Aniruddh Chandratre
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Aniruddh Chandratre has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Georgios Fainekos
Toyota NA R&D, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
2 shared publications - Giulia Pedrielli
Arizona State University, Tempe, USA
2 shared publications - Tanmay Khandait
School of Computing and Augments Intelligence, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, USA
2 shared publications - Tomas Hernandez Acosta
School of Computing and Augmented Intelligence, Arizona State University, USA
1 shared publication - Walstan Baptista
School of Computing and Augmented Intelligence, Arizona State University, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-8
Stealthy attacks formalized as STL formulas for Falsification of CPS Security
We propose a framework for security vulnerability analysis for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Our framework imposes only minimal assumptions on the structure of the CPS. Namely, we consider CPS with feedback control loops, state observers, and anomaly detection algorithms. Moreover, our framework does not require any knowledge about the dynamics or the algorithms used in the CPS. Under this common CPS architecture, we develop tools that can identify vulnerabilities in the system and their impact on the functionality of the CPS. We pose the CPS security problem as a falsification (or Search Based Test Generation (SBTG)) problem guided by security requirements expressed in Signal Temporal Logic (STL). We propose two different categories of security requirements encoded in STL: (1) detectability (stealthiness) and (2) effectiveness (impact on the CPS function). Finally, we demonstrate in simulation on an inverted pendulum and on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that both specifications are falsifiable using our SBTG techniques.
- 9 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-8
Open AccessStealthy attacks formalized as STL formulas for Falsification of CPS Security
We propose a framework for security vulnerability analysis for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Our framework imposes only minimal assumptions on the structure of the CPS. Namely, we consider CPS with feedback control loops, state observers, and anomaly detection algorithms. Moreover, our framework does not require any knowledge about the dynamics or the algorithms used in the CPS. Under this common CPS architecture, we develop tools that can identify vulnerabilities in the system and their impact on the functionality of the CPS. We pose the CPS security problem as a falsification (or Search Based Test Generation (SBTG)) problem guided by security requirements expressed in Signal Temporal Logic (STL). We propose two different categories of security requirements encoded in STL: (1) detectability (stealthiness) and (2) effectiveness (impact on the CPS function). Finally, we demonstrate in simulation on an inverted pendulum and on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that both specifications are falsifiable using our SBTG techniques.
- Open Access
- 9 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-2
Demo Abstract: Analysing CPS Security with Falsification on the Microsoft Flight Simulator | Proceedings of the 26th ACM International Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control
In the paper titled " Stealthy attacks formalized as STL formulas for Falsification of CPS Security", we investigate a broad class of attacks on the sensor and actuation blocks in the form of additive perturbation that impacts the measurement and control, respectively. In this demo, we demonstrate the usage of our framework and the underlying technologies along with a case study on aviation systems using Microsoft Flight Simulator (MSFS).
- 9 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-2
Open AccessDemo Abstract: Analysing CPS Security with Falsification on the Microsoft Flight Simulator | Proceedings of the 26th ACM International Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control
In the paper titled " Stealthy attacks formalized as STL formulas for Falsification of CPS Security", we investigate a broad class of attacks on the sensor and actuation blocks in the form of additive perturbation that impacts the measurement and control, respectively. In this demo, we demonstrate the usage of our framework and the underlying technologies along with a case study on aviation systems using Microsoft Flight Simulator (MSFS).