Ahmed Tanvir Mahdad
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ahmed Tanvir Mahdad has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Nitesh Saxena
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
13 shared publications - Yan Wang
Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
7 shared publications - Yingying Chen
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA
7 shared publications - Cong Shi
New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, New Jersey, USA
6 shared publications - Zhengkun Ye
Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
6 shared publications - Mojibur Rahman Redoy Akanda
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 292-303
TrackAR: AR/VR Device Fingerprinting and User-Device Pairing Detection via Shared Motion Sensor Data
- 29 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 292-303
Open AccessTrackAR: AR/VR Device Fingerprinting and User-Device Pairing Detection via Shared Motion Sensor Data
- Open Access
- 3 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-2
VR Testbed-based Blood Pressure Privacy Leakage Analysis
- 3 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-2
Open AccessVR Testbed-based Blood Pressure Privacy Leakage Analysis
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3520-3534
Harnessing Vital Sign Vibration Harmonics for Effortless and Inbuilt XR User Authentication
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3520-3534
Open AccessHarnessing Vital Sign Vibration Harmonics for Effortless and Inbuilt XR User Authentication
- Open Access
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1116-1128
Broken Access: On the Challenges of Screen Reader Assisted Two-Factor and Passwordless Authentication
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1116-1128
Open AccessBroken Access: On the Challenges of Screen Reader Assisted Two-Factor and Passwordless Authentication
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 153-167
SAFARI: Speech-Associated Facial Authentication for AR/VR Settings via Robust VIbration Signatures
In AR/VR devices, the voice interface, serving as one of the primary AR/VR control mechanisms, enables users to interact naturally using speeches (voice commands) for accessing data, controlling applications, and engaging in remote communication/meetings. Voice authentication can be adopted to protect against unauthorized speech inputs. However, existing voice authentication mechanisms are usually susceptible to voice spoofing attacks and are unreliable under the variations of phonetic content. In this work, we propose SAFARI, a spoofing-resistant and text-independent speech authentication system that can be seamlessly integrated into AR/VR voice interfaces. The key idea is to elicit phonetic-invariant biometrics from the facial muscle vibrations upon the headset. During speech production, a user's facial muscles are deformed for articulating phoneme sounds. The facial deformations associated with the phonemes are referred to as visemes. They carry rich biometrics of the wearer's muscles, tissue, and bones, which can propagate through the head and vibrate the headset. SAFARI aims to derive reliable facial biometrics from the viseme-associated facial vibrations captured by the AR/VR motion sensors. Particularly, it identifies the vibration data segments that contain rich viseme patterns (prominent visemes) less susceptible to phonetic variations. Based on the prominent visemes, SAFARI learns on the correlations among facial vibrations of different frequencies to extract biometric representations invariant to the phonetic context. The key advantages of SAFARI are that it is suitable for commodity AR/VR headsets (no additional sensors) and is resistant to voice spoofing attacks as the conductive property of the facial vibrations prevents biometric disclosure via the air media or the audio channel. To mitigate the impacts of body motions in AR/VR scenarios, we also design a generative diffusion model trained to reconstruct the viseme patterns from the data distorted by motion artifacts. We conduct extensive experiments with two representative AR/VR headsets and 35 users under various usage and attack settings. We demonstrate that SAFARI can achieve over 96% true positive rate on verifying legitimate users while successfully rejecting different kinds of spoofing attacks with over 97% true negative rates.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 153-167
Open AccessSAFARI: Speech-Associated Facial Authentication for AR/VR Settings via Robust VIbration Signatures
