Burak Uras
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Burak Uras has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Haki Pamuk
Wageningen University & Research
3 shared publications Ravindra Ramrattan
3 shared publicationsThorsten Beck
Cass Business School City University London 106 Bunhill Row London EC1Y 8TZ UK
3 shared publications- Daan P. van Soest
Tilburg University
2 shared publications - Francesco Carli
Deakin University
2 shared publications Haki Pamuk
Wageningen Economic Research, Wageningen University and Research, 6706 KN Wageningen, Netherlands
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 11 (2) , 270-278
Asymmetric group loan contracts: experimental evidence
We design an experiment to study the effect of asymmetry in the context of group lending with joint liability. The performance of group loan contracts crucially hinges on borrowers engaging in peer monitoring and the common practice is to offer participants of a group loan symmetric contract terms. Our experiment shows that asymmetric contracts, in which monitoring is a dominant strategy for one borrower, increase the monitoring rate, and thus the repayment rate, without leaving borrowers substantially worse off. In addition, asymmetric contracting also raises expected profits of the lending institution. Overall, our experiment reveals that asymmetric group loan contracts are worth considering as part of a policy to maintain both financial stability and higher lender profits.
- 27 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 11 (2) , 270-278
Open AccessAsymmetric group loan contracts: experimental evidence
We design an experiment to study the effect of asymmetry in the context of group lending with joint liability. The performance of group loan contracts crucially hinges on borrowers engaging in peer monitoring and the common practice is to offer participants of a group loan symmetric contract terms. Our experiment shows that asymmetric contracts, in which monitoring is a dominant strategy for one borrower, increase the monitoring rate, and thus the repayment rate, without leaving borrowers substantially worse off. In addition, asymmetric contracting also raises expected profits of the lending institution. Overall, our experiment reveals that asymmetric group loan contracts are worth considering as part of a policy to maintain both financial stability and higher lender profits.
- 1 April 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (4) , 2590-2625
Electronic Payment Technology and Business Finance: A Randomized, Controlled Trial with Mobile Money
We conducted a randomized, controlled trial with small- and medium-sized enterprises in Kenya to estimate the causal impact of an electronic payment (e-payment) technology on business finance. Using an encouragement design, we exogenously increased e-payment usage among a random subset of firms by relaxing adoption transaction costs and information barriers. Sixteen months after the intervention, we find that the e-payment technology increased access to mobile loans (in the number of loans as well as in the amount borrowed) by at least 50% (0.17 standard deviation), likely because of the reduction of information asymmetries brought by an increase in digital transactions. We find no effect of the e-payment technology on sales and profits, but we do find a reduction of sales volatility and precautionary investment, especially for smaller firms. This suggests that mobile loans help smaller firms cope with short-term negative shocks. We provide a stylized model of business finance that rationalizes these findings. This paper was accepted by Bruno Biais, finance. Funding: This paper was produced under the framework of the “Enabling Innovation and Productivity Growth in Low Income Countries (EIP-LIC/PO5639)” project, funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom and implemented by Tilburg University. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4821 .
- 1 April 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (4) , 2590-2625
Electronic Payment Technology and Business Finance: A Randomized, Controlled Trial with Mobile Money
We conducted a randomized, controlled trial with small- and medium-sized enterprises in Kenya to estimate the causal impact of an electronic payment (e-payment) technology on business finance. Using an encouragement design, we exogenously increased e-payment usage among a random subset of firms by relaxing adoption transaction costs and information barriers. Sixteen months after the intervention, we find that the e-payment technology increased access to mobile loans (in the number of loans as well as in the amount borrowed) by at least 50% (0.17 standard deviation), likely because of the reduction of information asymmetries brought by an increase in digital transactions. We find no effect of the e-payment technology on sales and profits, but we do find a reduction of sales volatility and precautionary investment, especially for smaller firms. This suggests that mobile loans help smaller firms cope with short-term negative shocks. We provide a stylized model of business finance that rationalizes these findings. This paper was accepted by Bruno Biais, finance. Funding: This paper was produced under the framework of the “Enabling Innovation and Productivity Growth in Low Income Countries (EIP-LIC/PO5639)” project, funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom and implemented by Tilburg University. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4821 .
