James M. Snyder
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
James M. Snyder has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michael M. Ting
Columbia University
4 shared publications - Stephen Ansolabehere
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
4 shared publications - Shigeo Hirano
Columbia University
2 shared publications - Aaron B. Strauss
The Mellman Group
1 shared publication - Andrea Prat
London School of Economics
1 shared publication - David M. Primo
University of Rochester
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 December 2010
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 5 (3) , 291-318
Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits
What would happen if the current U.S. campaign finance system, mostly based on private donations, were replaced by a public funding scheme of the same magnitude? Some argue that public funding would deprive voters of useful information, but this can only be true if private donations are somehow targeted to “better” candidates. In this paper, we ask what voters can learn about the “effectiveness” of a legislator from the amount and pattern of contributions received during the campaign. We find that the total amount that a candidate receives is a positive, but weak, predictor of that candidate’s effectiveness. Small contributions provide a strong and positive signal of effectiveness, while large contributions are a negative signal of effectiveness. Contributions from organizations also provide a positive signal, while contributions from individuals, parties, and candidates themselves do not.
- 16 December 2010
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 5 (3) , 291-318
Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits
What would happen if the current U.S. campaign finance system, mostly based on private donations, were replaced by a public funding scheme of the same magnitude? Some argue that public funding would deprive voters of useful information, but this can only be true if private donations are somehow targeted to “better” candidates. In this paper, we ask what voters can learn about the “effectiveness” of a legislator from the amount and pattern of contributions received during the campaign. We find that the total amount that a candidate receives is a positive, but weak, predictor of that candidate’s effectiveness. Small contributions provide a strong and positive signal of effectiveness, while large contributions are a negative signal of effectiveness. Contributions from organizations also provide a positive signal, while contributions from individuals, parties, and candidates themselves do not.
- 11 August 2010
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 5 (2) , 169-191
Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress
Many observers and scholars argue that primary elections contribute to ideological polarization in U.S. politics. We test this claim using congressional elections and roll call voting behavior. Many of our findings are null. We find little evidence that the introduction of primary elections, the level of primary election turnout, or the threat of primary competition are associated with partisan polarization in congressional roll call voting. We also find little evidence that extreme roll call voting records are positively associated with primary election outcomes. A positive finding is that general election competition exerts pressure toward convergence as extreme roll call voting is negatively correlated with general election outcomes.
- 11 August 2010
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 5 (2) , 169-191
Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress
Many observers and scholars argue that primary elections contribute to ideological polarization in U.S. politics. We test this claim using congressional elections and roll call voting behavior. Many of our findings are null. We find little evidence that the introduction of primary elections, the level of primary election turnout, or the threat of primary competition are associated with partisan polarization in congressional roll call voting. We also find little evidence that extreme roll call voting records are positively associated with primary election outcomes. A positive finding is that general election competition exerts pressure toward convergence as extreme roll call voting is negatively correlated with general election outcomes.
- 9 April 2010
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 54 (2) , 354-370
Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending
“Strong” political parties within legislatures are one possible solution to the problem of inefficient universalism, a norm under which all legislators seek large projects for their districts that are paid for out of a common pool. We demonstrate that even if parties have no role in the legislature, their role in elections can be sufficient to reduce spending. If parties in the electorate are strong, then legislators will demand less distributive spending because of a decreased incentive to secure a “personal vote” via local projects. We estimate that spending in states with strong party organizations is at least 4% smaller than in states where parties are weak. We also find evidence that strong party states receive less federal aid than states with weak organizations, and we theorize that this is because members of Congress from strong party states feel less compelled to secure aid than members from weak party states.
- 9 April 2010
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 54 (2) , 354-370
Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending
“Strong” political parties within legislatures are one possible solution to the problem of inefficient universalism, a norm under which all legislators seek large projects for their districts that are paid for out of a common pool. We demonstrate that even if parties have no role in the legislature, their role in elections can be sufficient to reduce spending. If parties in the electorate are strong, then legislators will demand less distributive spending because of a decreased incentive to secure a “personal vote” via local projects. We estimate that spending in states with strong party organizations is at least 4% smaller than in states where parties are weak. We also find evidence that strong party states receive less federal aid than states with weak organizations, and we theorize that this is because members of Congress from strong party states feel less compelled to secure aid than members from weak party states.