In AR/VR devices, the voice interface, serving as one of the primary AR/VR control mechanisms, enables users to interact naturally using speeches (voice commands) for accessing data, controlling applications, and engaging in remote communication/meetings. Voice authentication can be adopted to protect against unauthorized speech inputs. However, existing voice authentication mechanisms are usually susceptible to voice spoofing attacks and are unreliable under the variations of phonetic content. In this work, we propose SAFARI, a spoofing-resistant and text-independent speech authentication system that can be seamlessly integrated into AR/VR voice interfaces. The key idea is to elicit phonetic-invariant biometrics from the facial muscle vibrations upon the headset. During speech production, a user's facial muscles are deformed for articulating phoneme sounds. The facial deformations associated with the phonemes are referred to as visemes. They carry rich biometrics of the wearer's muscles, tissue, and bones, which can propagate through the head and vibrate the headset. SAFARI aims to derive reliable facial biometrics from the viseme-associated facial vibrations captured by the AR/VR motion sensors. Particularly, it identifies the vibration data segments that contain rich viseme patterns (prominent visemes) less susceptible to phonetic variations. Based on the prominent visemes, SAFARI learns on the correlations among facial vibrations of different frequencies to extract biometric representations invariant to the phonetic context. The key advantages of SAFARI are that it is suitable for commodity AR/VR headsets (no additional sensors) and is resistant to voice spoofing attacks as the conductive property of the facial vibrations prevents biometric disclosure via the air media or the audio channel. To mitigate the impacts of body motions in AR/VR scenarios, we also design a generative diffusion model trained to reconstruct the viseme patterns from the data distorted by motion artifacts. We conduct extensive experiments with two representative AR/VR headsets and 35 users under various usage and attack settings. We demonstrate that SAFARI can achieve over 96% true positive rate on verifying legitimate users while successfully rejecting different kinds of spoofing attacks with over 97% true negative rates.
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1686-1700
Breaching Security Keys without Root: FIDO2 Deception Attacks via Overlays exploiting Limited Display Authenticators
Two-factor authentication (2FA) systems aim to secure user accounts, provided that either the password or the second factor device remains uncompromised. However, in this research, we challenge this perception and analyze the security of FIDO2 hardware security keys, which are increasingly used in 2FA and passwordless systems. Specifically, we develop an attack framework, analyze the underlying protocols of FIDO2, and examine the associated OS-level security. Through practical demonstrations, we illustrate how adversaries can exploit this framework and OS-level security measures to execute our designed attack, known as FIDOLA (FIDO2 Deception Attack via Overlays exploiting Limited Display Authenticators). Our attack framework injects hidden login sessions, either into the same service the user intends to authenticate with or into a different service. It deceives users into approving the attackers request using the limited display of authenticators. This cross-service attack raises concerns about compromising more sensitive accounts (e.g., financial) when users log into less sensitive ones. Our attack poses a practical and fundamental threat not addressed in the FIDO specification or prior research. Unlike prior research, our demonstration exposes FIDO2 authenticator vulnerabilities in real-world 2FA and passwordless setups, where OS-level security mitigates traditional concurrent attacks (simultaneous authentication attempts by the attacker). To assess our attacks effectiveness, we conducted a user study, revealing that users approved approximately 95.55% of cross-service attacks when presented with a screen overlay.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1686-1700
Open AccessBreaching Security Keys without Root: FIDO2 Deception Attacks via Overlays exploiting Limited Display Authenticators
Two-factor authentication (2FA) systems aim to secure user accounts, provided that either the password or the second factor device remains uncompromised. However, in this research, we challenge this perception and analyze the security of FIDO2 hardware security keys, which are increasingly used in 2FA and passwordless systems. Specifically, we develop an attack framework, analyze the underlying protocols of FIDO2, and examine the associated OS-level security. Through practical demonstrations, we illustrate how adversaries can exploit this framework and OS-level security measures to execute our designed attack, known as FIDOLA (FIDO2 Deception Attack via Overlays exploiting Limited Display Authenticators). Our attack framework injects hidden login sessions, either into the same service the user intends to authenticate with or into a different service. It deceives users into approving the attackers request using the limited display of authenticators. This cross-service attack raises concerns about compromising more sensitive accounts (e.g., financial) when users log into less sensitive ones. Our attack poses a practical and fundamental threat not addressed in the FIDO specification or prior research. Unlike prior research, our demonstration exposes FIDO2 authenticator vulnerabilities in real-world 2FA and passwordless setups, where OS-level security mitigates traditional concurrent attacks (simultaneous authentication attempts by the attacker). To assess our attacks effectiveness, we conducted a user study, revealing that users approved approximately 95.55% of cross-service attacks when presented with a screen overlay.
