Gaodan Deng

Based on the perspective of joint operation between coal power enterprises and new energy power enterprises (JOCN), this paper constructs an evolutionary game model among coal power enterprises (CPEs), new energy power enterprises (NEPEs) and the government, and analyzes the influencing factors of the final strategy choices of various subjects through evolutionary simulation. The results show that: (1) The game among CPEs, NEPEs and the government in JOCN is a win–win game. (2) The probability of CPEs choosing to participate in the joint operation is positively correlated with additional operating income, government subsidies and environmental costs in coal power generation, while negatively correlated with additional operating costs and spillover effects. (3) The probability of NEPEs choosing to participate in the joint operation is positively correlated with additional operating income, government subsidies and the cost of power loss in new energy power generation, while negatively correlated with additional operating costs and spillover effects. (4) The probability of the government choosing to support joint operation is positively correlated with social welfare, and negatively correlated with the cost of governmental strict supervision. The research results can provide theoretical reference for enterprises and the government in the future transformations and policy formulation.

The wind power price policy has promoted the rapid development of the wind power industry in China. However, China’s wind power industry is facing high-quality development problems such as wind curtailment and blind investment. Exploring the relationship between the change in wind power price policy and China’s high-quality development of wind power is of great significance for the energy system to achieve carbon neutrality. This paper constructs an SBM-GML global covariance model, calculates the total factor productivity of wind power in 30 provinces in China from 2015 to 2019 and conducts index decomposition, and selects provincial panel data from 2015 to 2019 to empirically test the impact of the wind power price policy on the total factor productivity of wind power in China. The results show that the wind power price policy can significantly improve the total factor productivity of wind power, and the results of the endogenous test and robustness test show the effectiveness of the model. The wind power price policy is helpful to promote the technological progress of wind power, affect the reduction of the price difference between wind power benchmark price and coal power benchmark price, and then promote the improvement of wind power total factor productivity so as to meet the policy requirements of wind power full grid parity. In addition, the impact of wind power price policy on the total factor productivity of wind power has obvious regional heterogeneity. Future price policy formulation should clarify industry development expectations, consider regional differences, and establish a sound, market-oriented electricity pricing mechanism.