APAnna Pätschke

Anna Pätschke

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Anna Pätschke has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Obelix: Mitigating Side-Channels Through Dynamic Obfuscation

    by Jan Wichelmann, Anja Rabich, Anna Patschke, Thomas Eisenbarth

    Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer hardware-assisted means to protect code and data. However, as shown in numerous results over the years, attackers can use side-channels to leak data access patterns and even single-step the code. While the vendors are slowly introducing hardware-based countermeasures for some attacks, others will stay unaddressed. This makes a software-level countermeasure desirable, but current available solutions only address very specific attack vectors or have a narrow leakage model. In this work, we take a holistic view at the vulnerabilities of TEEs and design a tool named Obelix, which is the first to protect both code and data against a wide range of TEE attacks, from cache attacks over single-stepping to ciphertext side-channels. We analyze the practically achievable precision of state-of-the-art single-stepping tools, and present an algorithm which uses that knowledge to divide a program into uniform code blocks, that are indistinguishable for a strong attacker. By storing these blocks and the program data in oblivious RAM, the attacker cannot follow execution, effectively protecting both secret code and data. We describe how we automate our approach to make it available for developers who are unfamiliar with side-channels. As an obfuscation tool, Obelix comes with a considerable performance overhead, but compensates this with strong security guarantees and easy applicability without requiring any expert knowledge.

  • Open Access

    MAMBO-V: Dynamic Side-Channel Leakage Analysis on RISC-V

    by Jan Wichelmann, Christopher Peredy, Florian Sieck, Anna Pätschke, Thomas Eisenbarth

    RISC-V is an emerging technology, with applications ranging from embedded devices to high-performance servers. Therefore, more and more security-critical workloads will be conducted with code that is compiled for RISC-V. Well-known microarchitectural side-channel attacks against established platforms like x86 apply to RISC-V CPUs as well. As RISC-V does not mandate any hardware-based side-channel countermeasures, a piece of code compiled for a generic RISC-V CPU in a cloud server cannot make safe assumptions about the microarchitecture on which it is running. Existing tools for aiding software-level precautions by checking side-channel vulnerabilities on source code or x86 binaries are not compatible with RISC-V machine code. In this work, we study the requirements and goals of architecture-specific leakage analysis for RISC-V and illustrate how to achieve these goals with the help of fast and precise dynamic binary analysis. We implement all necessary building blocks for finding side-channel leakages on RISC-V, while relying on existing mature solutions when possible. Our leakage analysis builds upon the modular side-channel analysis framework Microwalk, that examines execution traces for leakage through secret-dependent memory accesses or branches. To provide suitable traces, we port the ARM dynamic binary instrumentation tool MAMBO to RISC-V. Our port named MAMBO-V can instrument arbitrary binaries which use the 64-bit general purpose instruction set. We evaluate our toolchain on several cryptographic libraries with RISC-V support and identify multiple exploitable leakages.

  • MAMBO–V: Dynamic Side-Channel Leakage Analysis on RISC–V

    by Jan Wichelmann, Christopher Peredy, Florian Sieck, Anna Pätschke, Thomas Eisenbarth


  • Open Access

    Cipherfix: Mitigating Ciphertext Side-Channel Attacks in Software

    by Jan Wichelmann, Anna Pätschke, Luca Wilke, Thomas Eisenbarth

    Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-assisted security guarantees. However, main memory encryption as a key mechanism to protect against system-level attackers trying to read the TEE's content and physical, off-chip attackers, is insufficient. The recent Cipherleaks attacks infer secret data from TEE-protected implementations by analyzing ciphertext patterns exhibited due to deterministic memory encryption. The underlying vulnerability, dubbed the ciphertext side-channel, is neither protected by state-of-the-art countermeasures like constant-time code nor by hardware fixes. Thus, in this paper, we present a software-based, drop-in solution that can harden existing binaries such that they can be safely executed under TEEs vulnerable to ciphertext side-channels, without requiring recompilation. We combine taint tracking with both static and dynamic binary instrumentation to find sensitive memory locations, and mitigate the leakage by masking secret data before it gets written to memory. This way, although the memory encryption remains deterministic, we destroy any secret-dependent patterns in encrypted memory. We show that our proof-of-concept implementation protects various constant-time implementations against ciphertext side-channels with reasonable overhead.