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Money, E-money, and Consumer Welfare
We develop a micro-founded monetary model to inquire the role of a privately provided e-money instrument for household consumption smoothing and welfare. Different from fiat money, e-money users pay electronic transaction fees, but in turn e-money reduces spatial separation frictions and enables risk-sharing. We characterize the conditions that promotes e-money to be Pareto improving and the conditions when e-money reduces its users’ welfare - despite for the consumption-smoothing it induces. We calibrate our model for the context of M-Pesa in Kenya and conduct a quantitative analysis. Since our quantitative analysis reveals a limited role for privately provided e-money, we recommend the optimality of e-money regulation.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMoney, E-money, and Consumer Welfare
We develop a micro-founded monetary model to inquire the role of a privately provided e-money instrument for household consumption smoothing and welfare. Different from fiat money, e-money users pay electronic transaction fees, but in turn e-money reduces spatial separation frictions and enables risk-sharing. We characterize the conditions that promotes e-money to be Pareto improving and the conditions when e-money reduces its users’ welfare - despite for the consumption-smoothing it induces. We calibrate our model for the context of M-Pesa in Kenya and conduct a quantitative analysis. Since our quantitative analysis reveals a limited role for privately provided e-money, we recommend the optimality of e-money regulation.
- Open Access
- 13 February 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 19 (5) , 2622-2657
Curating Local Knowledge: Experimental Evidence from Small Retailers in Indonesia
Business practices and performance vary widely across businesses within the same sector. A key outstanding question is why profitable practices do not readily diffuse. We conduct a field experiment among urban retailers in Indonesia to study whether alleviating informational and behavioral frictions can facilitate such diffusion in a cost-effective manner. Through quantitative and qualitative fieldwork, we curate a handbook that associates locally relevant practices with performance, and provides idiosyncratic implementation guidance informed by exemplary local retailers. We complement this handbook with two light-touch interventions to facilitate behavior change. A subset of retailers is invited to a documentary movie screening featuring the paths to success of exemplary peers. Another subset is offered two 30-minute personal visits by a local facilitator. A third group is offered both. Eighteen months later, we find significant impacts on practice adoption when the handbook is coupled with the two behavioral nudges, and up to a 35% increase in profits and 16.7% increase in sales. These findings suggest both informational and behavioral constraints are at play. The types of practices adopted map the performance improvements to efficiency gains rather than other channels. A simple cost–benefit analysis shows such locally relevant knowledge can be codified and scaled successfully at relatively low cost.
- 13 February 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 19 (5) , 2622-2657
Open AccessCurating Local Knowledge: Experimental Evidence from Small Retailers in Indonesia
Business practices and performance vary widely across businesses within the same sector. A key outstanding question is why profitable practices do not readily diffuse. We conduct a field experiment among urban retailers in Indonesia to study whether alleviating informational and behavioral frictions can facilitate such diffusion in a cost-effective manner. Through quantitative and qualitative fieldwork, we curate a handbook that associates locally relevant practices with performance, and provides idiosyncratic implementation guidance informed by exemplary local retailers. We complement this handbook with two light-touch interventions to facilitate behavior change. A subset of retailers is invited to a documentary movie screening featuring the paths to success of exemplary peers. Another subset is offered two 30-minute personal visits by a local facilitator. A third group is offered both. Eighteen months later, we find significant impacts on practice adoption when the handbook is coupled with the two behavioral nudges, and up to a 35% increase in profits and 16.7% increase in sales. These findings suggest both informational and behavioral constraints are at play. The types of practices adopted map the performance improvements to efficiency gains rather than other channels. A simple cost–benefit analysis shows such locally relevant knowledge can be codified and scaled successfully at relatively low cost.