- Open Access
- 10 January 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
- Vol. 27 (1) , 1-27
Sound-based Two-factor Authentication: Vulnerabilities and Redesign
Reducing the level of user effort involved in traditional two-factor authentication (TFA) constitutes an important research topic. An interesting representative approach, Sound-Proof , leverages ambient sounds to detect the proximity between the second-factor device (phone) and the login terminal (browser), and it eliminates the need for the user to transfer PIN codes. In this article, we identify a weakness of the Sound-Proof system that makes it completely vulnerable to passive “environment guessing” and active “environment manipulating” remote attackers and proximity attackers. Addressing these security issues, we propose Listening-Watch , a new TFA mechanism based on a wearable device (watch/bracelet) and active browser-generated random speech sounds. As the user attempts to log in, the browser populates a short random code encoded into speech, and the login succeeds if the watch’s audio recording contains this code (decoded using speech recognition ) and is similar enough to the browser’s audio recording. The remote attacker, who has guessed/manipulated the user’s environment, will be defeated, since authentication success relies upon the presence of the random code in watch’s recordings. The proximity attacker will also be defeated unless it is extremely close (<50 cm) to the watch, since the wearable microphones are usually designed to capture only nearby sounds (e.g., voice commands).
- 10 January 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
- Vol. 27 (1) , 1-27
Open AccessSound-based Two-factor Authentication: Vulnerabilities and Redesign
Reducing the level of user effort involved in traditional two-factor authentication (TFA) constitutes an important research topic. An interesting representative approach, Sound-Proof , leverages ambient sounds to detect the proximity between the second-factor device (phone) and the login terminal (browser), and it eliminates the need for the user to transfer PIN codes. In this article, we identify a weakness of the Sound-Proof system that makes it completely vulnerable to passive “environment guessing” and active “environment manipulating” remote attackers and proximity attackers. Addressing these security issues, we propose Listening-Watch , a new TFA mechanism based on a wearable device (watch/bracelet) and active browser-generated random speech sounds. As the user attempts to log in, the browser populates a short random code encoded into speech, and the login succeeds if the watch’s audio recording contains this code (decoded using speech recognition ) and is similar enough to the browser’s audio recording. The remote attacker, who has guessed/manipulated the user’s environment, will be defeated, since authentication success relies upon the presence of the random code in watch’s recordings. The proximity attacker will also be defeated unless it is extremely close (<50 cm) to the watch, since the wearable microphones are usually designed to capture only nearby sounds (e.g., voice commands).
