Lucianna Kiffer

We present the first longitudinal, cross-network measurement study of 36 public blockchain peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, spanning nine months from late 2024. We deployed 15 active crawlers with hourly connectivity probes, performed Internet-wide scans, and decomposed shared discovery substrates to identify 19 auxiliary networks. We find that active node counts span three orders of magnitude (10,000) and vary substantially in reachability, discovery coverage, and deployment structure. To characterize these differences, we quantify discovery effectiveness, churn dynamics, peer-table coverage, and AS- and geographic concentration (via the Herfindahl--Hirschman Index). Our results reveal pronounced heterogeneity in network structure and highlight fundamental observability limitations in widely deployed peer-discovery mechanisms. This extended abstract accompanies the full paper [10].

We present the first longitudinal, cross-network measurement study of 36 public blockchain peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, spanning nine months from late 2024. We deployed 15 active crawlers with hourly connectivity probes, performed Internet-wide scans, and decomposed shared discovery substrates to identify 19 auxiliary networks. We find that active node counts span three orders of magnitude (10,000) and vary substantially in reachability, discovery coverage, and deployment structure. To characterize these differences, we quantify discovery effectiveness, churn dynamics, peer-table coverage, and AS- and geographic concentration (via the Herfindahl--Hirschman Index). Our results reveal pronounced heterogeneity in network structure and highlight fundamental observability limitations in widely deployed peer-discovery mechanisms. This extended abstract accompanies the full paper [10].

Blockchain technologies underpin an expanding ecosystem of decentralized applications, financial systems, and infrastructure. However, the fundamental networking layer that sustains these systems, the peer-to-peer (P2P) layer, of all but the top few ecosystems remains largely opaque. In this paper, we present the first longitudinal, cross-network measurement study of 36 public blockchain networks. Over 9 months (since late 2024), we deployed 15 active crawlers, sourced data from two additional community crawlers, and conducted hourly connectivity probes (e.g., pings and protocol-level handshakes) to observe the evolving state of these networks. Furthermore, by leveraging Ethereum's discovery protocols, we inferred metadata for an additional 19 auxiliary networks that utilize the Ethereum peer discovery protocol. We also explored Internet-wide scans, which only require probing each protocol's default ports with a simple, network-specific payload. This approach allows us to rapidly identify responsive peers across the entire address space without having to implement custom discovery and handshake logic for every blockchain. We validated this method on Bitcoin and similar networks with known ground truth, then applied it to Cardano, which we could not crawl directly. Our study uncovers dramatic variation in network size from under 10 to more than 10,000 active nodes. We quantify trends in IPv4 versus IPv6 usage, analyze autonomous systems and geographic concentration, and characterize churn, diurnal behavior, and the coverage and redundancy of discovery protocols. These findings expose critical differences in network resilience, decentralization, and observability. Beyond characterizing each network, our methodology demonstrates a general framework for measuring decentralized networks at scale. This opens the door for continued monitoring, benchmarking, and more transparent assessments of blockchain infrastructure across diverse ecosystems.

Blockchain technologies underpin an expanding ecosystem of decentralized applications, financial systems, and infrastructure. However, the fundamental networking layer that sustains these systems, the peer-to-peer layer, of all but the top few ecosystems remains largely opaque. In this paper, we present the first longitudinal, cross-network measurement study of 36 public blockchain networks. Over 9 months, we deployed 15 active crawlers, sourced data from two additional community crawlers, and conducted hourly connectivity probes to observe the evolving state of these networks. Furthermore, by leveraging Ethereum's discovery protocols, we inferred metadata for an additional 19 auxiliary networks that utilize the Ethereum peer discovery protocol. We also explored Internet-wide scans, which only require probing each protocol's default ports with a simple, network-specific payload. This approach allows us to rapidly identify responsive peers across the entire address space without having to implement custom discovery and handshake logic for every blockchain. We validated this method on Bitcoin and similar networks with known ground truth, then applied it to Cardano, which we could not crawl directly. Our study uncovers dramatic variation in network size from under 10 to more than 10,000 active nodes. We quantify trends in IPv4 versus IPv6 usage, analyze autonomous systems and geographic concentration, and characterize churn, diurnal behavior, and the coverage and redundancy of discovery protocols. These findings expose critical differences in network resilience, decentralization, and observability. Beyond characterizing each network, our methodology demonstrates a general framework for measuring decentralized networks at scale. This opens the door for continued monitoring, benchmarking, and more transparent assessments of blockchain infrastructure across diverse ecosystems.

For Nakamoto's longest-chain consensus protocol, whose proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS) variants power major blockchains such as Bitcoin and Cardano, we revisit the classic problem of the security--performance tradeoff: Given a network of nodes with finite communication- and computation-resources, against what fraction of adversary power is Nakamoto consensus (NC) secure for a given block production rate? State-of-the-art analyses of NC fail to answer this question, because their bounded-delay model does not capture the rate limits to nodes' processing of blocks, which cause congestion when blocks are released in quick succession. We develop a new analysis technique to prove a refined security--performance tradeoff for PoW NC in a bounded-capacity model. In this model, we show that, in contrast to the classic bounded-delay model, Nakamoto's private attack is no longer the worst attack, and a new attack we call the teasing strategy, that exploits congestion, is strictly worse. In PoS, equivocating blocks can exacerbate congestion, making traditional PoS NC insecure except at very low block production rates. To counter such equivocation spamming, we present a variant of PoS NC we call Blanking NC (BlaNC), which achieves the same resilience as PoW NC.