- Open Access
- 6 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Transparency and Financial Inclusion: Experimental Evidence from Mobile Money
Electronic payment instruments have the potential to spur the transparency of business transactions and thereby reduce information frictions. We design a field experiment to understand whether e-payments facilitate the financial inclusion of SMEs in developing world and to study adoption barriers. We encourage a random sample of Kenyan merchants to adopt a new mobile-money payment instrument and find that the decision to adopt is hampered by the combination of information, know-how and seemingly small transaction costs barriers. In addition, we find that business owners who are more averse to transparency are more reluctant to adopt. Sixteen months after the intervention, we observe that treated firms have better access to finance in the form of mobile loans. The impact on financial access is more pronounced for smaller establishments, which also experience a considerable reduction in sales volatility. We conclude that e-payments can help un-collateralized firms become transparent and get financially integrated.
- 6 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTransparency and Financial Inclusion: Experimental Evidence from Mobile Money
Electronic payment instruments have the potential to spur the transparency of business transactions and thereby reduce information frictions. We design a field experiment to understand whether e-payments facilitate the financial inclusion of SMEs in developing world and to study adoption barriers. We encourage a random sample of Kenyan merchants to adopt a new mobile-money payment instrument and find that the decision to adopt is hampered by the combination of information, know-how and seemingly small transaction costs barriers. In addition, we find that business owners who are more averse to transparency are more reluctant to adopt. Sixteen months after the intervention, we observe that treated firms have better access to finance in the form of mobile loans. The impact on financial access is more pronounced for smaller establishments, which also experience a considerable reduction in sales volatility. We conclude that e-payments can help un-collateralized firms become transparent and get financially integrated.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Macroeconomic Dynamics
- Vol. 23 (4) , 1401-1441
UNBUNDLING FINANCIAL IMPERFECTIONS: LENDING FRICTIONS VS. TRADING FRICTIONS
Two essential imperfections determine the degree of the financial sector development in an economy: lending frictions, which constrain the ability to extend loans to borrowers; and, trading frictions, which constrain the trading of these loans in secondary markets. I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where long-term investment is the engine of growth to study macroeconomic consequences of financial development. In the model, long-term loans are extended to entrepreneurs in a primary market and then traded in a secondary market among financiers. In competitive equilibria, reductions in either lending or trading frictions enlarge the financial sector. Although financial deepening through low-cost lending is always welfare improving, financial deepening stimulated by low-cost trading could be detrimental to the society. I illustrate that a model qualitatively consistent with the U.S. financial development episode of the last 30 years should exhibit disproportionately large reductions in trading frictions relative to lending frictions.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Macroeconomic Dynamics
- Vol. 23 (4) , 1401-1441
UNBUNDLING FINANCIAL IMPERFECTIONS: LENDING FRICTIONS VS. TRADING FRICTIONS
Two essential imperfections determine the degree of the financial sector development in an economy: lending frictions, which constrain the ability to extend loans to borrowers; and, trading frictions, which constrain the trading of these loans in secondary markets. I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where long-term investment is the engine of growth to study macroeconomic consequences of financial development. In the model, long-term loans are extended to entrepreneurs in a primary market and then traded in a secondary market among financiers. In competitive equilibria, reductions in either lending or trading frictions enlarge the financial sector. Although financial deepening through low-cost lending is always welfare improving, financial deepening stimulated by low-cost trading could be detrimental to the society. I illustrate that a model qualitatively consistent with the U.S. financial development episode of the last 30 years should exhibit disproportionately large reductions in trading frictions relative to lending frictions.
- Open Access
- 23 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Efficient Lemons
We show that asset opacity can improve the efficiency of investment in the economy. We consider a model where underinvestment arises from speculative cash-hoardings aiming to benefit from fire-sale prices. Whereas opacity provides no benefit to asset originators in the case of isolated liquidations, this is not the case when collective liquidations lead to fire-sale prices ("cash-in-the market" pricing). As cash-in-the-market prices are set to reflect shortages of liquidity and not expected asset quality, originators can sell low quality assets opportunistically. This raises the ex-ante benefit from asset origination and reduces liquidity hoarding. The model suggests that a "seemingly undesirable" feature at the asset level can improve economic efficiency, due to a general equilibrium effect.
