state that had long been known for brutal repression had far-reaching consequences for social stability. The political opportunities that opened for ethnic groups in the Soviet Union to push for far-reaching change, including independence, created great difficulty for Gorbachev’s attempts to hold the Soviet Union together. Although he could have resorted to the use of large-scale violence as previous Soviet leaders had repeatedly done, he was deeply reluctant to cause mass bloodshed. His aversion to the use of mass repression was one of the key factors that precipitated the unraveling of the USSR. This article presents an in-depth analysis of Gorbachev’s responses to ethnic unrest in the Soviet Union from 1986 through 1991.
- 23 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 113-130
Autocratic Ideology as an Obstacle to Liberal Democratic Thought in Post-Soviet Russia
- 23 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 113-130
Autocratic Ideology as an Obstacle to Liberal Democratic Thought in Post-Soviet Russia
- 15 April 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Cold War History
- Vol. 11 (4) , 679-682
Prager Frühling: das internationale Krisenjahr 1968
- 15 April 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Cold War History
- Vol. 11 (4) , 679-682
Prager Frühling: das internationale Krisenjahr 1968
- 12 March 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 32 (2) , 39-61
The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia
(2009). The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia. The Washington Quarterly: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 39-61.
- 12 March 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 32 (2) , 39-61
The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia
(2009). The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia. The Washington Quarterly: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 39-61.