Giulia Cabbai
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Giulia Cabbai has a total of 41 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Carla Dance
School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK
3 shared publicationsJulia Simner
School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
3 shared publicationsSophie Forster
School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
3 shared publications- Carla Dance
School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
2 shared publications Jamie Ward
School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK; Sussex Neuroscience, School of Life Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
2 shared publications- Julia Simner
School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 November 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Not All Fakes Are Equally Ugly: The Anti-AI Bias in Aesthetic Judgment and the Role of Affect, Self-Relevance, and Authenticity
Art is devalued once it is attributed to artificial intelligence (AI). Whether this anti-AI bias is a generic penalty for non-original works or specific to the absence of a human author is unknown, as is how long it lasts. In a preregistered study, 324 participants rated 48 genuine human paintings, each presented as an Original, a human Forgery or AI-Generated, on beauty, valence, meaningfulness and monetary worth, then judged how synthetic (AI vs. human) and authentic (copy vs. original) each was. Forgeries were rated below Originals on every dimension, and AI-Generated works about twice as low, the AI-specific penalty falling most heavily on meaningfulness. The labels did not alter gaze, and their effects did not depend on the emotional content or personal relevance of the artworks. Artworks labelled AI-Generated were judged more synthetic and, less clearly, Forgeries less original, and the more beautiful an artwork, the more likely it was judged human-made, even when unlabelled. About six weeks later (n = 220), after learning that all artworks were human originals, participants no longer rated previously AI-labelled works as less beautiful. They had forgotten the labels but remembered what they had believed, and reconstructed the labels from these beliefs and their initial appraisal. The bias tracked attitudes toward AI, not interoceptive sensibility or visual imagery. The anti-AI bias thus combines a generic non-originality penalty with a penalty specific to the missing human author: it acts at the moment of judgment, yet leaves beliefs that outlast the memory of the label.
- 19 November 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessNot All Fakes Are Equally Ugly: The Anti-AI Bias in Aesthetic Judgment and the Role of Affect, Self-Relevance, and Authenticity
Art is devalued once it is attributed to artificial intelligence (AI). Whether this anti-AI bias is a generic penalty for non-original works or specific to the absence of a human author is unknown, as is how long it lasts. In a preregistered study, 324 participants rated 48 genuine human paintings, each presented as an Original, a human Forgery or AI-Generated, on beauty, valence, meaningfulness and monetary worth, then judged how synthetic (AI vs. human) and authentic (copy vs. original) each was. Forgeries were rated below Originals on every dimension, and AI-Generated works about twice as low, the AI-specific penalty falling most heavily on meaningfulness. The labels did not alter gaze, and their effects did not depend on the emotional content or personal relevance of the artworks. Artworks labelled AI-Generated were judged more synthetic and, less clearly, Forgeries less original, and the more beautiful an artwork, the more likely it was judged human-made, even when unlabelled. About six weeks later (n = 220), after learning that all artworks were human originals, participants no longer rated previously AI-labelled works as less beautiful. They had forgotten the labels but remembered what they had believed, and reconstructed the labels from these beliefs and their initial appraisal. The bias tracked attitudes toward AI, not interoceptive sensibility or visual imagery. The anti-AI bias thus combines a generic non-originality penalty with a penalty specific to the missing human author: it acts at the moment of judgment, yet leaves beliefs that outlast the memory of the label.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 June 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts
- Vol. 20 (3) , 623-645
Emotion, embodiment, and aesthetic appraisal: The impact of interoceptive abilities and art type.
- 1 June 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts
- Vol. 20 (3) , 623-645
Top Cited PapersEmotion, embodiment, and aesthetic appraisal: The impact of interoceptive abilities and art type.
- Open Access
- 21 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Vivid Imagery is Reported Faster than Weak Imagery
Visual imagery and external perception rely on similar representations. However, whether the same processes underpin the subjective appraisal of both percepts and mental images is not yet known. One well-known effect in perceptual detection tasks is that people take longer to report perceptions of absence compared to presence. Vividness reports are detection-like in that participants report the presence or absence of a mental image. We therefore asked whether reports of low vividness share commonalities with reports of target absence. Across five pre-existing datasets, we report a robust negative relationship between imagery vividness ratings and reaction times: participants take longer to report the vividness of mental images when they are weak. In addition, we tentatively find that individual differences in detection asymmetries and trait imagery can predict the strength of this vividness-response time relationship. Our results may be suggestive of a shared mechanism employed across both perception and imagery that evaluates the strength of visual experience. Future research is necessary to fully characterise the mechanisms driving this effect.