- 20 October 2009
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 4 (3) , 251-278
Two’s Company, Three’s an Equilibrium: Strategic Voting and Multicandidate Elections
In this paper, we characterize equilibria in games of electoral competition between three or more office-seeking candidates. Recognizing that electoral equilibrium involves both candidates’ and voters’ strategies, we first prove existence of pure strategy electoral equilibria when candidates seek to maximize their vote share. Accordingly, the main difficulty with electoral equilibria is multiplicity. We prove that, even after restricting attention to subgame perfect Nash equilibria in weakly undominated strategies, the set of electoral equilibria is very large. We provide several characterizations of candidates’ equilibrium platforms, including a set of conditions under which equilibrium platforms are located in the minmax set. We also examine welfare implications of the results as well as connections between the noncooperative equilibria and the uncovered set.
- 20 October 2009
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 4 (3) , 251-278
Two’s Company, Three’s an Equilibrium: Strategic Voting and Multicandidate Elections
In this paper, we characterize equilibria in games of electoral competition between three or more office-seeking candidates. Recognizing that electoral equilibrium involves both candidates’ and voters’ strategies, we first prove existence of pure strategy electoral equilibria when candidates seek to maximize their vote share. Accordingly, the main difficulty with electoral equilibria is multiplicity. We prove that, even after restricting attention to subgame perfect Nash equilibria in weakly undominated strategies, the set of electoral equilibria is very large. We provide several characterizations of candidates’ equilibrium platforms, including a set of conditions under which equilibrium platforms are located in the minmax set. We also examine welfare implications of the results as well as connections between the noncooperative equilibria and the uncovered set.
- 27 March 2009
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 53 (2) , 292-306
Using Multimember District Elections to Estimate the Sources of the Incumbency Advantage
In this article we use a novel research design that exploits unique features of multimember districts to estimate and decompose the incumbency advantage in state legislative elections. Like some existing related studies we also use repeated observations on the same candidates to account for unobserved factors that remain constant across observations. Multimember districts have the additional feature of copartisans competing for multiple seats within the same district. This allows us to identify both the direct office‐holder benefits and the incumbent quality advantage over nonincumbent candidates from the same party. We find that the overall incumbency advantage is of similar magnitude as that found in previous studies. We attribute approximately half of this advantage to incumbents' quality advantage over open‐seat candidates and the remainder to direct office‐holder benefits. However, we also find some evidence that direct office‐holder benefits are larger in competitive districts than in safe districts and in states with relatively large legislative budgets per capita.
- 27 March 2009
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 53 (2) , 292-306
Using Multimember District Elections to Estimate the Sources of the Incumbency Advantage
In this article we use a novel research design that exploits unique features of multimember districts to estimate and decompose the incumbency advantage in state legislative elections. Like some existing related studies we also use repeated observations on the same candidates to account for unobserved factors that remain constant across observations. Multimember districts have the additional feature of copartisans competing for multiple seats within the same district. This allows us to identify both the direct office‐holder benefits and the incumbent quality advantage over nonincumbent candidates from the same party. We find that the overall incumbency advantage is of similar magnitude as that found in previous studies. We attribute approximately half of this advantage to incumbents' quality advantage over open‐seat candidates and the remainder to direct office‐holder benefits. However, we also find some evidence that direct office‐holder benefits are larger in competitive districts than in safe districts and in states with relatively large legislative budgets per capita.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 May 2008
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 102 (2) , 215-232
The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting
A venerable supposition of American survey research is that the vast majority of voters have incoherent and unstable preferences about political issues, which in turn have little impact on vote choice. We demonstrate that these findings are manifestations of measurement error associated with individual survey items. First, we show that averaging a large number of survey items on the same broadly defined issue area—for example, government involvement in the economy, or moral issues—eliminates a large amount of measurement error and reveals issue preferences that are well structured and stable. This stability increases steadily as the number of survey items increases and can approach that of party identification. Second, we show that once measurement error has been reduced through the use of multiple measures, issue preferences have much greater explanatory power in models of presidential vote choice, again approaching that of party identification.
