Helen Callaghan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Helen Callaghan has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Martin Höpner
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln, Deutschland
2 shared publications Alexandra Hees
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 13 August 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 275-302
„Nation“ und „Markt“ als Legitimationsgrundlagen im politischen Diskurs
- 13 August 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 275-302
„Nation“ und „Markt“ als Legitimationsgrundlagen im politischen Diskurs
- 17 February 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Socio-Economic Review
- Vol. 13 (2) , 331-350
Who cares about financialization? Self-reinforcing feedback, issue salience, and increasing acquiescence to market-enabling takeover rules
Financialization requires a regulatory framework that allows markets to emerge and expand. What explains growing political acquiescence to relevant market-enabling rules? The present article identifies feedback processes whereby such rules lock in over time. First, as markets expand, market proponents grow more numerous and develop increasing stakes. Second, potential challengers find it increasingly difficult to mobilize protest, because routinization reduces salience and because market exposure renders protesters more vulnerable. Third, potential challengers lose incentives to protest, because market exposure eliminates some non-market structures that inspire defensive action, and because ‘constrain-thy-neighbor’ dynamics encourage the further spread of market-enabling rules as a means of self-defense. The case of market-enabling takeover regulation in Britain since the 1950s illustrates how these processes gradually changed the preferences and resources of bankers, institutional investors, corporate managers and employees and thereby help explain why parliamentary interest in market-restraining counter-measures grew weaker over time.
- 17 February 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Socio-Economic Review
- Vol. 13 (2) , 331-350
Who cares about financialization? Self-reinforcing feedback, issue salience, and increasing acquiescence to market-enabling takeover rules
Financialization requires a regulatory framework that allows markets to emerge and expand. What explains growing political acquiescence to relevant market-enabling rules? The present article identifies feedback processes whereby such rules lock in over time. First, as markets expand, market proponents grow more numerous and develop increasing stakes. Second, potential challengers find it increasingly difficult to mobilize protest, because routinization reduces salience and because market exposure renders protesters more vulnerable. Third, potential challengers lose incentives to protest, because market exposure eliminates some non-market structures that inspire defensive action, and because ‘constrain-thy-neighbor’ dynamics encourage the further spread of market-enabling rules as a means of self-defense. The case of market-enabling takeover regulation in Britain since the 1950s illustrates how these processes gradually changed the preferences and resources of bankers, institutional investors, corporate managers and employees and thereby help explain why parliamentary interest in market-restraining counter-measures grew weaker over time.
- 16 April 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 35 (3) , 551-573
Changing Ideas: Organised Capitalism and the German Left
What determines party positions on issues of economic governance? Most previous research has pointed either to the presumed material interests of the parties' clienteles, or to the political institutions that shape electoral competition. Both approaches do well in explaining cross-national variation, but neither can adequately account for changes over time. This article documents German Social Democrats' policy preferences and the underlying discourse on organised capitalism from 1880 onward to highlight the crucial role of historical context. The interests reflected in party positions cannot simply be read off the material environment. Instead, as suggested by constructivist work on preference formation, they depend on theories regarding the causal effect of alterative policy measures. Following Peter Hall, we treat the evolution of such theories as a ‘process structured in space and time’, by illustrating how ‘context factors’ affect the relative salience of the multiple considerations pertaining to organised capital.
- 16 April 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 35 (3) , 551-573
Changing Ideas: Organised Capitalism and the German Left
What determines party positions on issues of economic governance? Most previous research has pointed either to the presumed material interests of the parties' clienteles, or to the political institutions that shape electoral competition. Both approaches do well in explaining cross-national variation, but neither can adequately account for changes over time. This article documents German Social Democrats' policy preferences and the underlying discourse on organised capitalism from 1880 onward to highlight the crucial role of historical context. The interests reflected in party positions cannot simply be read off the material environment. Instead, as suggested by constructivist work on preference formation, they depend on theories regarding the causal effect of alterative policy measures. Following Peter Hall, we treat the evolution of such theories as a ‘process structured in space and time’, by illustrating how ‘context factors’ affect the relative salience of the multiple considerations pertaining to organised capital.