- 21 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessVivid Imagery is Reported Faster than Weak Imagery
Visual imagery and external perception rely on similar representations. However, whether the same processes underpin the subjective appraisal of both percepts and mental images is not yet known. One well-known effect in perceptual detection tasks is that people take longer to report perceptions of absence compared to presence. Vividness reports are detection-like in that participants report the presence or absence of a mental image. We therefore asked whether reports of low vividness share commonalities with reports of target absence. Across five pre-existing datasets, we report a robust negative relationship between imagery vividness ratings and reaction times: participants take longer to report the vividness of mental images when they are weak. In addition, we tentatively find that individual differences in detection asymmetries and trait imagery can predict the strength of this vividness-response time relationship. Our results may be suggestive of a shared mechanism employed across both perception and imagery that evaluates the strength of visual experience. Future research is necessary to fully characterise the mechanisms driving this effect.
- Open Access
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Current Biology
- Vol. 34 (21) , 5073-5082.e5
Sensory representations in primary visual cortex are not sufficient for subjective imagery
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Current Biology
- Vol. 34 (21) , 5073-5082.e5
Open AccessSensory representations in primary visual cortex are not sufficient for subjective imagery
- Open Access
- 26 February 2024
- Published by University of California Press in Collabra: Psychology
- Vol. 10 (1)
Investigating Relationships Between Trait Visual Imagery and Phenomenological Control: The Role of Context Effects
Phenomenological control is the ability to alter experience according to goals, measured by responses to imaginative suggestion. The capacity to create vivid mental imagery has been thought to contribute to generation of experiences following suggestions during hypnosis, but evidence is mixed. Moreover, no study has yet investigated this link outside of hypnosis. Across two studies (n = 639 and n = 66), we tested the relationship between imagery vividness and both non-hypnotic and hypnotic imaginative suggestion scales. Our samples included, for the first time, people lacking voluntary imagery (aphantasics). We also assessed this relationship following commonly used approaches to studying aphantasia (direct recruitment of self-reported aphantasics), versus those designed to minimize demand characteristics effects. We observed a weak positive relationship between imagery vividness and phenomenological control, with aphantasics being slightly lower in this trait than non-aphantasics. However, this effect was exaggerated among self-reported aphantasics, who scored lower on phenomenological control than samples experiencing imagery as well as aphantasics assessed via single-blind procedure. Our results have been certified as computationally reproducible by an independent statistician. We conclude that, while imagery may contribute to responding to imaginative suggestions, it is crucial to follow single-blind recruitment to reduce the effect of demand characteristics.
- 26 February 2024
- Published by University of California Press in Collabra: Psychology
- Vol. 10 (1)
Open AccessInvestigating Relationships Between Trait Visual Imagery and Phenomenological Control: The Role of Context Effects
Phenomenological control is the ability to alter experience according to goals, measured by responses to imaginative suggestion. The capacity to create vivid mental imagery has been thought to contribute to generation of experiences following suggestions during hypnosis, but evidence is mixed. Moreover, no study has yet investigated this link outside of hypnosis. Across two studies (n = 639 and n = 66), we tested the relationship between imagery vividness and both non-hypnotic and hypnotic imaginative suggestion scales. Our samples included, for the first time, people lacking voluntary imagery (aphantasics). We also assessed this relationship following commonly used approaches to studying aphantasia (direct recruitment of self-reported aphantasics), versus those designed to minimize demand characteristics effects. We observed a weak positive relationship between imagery vividness and phenomenological control, with aphantasics being slightly lower in this trait than non-aphantasics. However, this effect was exaggerated among self-reported aphantasics, who scored lower on phenomenological control than samples experiencing imagery as well as aphantasics assessed via single-blind procedure. Our results have been certified as computationally reproducible by an independent statistician. We conclude that, while imagery may contribute to responding to imaginative suggestions, it is crucial to follow single-blind recruitment to reduce the effect of demand characteristics.
- Open Access
Sensory representations in primary visual cortex are not sufficient for subjective imagery
The contemporary definition of mental imagery is characterized by two aspects: a sensory representation resembling, but not resulting from, perception, and an associated subjective experience. Neuroimaging demonstrated imagery-related sensory representations in primary visual cortex (V1) that show striking parallels to perception. However, it remains unclear whether these representations always reflect subjective experience, or they can be dissociated from it. We addressed this question by comparing sensory representations and subjective imagery among visualizers and aphantasics, the latter with an impaired ability to experience imagery. Importantly, to test for the presence of sensory representations independently of the ability to generate imagery on demand we examined both spontaneous and voluntary imagery forms. Using multivariate fMRI, we tested for decodable sensory representations in V1 and subjective visual imagery reports that occurred either spontaneously (during passive listening of evocative sounds) or in response to the instruction to voluntarily generate imagery of the sound content (always while blindfolded inside the scanner). Among aphantasics, V1 decoding of sound content was at chance during voluntary imagery, and lower than in visualizers, but it succeeded during passive listening, despite them reporting no imagery. In contrast, in visualizers, decoding accuracy in V1 was greater in voluntary than spontaneous imagery (while being positively associated with the reported vividness of both imagery types). Finally, for both conditions, decoding in precuneus was successful in visualizers but at chance for aphantasics. Together, our findings show that V1 representations can be dissociated from subjective imagery, while implicating a key role of precuneus in the latter.