- 1 May 2008
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 102 (2) , 215-232
Top Cited PapersThe Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting
A venerable supposition of American survey research is that the vast majority of voters have incoherent and unstable preferences about political issues, which in turn have little impact on vote choice. We demonstrate that these findings are manifestations of measurement error associated with individual survey items. First, we show that averaging a large number of survey items on the same broadly defined issue area—for example, government involvement in the economy, or moral issues—eliminates a large amount of measurement error and reveals issue preferences that are well structured and stable. This stability increases steadily as the number of survey items increases and can approach that of party identification. Second, we show that once measurement error has been reduced through the use of multiple measures, issue preferences have much greater explanatory power in models of presidential vote choice, again approaching that of party identification.
- 1 November 2007
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 32 (4) , 649-679
Do Multimember Districts Lead to Free‐Riding?
We studied the effects of districting on intergovernmental aid by state governments to local governments in the United States. We found that metropolitan areas receive relatively more aid when represented in the state legislature by an at‐large delegation than when divided into single‐member districts. This suggests that the free‐riding that may occur with at‐large representation is more than counterbalanced by other factors. The estimated effects are robust to the effects of other confounding factors as well as the choice of estimators.
- 1 November 2007
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 32 (4) , 649-679
Do Multimember Districts Lead to Free‐Riding?
We studied the effects of districting on intergovernmental aid by state governments to local governments in the United States. We found that metropolitan areas receive relatively more aid when represented in the state legislature by an at‐large delegation than when divided into single‐member districts. This suggests that the free‐riding that may occur with at‐large representation is more than counterbalanced by other factors. The estimated effects are robust to the effects of other confounding factors as well as the choice of estimators.
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 108 (4) , 547-569
Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures*
This paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997. We find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support. This is borne out in two ways. (i) Counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments. (ii) When control of the state government changes, the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party. We find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts. Finally, we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections. This suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results, and the mechanism through which this works is “mobilization” rather than “conversion” of voters in a fixed electorate.
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 108 (4) , 547-569
Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures*
This paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997. We find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support. This is borne out in two ways. (i) Counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments. (ii) When control of the state government changes, the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party. We find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts. Finally, we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections. This suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results, and the mechanism through which this works is “mobilization” rather than “conversion” of voters in a fixed electorate.
- 1 August 2006
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 31 (3) , 347-381
Legislative Effectiveness and Legislative Careers
We studied an underutilized source of data on legislative effectiveness and exploited its panel structure to uncover several interesting patterns. We found that effectiveness rises sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms, even when we control for legislators' institutional positions, party affiliation, and other factors. Effectiveness never declines with tenure, even out to nine terms. The increase in effectiveness is not simply due to electoral attrition and selective retirement, but to learning‐by‐doing. We also found evidence that a significant amount of “positive sorting” occurs in the legislature, with highly talented legislators moving more quickly into positions of responsibility and power. Finally, effectiveness has a positive impact on incumbents' electoral success and on the probability of legislators moving to higher office. These findings have important implications for arguments about term limits, the incumbency advantage, and seniority rule.
- 1 August 2006
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 31 (3) , 347-381
Legislative Effectiveness and Legislative Careers
We studied an underutilized source of data on legislative effectiveness and exploited its panel structure to uncover several interesting patterns. We found that effectiveness rises sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms, even when we control for legislators' institutional positions, party affiliation, and other factors. Effectiveness never declines with tenure, even out to nine terms. The increase in effectiveness is not simply due to electoral attrition and selective retirement, but to learning‐by‐doing. We also found evidence that a significant amount of “positive sorting” occurs in the legislature, with highly talented legislators moving more quickly into positions of responsibility and power. Finally, effectiveness has a positive impact on incumbents' electoral success and on the probability of legislators moving to higher office. These findings have important implications for arguments about term limits, the incumbency advantage, and seniority rule.
- 1 July 2005
- Published by JSTOR in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 49 (3) , 550-563
Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments
Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions. To test key predictions of these models, we exam...
- 1 July 2005
- Published by JSTOR in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 49 (3) , 550-563
Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments
Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions. To test key predictions of these models, we exam...