- 23 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEfficient Lemons
We show that asset opacity can improve the efficiency of investment in the economy. We consider a model where underinvestment arises from speculative cash-hoardings aiming to benefit from fire-sale prices. Whereas opacity provides no benefit to asset originators in the case of isolated liquidations, this is not the case when collective liquidations lead to fire-sale prices ("cash-in-the market" pricing). As cash-in-the-market prices are set to reflect shortages of liquidity and not expected asset quality, originators can sell low quality assets opportunistically. This raises the ex-ante benefit from asset origination and reduces liquidity hoarding. The model suggests that a "seemingly undesirable" feature at the asset level can improve economic efficiency, due to a general equilibrium effect.
- 10 January 2017
- Published by Wiley in Review of Development Economics
- Vol. 21 (4) , 1205-1228
Entrepreneurial Saving Practices and Reinvestment: Theory and Evidence
We use a novel enterprise survey to gauge the relationship between saving instruments and entrepreneurial reinvestment. We show that while most informal saving practices are not associated with a lower likelihood of reinvestment when compared with formal saving practices, there is a significantly lower association of saving within the household with the likelihood of reinvesting profits than other savings form, most importantly, formal saving forms. This result is robust to the model specification and controlling for a large array of variables including district‐level fixed effects. We also provide empirical tests to address reverse causation and omitted variable concerns. Our work contributes to the debate on the implications of different saving instruments in developing countries and expands the entrepreneurial financing constraints literature by focusing on internal rather than external funding constraints.
- 10 January 2017
- Published by Wiley in Review of Development Economics
- Vol. 21 (4) , 1205-1228
Entrepreneurial Saving Practices and Reinvestment: Theory and Evidence
We use a novel enterprise survey to gauge the relationship between saving instruments and entrepreneurial reinvestment. We show that while most informal saving practices are not associated with a lower likelihood of reinvestment when compared with formal saving practices, there is a significantly lower association of saving within the household with the likelihood of reinvesting profits than other savings form, most importantly, formal saving forms. This result is robust to the model specification and controlling for a large array of variables including district‐level fixed effects. We also provide empirical tests to address reverse causation and omitted variable concerns. Our work contributes to the debate on the implications of different saving instruments in developing countries and expands the entrepreneurial financing constraints literature by focusing on internal rather than external funding constraints.
- Open Access
- 19 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Leverage, Bank Employee Compensation and Institutions
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between financial structure and employee compensation in the banking industry. Using an international panel of banks, we show that well-capitalized banks pay higher wages to their employees. Our results are robust to changes in measurement, model specification and estimation methods. In order to account for the positive association between bank capital and employee compensation, we illustrate a stylized 3-period model and show that well-capitalized banks have incentives to pay higher wages to induce monitoring. Such monitoring rents of employees at capitalized banks are expected to be higher in societies with weak institutions. Further empirical analysis shows that the weaker is institutional quality of a country the stronger is the positive relationship between bank capital and wages -- supporting our theoretical conjectures. High compensations in the financial industry received increasing criticism over the course of years following the great recession, whereas capitalization of banks has been encouraged. Our paper is the first to highlight that there is an empirically visible trade-off between the two and that institutions strongly interact with this relationship.
- 19 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLeverage, Bank Employee Compensation and Institutions
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between financial structure and employee compensation in the banking industry. Using an international panel of banks, we show that well-capitalized banks pay higher wages to their employees. Our results are robust to changes in measurement, model specification and estimation methods. In order to account for the positive association between bank capital and employee compensation, we illustrate a stylized 3-period model and show that well-capitalized banks have incentives to pay higher wages to induce monitoring. Such monitoring rents of employees at capitalized banks are expected to be higher in societies with weak institutions. Further empirical analysis shows that the weaker is institutional quality of a country the stronger is the positive relationship between bank capital and wages -- supporting our theoretical conjectures. High compensations in the financial industry received increasing criticism over the course of years following the great recession, whereas capitalization of banks has been encouraged. Our paper is the first to highlight that there is an empirically visible trade-off between the two and that institutions strongly interact with this relationship.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Heterogeneity in Wage Setting Behavior in a New-Keynesian Model
In this paper we estimate a New-Keynesian DSGE model with heterogeneity in price and wage setting behavior. In a recent study, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHeterogeneity in Wage Setting Behavior in a New-Keynesian Model
In this paper we estimate a New-Keynesian DSGE model with heterogeneity in price and wage setting behavior. In a recent study, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)