Open AccessSensory representations in primary visual cortex are not sufficient for subjective imagery
The contemporary definition of mental imagery is characterized by two aspects: a sensory representation resembling, but not resulting from, perception, and an associated subjective experience. Neuroimaging demonstrated imagery-related sensory representations in primary visual cortex (V1) that show striking parallels to perception. However, it remains unclear whether these representations always reflect subjective experience, or they can be dissociated from it. We addressed this question by comparing sensory representations and subjective imagery among visualizers and aphantasics, the latter with an impaired ability to experience imagery. Importantly, to test for the presence of sensory representations independently of the ability to generate imagery on demand we examined both spontaneous and voluntary imagery forms. Using multivariate fMRI, we tested for decodable sensory representations in V1 and subjective visual imagery reports that occurred either spontaneously (during passive listening of evocative sounds) or in response to the instruction to voluntarily generate imagery of the sound content (always while blindfolded inside the scanner). Among aphantasics, V1 decoding of sound content was at chance during voluntary imagery, and lower than in visualizers, but it succeeded during passive listening, despite them reporting no imagery. In contrast, in visualizers, decoding accuracy in V1 was greater in voluntary than spontaneous imagery (while being positively associated with the reported vividness of both imagery types). Finally, for both conditions, decoding in precuneus was successful in visualizers but at chance for aphantasics. Together, our findings show that V1 representations can be dissociated from subjective imagery, while implicating a key role of precuneus in the latter.
- Open Access
- 3 September 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Emotion, Embodiment, and Aesthetic Appraisal: The Impact of Interoceptive Abilities and Art Type
Emotions are considered important in aesthetic experience. Given that emotions have bodily dimensions, it follows that interoception—the ability to perceive bodily signals accurately—may play a role in experiences of art. This raises the intriguing question of whether variation in interoceptive abilities relates to differences in art experience. We addressed this possibility across two studies that employed objective and subjective measures of interoceptive abilities. In Study 1, we examined the impact of objective interoceptive accuracy (IAc) and bodily changes (heart rate and skin conductance) while viewing art on participants’ appraisal and emotional response to abstract and representational artworks. IAc was positively related to participants' subjective emotional reactions to art, particularly in response to representational paintings, while no relationship was found for art appraisal. We also observed that heart rate change was higher for representational art. Moreover, for the first time, we found that skin conductance response was positively related to art appraisal and emotional response and did not differ by art type. In Study 2, we assessed the role of individual differences in self-reported interoception and emotion in participants’ experiences of art. As in Study 1, we found that individual differences were mainly related to ratings of emotional response, particularly for representational artworks. All in all, we propose that an interplay between artwork type, emotions, and interoceptive abilities plays a crucial role in the experience of art.
- 3 September 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessEmotion, Embodiment, and Aesthetic Appraisal: The Impact of Interoceptive Abilities and Art Type
Emotions are considered important in aesthetic experience. Given that emotions have bodily dimensions, it follows that interoception—the ability to perceive bodily signals accurately—may play a role in experiences of art. This raises the intriguing question of whether variation in interoceptive abilities relates to differences in art experience. We addressed this possibility across two studies that employed objective and subjective measures of interoceptive abilities. In Study 1, we examined the impact of objective interoceptive accuracy (IAc) and bodily changes (heart rate and skin conductance) while viewing art on participants’ appraisal and emotional response to abstract and representational artworks. IAc was positively related to participants' subjective emotional reactions to art, particularly in response to representational paintings, while no relationship was found for art appraisal. We also observed that heart rate change was higher for representational art. Moreover, for the first time, we found that skin conductance response was positively related to art appraisal and emotional response and did not differ by art type. In Study 2, we assessed the role of individual differences in self-reported interoception and emotion in participants’ experiences of art. As in Study 1, we found that individual differences were mainly related to ratings of emotional response, particularly for representational artworks. All in all, we propose that an interplay between artwork type, emotions, and interoceptive abilities plays a crucial role in the experience of art.