- 18 May 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 17 (4) , 564-580
Beyond methodological nationalism: how multilevel governance affects the clash of capitalisms
This article challenges the methodological nationalism of the convergence debate by arguing that multilevel governance destabilizes the coalitions thought to underpin liberal and co-ordinated varieties of capitalism. Many attempts to explain how coherent production regimes emerge and persist assume that some dominant social bloc ensures coherence by imposing its interests across all relevant regulatory subspheres. This assumption is not tenable in systems of multilevel governance. Three features of multilevel governance diminish the scope for a homogenous social bloc to ensure a tight coupling of complementary regulations. First, the incentives for interest groups to unite at the transnational level vary across regulatory subspheres, because the transnational scope of legislation adds a ‘constrain-thy-neighbour’ dimension to actors' decision-making that may either strengthen or weaken interest group cohesion. Second, the strategic opportunities for playing multilevel games vary across subspheres. Third, the institutional set-up at the supranational level of Europe's multilevel polity reduces the capacity of state actors to impose coherence from above. To illustrate these claims, the article draws on case studies of EU legislative initiatives concerning takeovers and worker participation.
- 18 May 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 17 (4) , 564-580
Beyond methodological nationalism: how multilevel governance affects the clash of capitalisms
This article challenges the methodological nationalism of the convergence debate by arguing that multilevel governance destabilizes the coalitions thought to underpin liberal and co-ordinated varieties of capitalism. Many attempts to explain how coherent production regimes emerge and persist assume that some dominant social bloc ensures coherence by imposing its interests across all relevant regulatory subspheres. This assumption is not tenable in systems of multilevel governance. Three features of multilevel governance diminish the scope for a homogenous social bloc to ensure a tight coupling of complementary regulations. First, the incentives for interest groups to unite at the transnational level vary across regulatory subspheres, because the transnational scope of legislation adds a ‘constrain-thy-neighbour’ dimension to actors' decision-making that may either strengthen or weaken interest group cohesion. Second, the strategic opportunities for playing multilevel games vary across subspheres. Third, the institutional set-up at the supranational level of Europe's multilevel polity reduces the capacity of state actors to impose coherence from above. To illustrate these claims, the article draws on case studies of EU legislative initiatives concerning takeovers and worker participation.
- 29 March 2010
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 44 (7) , 910-931
Constrain-Thy-Neighbor Effects as a Determinant of Transnational Interest Group Cohesion
Why does the willingness of interest groups to join forces with their peers abroad vary across issues? The present article points to cross-issue variation in the “constrain-thy-neighbor” effects of transnational law. Interest groups consider not only whether they are worse off if they themselves are subjected to a transnational law. They also consider how it affects them if the same law applies abroad. Depending on the issue, they derive advantages or disadvantages from seeing their neighbors constrained, and this affects their willingness to fight transnational legislation on that issue. To illustrate the argument, the article compares cohesion within the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the European peak employer federation, on two aspects of EU company law. UNICE members were divided over EU takeover directives while uniting against EU worker participation directives. Statements released by German and British UNICE members show that the divergent constrain-thy-neighbor effect associated with these issues contributed to variation in cohesion.
- 29 March 2010
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 44 (7) , 910-931
Constrain-Thy-Neighbor Effects as a Determinant of Transnational Interest Group Cohesion
Why does the willingness of interest groups to join forces with their peers abroad vary across issues? The present article points to cross-issue variation in the “constrain-thy-neighbor” effects of transnational law. Interest groups consider not only whether they are worse off if they themselves are subjected to a transnational law. They also consider how it affects them if the same law applies abroad. Depending on the issue, they derive advantages or disadvantages from seeing their neighbors constrained, and this affects their willingness to fight transnational legislation on that issue. To illustrate the argument, the article compares cohesion within the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the European peak employer federation, on two aspects of EU company law. UNICE members were divided over EU takeover directives while uniting against EU worker participation directives. Statements released by German and British UNICE members show that the divergent constrain-thy-neighbor effect associated with these issues contributed to variation in cohesion.
- 24 August 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 3 (3) , 307-332
European Integration and the Clash of Capitalisms: Political Cleavages over Takeover Liberalization
- 24 August 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 3 (3) , 307-332
European Integration and the Clash of Capitalisms: Political Cleavages over Takeover Liberalization