Gagan Aggarwal
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Gagan Aggarwal has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mingfei Zhao
Google Research, Mountain View, CA, USA
4 shared publications - Andres Perlroth
Google Research, Mountain View, CA, United States
2 shared publications - Anupam Gupta
New York University, New York, USA
1 shared publication - Ariel Schvartzman
Google research
1 shared publication - Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru
Google, Mountain View, USA
1 shared publication - Federico Fusco
Sapienza University of Rome
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 87-98
Platform Competition in the Autobidding World
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 87-98
Open AccessPlatform Competition in the Autobidding World
- Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 213-224
Online Advertising with Spatial Interactions
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 213-224
Open AccessOnline Advertising with Spatial Interactions
- Open Access
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1398-1415
No-Regret Algorithms in non-Truthful Auctions with Budget and ROI Constraints
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1398-1415
Open AccessNo-Regret Algorithms in non-Truthful Auctions with Budget and ROI Constraints
- Open Access
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2850-2859
Multi-Platform Autobidding with and without Predictions
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2850-2859
Open AccessMulti-Platform Autobidding with and without Predictions
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 164-194
Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspective
Motivated by online retail, we consider the problem of selling one item (e.g., an ad slot) to two non-excludable buyers (say, a merchant and a brand). This problem captures, for example, situations where a merchant and a brand cooperatively bid in an auction to advertise a product, and both benefit from the ad being shown. A mechanism collects bids from the two and decides whether to allocate and which payments the two parties should make. This gives rise to intricate incentive compatibility constraints, e.g., on how to split payments between the two parties. We approach the problem of finding a revenue-maximizing incentive-compatible mechanism from an online learning perspective; this poses significant technical challenges. First, the action space (the class of all possible mechanisms) is huge; second, the function that maps mechanisms to revenue is highly irregular, ruling out standard discretization-based approaches. In the stochastic setting, where agents' valuations are drawn according to some fixed but unknown distribution, we design an efficient learning algorithm achieving a regret bound of O(T3/4). Our approach is based on an adaptive discretization scheme of the space of mechanisms, as any non-adaptive discretization fails to achieve sublinear regret. In the adversarial setting, when the valuations are arbitrarily generated upfront, we exploit the non-Lipschitzness of the problem to prove a strong negative result, namely that no learning algorithm can achieve more than half of the revenue of the best fixed mechanism in hindsight. We then consider the σ-smooth adversary, which randomly generates the valuations from smooth distributions but, unlike in the stochastic case, can do so in a non-stationary way. In this setting, we construct an efficient learning algorithm that achieves a regret bound of O(T2/3) and builds on a succinct encoding of exponentially many experts. Finally, we prove that no learning algorithm can achieve less than [EQUATION] regret, in both the stochastic and the smooth setting, thus narrowing the range where the minimax regret rates for these two problems lie.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 164-194
Open AccessSelling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspective
Motivated by online retail, we consider the problem of selling one item (e.g., an ad slot) to two non-excludable buyers (say, a merchant and a brand). This problem captures, for example, situations where a merchant and a brand cooperatively bid in an auction to advertise a product, and both benefit from the ad being shown. A mechanism collects bids from the two and decides whether to allocate and which payments the two parties should make. This gives rise to intricate incentive compatibility constraints, e.g., on how to split payments between the two parties. We approach the problem of finding a revenue-maximizing incentive-compatible mechanism from an online learning perspective; this poses significant technical challenges. First, the action space (the class of all possible mechanisms) is huge; second, the function that maps mechanisms to revenue is highly irregular, ruling out standard discretization-based approaches. In the stochastic setting, where agents' valuations are drawn according to some fixed but unknown distribution, we design an efficient learning algorithm achieving a regret bound of O(T3/4). Our approach is based on an adaptive discretization scheme of the space of mechanisms, as any non-adaptive discretization fails to achieve sublinear regret. In the adversarial setting, when the valuations are arbitrarily generated upfront, we exploit the non-Lipschitzness of the problem to prove a strong negative result, namely that no learning algorithm can achieve more than half of the revenue of the best fixed mechanism in hindsight. We then consider the σ-smooth adversary, which randomly generates the valuations from smooth distributions but, unlike in the stochastic case, can do so in a non-stationary way. In this setting, we construct an efficient learning algorithm that achieves a regret bound of O(T2/3) and builds on a succinct encoding of exponentially many experts. Finally, we prove that no learning algorithm can achieve less than [EQUATION] regret, in both the stochastic and the smooth setting, thus narrowing the range where the minimax regret rates for these two problems lie.
- Open Access
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 21
Multi-Channel Auction Design in the Autobidding World
Over the past few years, more and more Internet advertisers have started using automated bidding for optimizing their advertising campaigns. Such advertisers have an optimization goal (e.g. to maximize conversions), and some constraints (e.g. a budget or an upper bound on average cost per conversion), and the automated bidding system optimizes their auction bids on their behalf. Often, these advertisers participate on multiple advertising channels and try to optimize across these channels. A central question that remains unexplored is how automated bidding affects optimal auction design in the multi-channel setting.
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 21
Open AccessMulti-Channel Auction Design in the Autobidding World
Over the past few years, more and more Internet advertisers have started using automated bidding for optimizing their advertising campaigns. Such advertisers have an optimization goal (e.g. to maximize conversions), and some constraints (e.g. a budget or an upper bound on average cost per conversion), and the automated bidding system optimizes their auction bids on their behalf. Often, these advertisers participate on multiple advertising channels and try to optimize across these channels. A central question that remains unexplored is how automated bidding affects optimal auction design in the multi-channel setting.