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 446-459
FaceReader: Unobtrusively Mining Vital Signs and Vital Sign Embedded Sensitive Info via AR/VR Motion Sensors
The market size of augmented reality and virtual reality (AR/VR) has been expanding rapidly in recent years, with the use of face-mounted headsets extending beyond gaming to various application sectors, such as education, healthcare, and the military. Despite the rapid growth, the understanding of information leakage through sensor-rich headsets remains in its infancy. Some of the headset's built-in sensors do not require users' permission to access, and any apps and websites can acquire their readings. While theseunrestricted sensors are generally considered free of privacy risks, we find that an adversary could uncover private information by scrutinizing sensor readings, making existing AR/VR apps and websites potential eavesdroppers. In this work, we investigate a novel, unobtrusive privacy attack called FaceReader, which reconstructs high-quality vital sign signals (breathing and heartbeat patterns) based on unrestricted AR/VR motion sensors. FaceReader is built on the key insight that the headset is closely mounted on the user's face, allowing the motion sensors to detect subtle facial vibrations produced by users' breathing and heartbeats. Based on the reconstructed vital signs, we further investigate three more advanced attacks, including gender recognition, user re-identification, and body fat ratio estimation. Such attacks pose severe privacy concerns, as an adversary may obtain users' sensitive demographic/physiological traits and potentially uncover their real-world identities. Compared to prior privacy attacks relying on speeches and activities, FaceReader targets spontaneous breathing and heartbeat activities that are naturally produced by the human body and are unobtrusive to victims. In particular, we design an adaptive filter to dynamically mitigate the impacts of body motions. We further employ advanced deep-learning techniques to reconstruct vital sign signals, achieving signal qualities comparable to those of dedicated medical instruments, as well as deriving sensitive gender, identity, and body fat information. We conduct extensive experiments involving 35 users on three types of mainstream AR/VR headsets across 3 months. The results reveal that FaceReader can reconstruct vital signs with low mean errors and accurately detect gender (over 93.33%). The attack can also link/re-identify users across different apps, websites, and longitudinal sessions with over 97.83% accuracy. Furthermore, we present the first successful attempt at revealing body fat information from motion sensor data, achieving a remarkably low estimation error of 4.43%.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 446-459
Open AccessFaceReader: Unobtrusively Mining Vital Signs and Vital Sign Embedded Sensitive Info via AR/VR Motion Sensors
The market size of augmented reality and virtual reality (AR/VR) has been expanding rapidly in recent years, with the use of face-mounted headsets extending beyond gaming to various application sectors, such as education, healthcare, and the military. Despite the rapid growth, the understanding of information leakage through sensor-rich headsets remains in its infancy. Some of the headset's built-in sensors do not require users' permission to access, and any apps and websites can acquire their readings. While theseunrestricted sensors are generally considered free of privacy risks, we find that an adversary could uncover private information by scrutinizing sensor readings, making existing AR/VR apps and websites potential eavesdroppers. In this work, we investigate a novel, unobtrusive privacy attack called FaceReader, which reconstructs high-quality vital sign signals (breathing and heartbeat patterns) based on unrestricted AR/VR motion sensors. FaceReader is built on the key insight that the headset is closely mounted on the user's face, allowing the motion sensors to detect subtle facial vibrations produced by users' breathing and heartbeats. Based on the reconstructed vital signs, we further investigate three more advanced attacks, including gender recognition, user re-identification, and body fat ratio estimation. Such attacks pose severe privacy concerns, as an adversary may obtain users' sensitive demographic/physiological traits and potentially uncover their real-world identities. Compared to prior privacy attacks relying on speeches and activities, FaceReader targets spontaneous breathing and heartbeat activities that are naturally produced by the human body and are unobtrusive to victims. In particular, we design an adaptive filter to dynamically mitigate the impacts of body motions. We further employ advanced deep-learning techniques to reconstruct vital sign signals, achieving signal qualities comparable to those of dedicated medical instruments, as well as deriving sensitive gender, identity, and body fat information. We conduct extensive experiments involving 35 users on three types of mainstream AR/VR headsets across 3 months. The results reveal that FaceReader can reconstruct vital signs with low mean errors and accurately detect gender (over 93.33%). The attack can also link/re-identify users across different apps, websites, and longitudinal sessions with over 97.83% accuracy. Furthermore, we present the first successful attempt at revealing body fat information from motion sensor data, achieving a remarkably low estimation error of 4.43%.
