SSScott A. Smolka

Scott A. Smolka

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Scott A. Smolka has a total of 65 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    An STREL-based Formulation of Spatial Resilience in Cyber-Physical Systems

    by Zeyu Zhang, Hongkai Chen, Nicola Paoletti, Shan Lin, Scott A. Smolka

    Resiliency is the ability of a system to quickly recover from a violation (recoverability) and avoid future violations for as long as possible (durability). In the spatial setting, recoverability and durability (now known as persistency) are measured in units of distance. Like its temporal counterpart, spatial resiliency is of fundamental importance for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and yet, to date, there is no widely agreed-upon formal treatment of spatial resiliency. We present a formal framework for reasoning about spatial resiliency in CPS. Our framework is based on the spatial fragment of STREL, which we refer to as SREL. In this framework, spatial resiliency is given a syntactic characterization in the form of a Spatial Resiliency Specification (SpaRS). An atomic predicate of SpaRS is called an S-atom. Given an arbitrary SREL formula $\varphi$, distance bounds $d_1, d_2$, the S-atom of $\varphi$, $S_{d_1, d_2} (\varphi)$, is the SREL formula $\neg\varphi R_{[0,d_1]} (\varphi R_{[d_2, +\infty)}\varphi)$, specifying that recovery from a violation of $\varphi$ occurs within distance $d_1$ (recoverability), and subsequently that $\varphi$ be maintained along a route for a distance greater than $d_2$ (persistency). S-atoms can be combined using spatial STREL operators, allowing one to express composite resiliency specifications. We define a quantitative semantics for SpaRS in the form of a Spatial Resilience Value (SpaRV) function $σ$ and prove its soundness and completeness w.r.t. SREL's Boolean semantics. The $σ$-value for $S_{d_1,d_2}(\varphi)$ is a set of non-dominated (rec, per) pairs, quantifying recoverability and persistency, given that some routes may offer better recoverability while others better persistency. In addition, we design algorithms to evaluate SpaRV for SpaRS formulas. Finally, two case studies demonstrate the practical utility of our approach.

  • Open Access

    Cumulative-Time Signal Temporal Logic

    by Hongkai Chen, Zeyu Zhang, Shouvik Roy, Ezio Bartocci, Scott A. Smolka, Scott Stoller, Shan Lin

    Signal Temporal Logic (STL) is a widely adopted specification language for Cyber-Physical Systems that can be used to express critical temporal requirements, such as system safety and response time. STL’s expressivity, however, is not sufficient to capture the cumulative duration during which a property holds within an interval of time. To overcome this limitation, we introduce Cumulative-Time Signal Temporal Logic (CT-STL) which operates over discrete-time signals and extends STL with a new cumulative-time operator. This operator compares the sum of all timesteps for which its nested formula is true with a threshold. We present both a qualitative and a quantitative (robustness) semantics for CT-STL and prove the soundness and completeness of the robustness semantics. We also provide an efficient online monitoring algorithm for both semantics. We demonstrate the utility of CT-STL via two case studies: specifying and monitoring cumulative temporal requirements for a microgrid and an artificial pancreas.


  • Open Access

    Enhanced File System Testing through Input and Output Coverage

    by Yifei Liu, Geoff Kuenning, Kamal Parvez, Scott A. Smolka, Erez Zadok

  • Open Access

    A Barrier Certificate-Based Simplex Architecture for Systems With Approximate and Hybrid Dynamics

    by Amol Damare, Shouvik Roy, Roshan Sharma, Keith Dsouza, Scott A. Smolka, Scott D. Stoller

    This paper presents Barrier-based Simplex (Bb-Simplex), a new, provably correct design for runtime assurance of continuous dynamic systems. Bb-Simplex is centered around the Simplex control architecture, which consists of a high-performance advanced controller that is not guaranteed to maintain safety of the plant, a verified-safe baseline controller, and a decision module that switches control of the plant between the two controllers to ensure safety without sacrificing performance. In Bb-Simplex, Barrier certificates are used to prove that the baseline controller ensures safety. Furthermore, Bb-Simplex features a new automated method for deriving, from the barrier certificate, the conditions for switching between the controllers. Our method is based on the Taylor expansion of the barrier certificate and yields computationally inexpensive switching conditions. We also propose extensions to Bb-Simplex to enable its use in hybrid systems, which have multiple modes each with its own dynamics, and to support its use when only approximate dynamics (not exact dynamics) are available, for both continuous and hybrid dynamic systems. We consider significant applications of Bb-Simplex to microgrids featuring advanced controllers in the form of neural networks trained using reinforcement learning. These microgrids are modeled in RTDS, an industry-standard high-fidelity, real-time power systems simulator. Our results demonstrate that Bb-Simplex can automatically derive switching conditions for complex continuous and hybrid dynamic systems, the switching conditions are not overly conservative, and Bb-Simplex ensures safety even in the presence of adversarial attacks on the neural controller when only approximate dynamics (with an error bound) are available. Our experiments to evaluate conservativeness of the switching conditions show that switches from an unsafe advanced controller to a baseline controller occur on average only a few control periods before a safety violation would have occurred.


  • Open Access

    Cumulative-Time Signal Temporal Logic

    by Hongkai Chen, Zeyu Zhang, Shouvik Roy, Ezio Bartocci, Scott A. Smolka, Scott D. Stoller, Shan Lin

    Signal Temporal Logic (STL) is a widely adopted specification language in cyber-physical systems for expressing critical temporal requirements, such as safety conditions and response time. However, STL's expressivity is not sufficient to capture the cumulative duration during which a property holds within an interval of time. To overcome this limitation, we introduce Cumulative-Time Signal Temporal Logic (CT-STL) that operates over discrete-time signals and extends STL with a new cumulative-time operator. This operator compares the sum of all time steps for which its nested formula is true with a threshold. We present both a qualitative and a quantitative (robustness) semantics for CT-STL and prove both their soundness and completeness properties. We provide an efficient online monitoring algorithm for both semantics. Finally, we show the applicability of CT-STL in two case studies: specifying and monitoring cumulative temporal requirements for a microgrid and an artificial pancreas.

  • Two Decades of Industrializing Formal Verification: The Reactis Story

    by Rance Cleaveland, David Hansel, Steve Sims, Scott A. Smolka


  • The black-box simplex architecture for runtime assurance of multi-agent CPS

    by Sanaz Sheikhi, Usama Mehmood, Stanley Bak, Scott A. Smolka, Scott D. Stoller


  • Open Access

    Input and Output Coverage Needed in File System Testing

    by Yifei Liu, Gautam Ahuja, Geoff Kuenning, Scott Smolka, Erez Zadok

    File systems need testing to discover bugs and to help ensure reliability. Many file system testing tools are evaluated based on their code coverage. We analyzed recently reported bugs in Ext4 and BtrFS and found a weak correlation between code coverage and test effectiveness: many bugs are missed because they depend on specific inputs, even though the code was covered by a test suite. Our position is that coverage of system call inputs and outputs is critically important for testing file systems. We thus suggest input and output coverage as criteria for file system testing, and show how they can improve the effectiveness of testing. We built a prototype called IOCov to evaluate the input and output coverage of file system testing tools. IOCov identified many untested cases (specific inputs and outputs or ranges thereof) for both CrashMonkey and xfstests. Additionally, we discuss a method and associated metrics to identify over- and under-testing using IOCov.