PNPhuong Ha Nguyen

Phuong Ha Nguyen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Phuong Ha Nguyen has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Breaking XOR Arbiter PUFs With Chosen Challenge Attack

    by Niloufar Sayadi, Phuong Ha Nguyen, Marten van Dijk, Chenglu Jin

    The XOR Arbiter PUF was introduced as a strong PUF in 2007 and was broken in 2015 by a Machine Learning (ML) attack, which allows the underlying Arbiter PUFs to be modeled individually by exploiting reliability information of the measured responses. To mitigate the reliability-based attacks, state-of-the-art understanding shows that the reliability of individual Arbiter PUFs and the overall XOR Arbiter PUF can be boosted to an arbitrarily high level, thus rendering all known reliability-based ML attacks infeasible; alternatively, an access control interface around the XOR Arbiter PUF can prevent the same challenge-response pairs from being accessed repeatedly, thus eliminating the leakage of reliability information. We show that, for the first time, a perfectly reliable XOR Arbiter PUF can be successfully attacked in a divide-and-conquer manner, meaning each underlying Arbiter PUF in an XOR Arbiter PUF can be attacked individually. This allows us to attack large XOR Arbiter PUFs efficiently, even without reliability information or any side-channel information. Our key insight is that, instead of reliability information, the responses of highly correlated challenges also reveal how close the responses are to the response decision boundary. This leads to a chosen challenge attack on XOR Arbiter PUFs by carefully choosing correlated challenges to measure and aggregate the collected information. We validate our attack by using PUF simulation, as well as an XOR Arbiter PUF implemented on FPGA. We also demonstrate that our chosen challenge methodology is compatible with the state-of-the-art combined gradient-based multi-objective optimization attack. Finally, we discuss an effective countermeasure that can prevent our attack but with a relatively large area overhead compared to the PUF itself.


  • Open Access

    Optimization-Based Budget Pacing in eBay Sponsored Search

    by Qinyi Chen, Phuong Ha Nguyen, Djordje Gligorijevic

    In online platforms like eBay, sponsored search advertising has become instrumental for businesses aiming for enhanced visibility. However, in automated ad auctions, the sellers (ad campaigns) run the risk of exhausting their budgets prematurely in the absence of proper pacing strategies. In response to this, online platforms have been prompted to employ budget pacing strategies to maintain consistent spending patterns for their sellers. While numerous budget pacing strategies have been introduced, they predominantly stem from either empirical or theoretical perspectives, often functioning in isolation. This paper aims to bridge this gap by investigating the performance of a theoretically inspired optimization-based bid shading method, AdaptivePacing, within eBay's sponsored search environment and proposing variants of the algorithm tailored to real-world environments. Our findings highlight the benefits of applying theoretical pacing approaches in practical contexts. Specifically, the optimization-based AdaptivePacing method offers the platform flexible control over campaign spending patterns, accounts for business constraints, and suggests tailored strategies for distinct advertisers. Furthermore, when evaluating AdaptivePacing alongside established empirical methods, we demonstrate its practical effectiveness and pinpoint areas for further refinement.


  • Secure Remote Attestation With Strong Key Insulation Guarantees

    by Deniz Gurevin, Chenglu Jin, Phuong Ha Nguyen, Omer Khan, Marten van Dijk

    Secure processors with hardware-enforced isolation are crucial for secure cloud computation. However, commercial secure processors have underestimated the capabilities of attackers and failed to provide secure execution environments capable of protecting sensitive information against side-channel attacks. Remote Attestation protocols based on traditional signature schemes are not secure under side-channel attacks anymore since their secret keys can be leaked. Previously, Key-Insulated Schemes (KIS) have been introduced to mitigate the damage caused by secret key exposure in cryptosystems by breaking the lifetime of secret keys into independent sessions. KIS protect the security of all other sessions if any session keys are compromised, however, provide no security guarantees for a compromised session. We introduce a new cryptographic primitive called One-Time Signature with Secret Key Exposure (OTS-SKE), which ensures no one can forge a valid signature of a new message or nonce even if all secret session keys are leaked. OTS-SKE enables us to sign attestation reports securely under a powerful adversary who can observe all digital states in secure enclaves through side-channel attacks. We also minimize the trusted computing base by introducing a secure co-processor that is only responsible for key generation into the system. Our experiments show that the signing of OTS-SKE is faster than KIS as well as Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) used in Intel SGX.


  • Open Access

    Besting the Black-Box: Barrier Zones for Adversarial Example Defense

    by Kaleel Mahmood, Phuong Ha Nguyen, Lam M. Nguyen, Thanh Nguyen, Marten Van Dijk

    Adversarial machine learning defenses have primarily been focused on mitigating static, white-box attacks. However, it remains an open question whether such defenses are robust under an adaptive black-box adversary. In this paper, we specifically focus on the black-box threat model and make the following contributions: First we develop an enhanced adaptive black-box attack which is experimentally shown to be ≥ 30% more effective than the original adaptive black-box attack proposed by Papernot et al. For our second contribution, we test 10 recent defenses using our new attack and propose our own black-box defense (barrier zones). We show that our defense based on barrier zones offers significant improvements in security over state-of-the-art defenses. This improvement includes greater than 85% robust accuracy against black-box boundary attacks, transfer attacks and our new adaptive black-box attack, for the datasets we study. For completeness, we verify our claims through extensive experimentation with 10 other defenses using three adversarial models (14 different black-box attacks) on two datasets (CIFAR-10 and Fashion-MNIST).