- Open Access
- 16 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 308-309
Poster: Unobtrusively Mining Vital Sign and Embedded Sensitive Info via AR/VR Motion Sensors
Despite the rapid growth of augmented reality and virtual reality (AR/VR) in various applications, the understanding of information leakage through sensor-rich headsets remains in its infancy. In this poster, we investigate an unobtrusive privacy attack, which exposes users' vital signs and embedded sensitive information (e.g., gender, identity, body fat ratio), based on unrestricted AR/VR motion sensors. The key insight is that the headset is closely mounted on the user's face, allowing the motion sensors to detect facial vibrations produced by users' breathing and heartbeats. Specifically, we employ deep-learning techniques to reconstruct vital signs, achieving signal qualities comparable to dedicated medical instruments, as well as deriving users' gender, identity, and body fat information. Experiments on three types of commodity AR/VR headsets reveal that our attack can successfully reconstruct high-quality vital signs, detect gender (accuracy over 93.33%), re-identify users (accuracy over 97.83%), and derive body fat ratio (error less than 4.43%).
- 16 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 308-309
Open AccessPoster: Unobtrusively Mining Vital Sign and Embedded Sensitive Info via AR/VR Motion Sensors
Despite the rapid growth of augmented reality and virtual reality (AR/VR) in various applications, the understanding of information leakage through sensor-rich headsets remains in its infancy. In this poster, we investigate an unobtrusive privacy attack, which exposes users' vital signs and embedded sensitive information (e.g., gender, identity, body fat ratio), based on unrestricted AR/VR motion sensors. The key insight is that the headset is closely mounted on the user's face, allowing the motion sensors to detect facial vibrations produced by users' breathing and heartbeats. Specifically, we employ deep-learning techniques to reconstruct vital signs, achieving signal qualities comparable to dedicated medical instruments, as well as deriving users' gender, identity, and body fat information. Experiments on three types of commodity AR/VR headsets reveal that our attack can successfully reconstruct high-quality vital signs, detect gender (accuracy over 93.33%), re-identify users (accuracy over 97.83%), and derive body fat ratio (error less than 4.43%).
- Open Access
- 2 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-15
Breaking Mobile Notification-based Authentication with Concurrent Attacks Outside of Mobile Devices
Notification-based authentication is an emerging Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) and passwordless solution that leverages interactive notifications on mobile devices to establish an additional layer of security beyond passwords. This method has gained popularity due to its convenience and ease of deployment in organizational settings. In this work, we aim to evaluate the effectiveness of notification-based authentication systems when a malicious entity is present on the user's computer, such as a keylogger or malicious extension, without compromising the mobile devices or communication channels. Furthermore, we investigate how the lack of information provided to users during the authentication workflow can lead to the approval of malicious authentication requests. Notably, we highlight the vulnerability of cross-service attacks, where an attacker authenticates to Service B while the user is attempting to authenticate to Service A. Our proof-of-concept attack program demonstrates the susceptibility of various notification-based authentication systems, and our user study reveals an alarming 82.2% cross-service attack success rate. These findings suggest a potential vulnerability in notification-based authentication systems, where the attacker compromise user account without compromising possession-factor device, such as smartphones.
- 2 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-15
Open AccessBreaking Mobile Notification-based Authentication with Concurrent Attacks Outside of Mobile Devices
Notification-based authentication is an emerging Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) and passwordless solution that leverages interactive notifications on mobile devices to establish an additional layer of security beyond passwords. This method has gained popularity due to its convenience and ease of deployment in organizational settings. In this work, we aim to evaluate the effectiveness of notification-based authentication systems when a malicious entity is present on the user's computer, such as a keylogger or malicious extension, without compromising the mobile devices or communication channels. Furthermore, we investigate how the lack of information provided to users during the authentication workflow can lead to the approval of malicious authentication requests. Notably, we highlight the vulnerability of cross-service attacks, where an attacker authenticates to Service B while the user is attempting to authenticate to Service A. Our proof-of-concept attack program demonstrates the susceptibility of various notification-based authentication systems, and our user study reveals an alarming 82.2% cross-service attack success rate. These findings suggest a potential vulnerability in notification-based authentication systems, where the attacker compromise user account without compromising possession-factor device, such as smartphones.