Yilun Chen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Yilun Chen has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Akshit Kumar
Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, USA
2 shared publications - Chen Chen
New York University Shanghai, Shanghai 200124, China
2 shared publications - Jiaqi Lu
School of Data Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen 518172, China; and School of Management and Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen 518172, China
2 shared publications - Pengyu Qian
Questrom School of Business, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215
2 shared publications - Wenxin Zhang
Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027
2 shared publications - Yash Kanoria
Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 26 October 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
Managing Newsvendors via Demand Shifting
How Demand Allocation Shapes Inventory Decisions Online platforms that fulfill orders for independent sellers often bear inventory costs without choosing how much sellers stock. In the paper “Managing Newsvendors via Demand Shifting,” Yilun Chen and Jiaqi Lu study how reallocating customer demand among substitutable products can influence sellers’ inventory decisions. The platform commits to a demand-shifting rule that effectively alters the demand distribution perceived by the sellers. Its optimal rule reduces demand fluctuations around a target inventory level, making that level attractive to sellers and pooling demand risk across them. The authors characterize this rule in closed form. When shifting demand is inexpensive, the platform can achieve the profit available under centralized inventory control, whereas sellers and customers also benefit. However, when shifting is costly and inventory is expensive for the platform, its optimal intervention can reduce customer service levels. The findings show why platforms should assess how demand allocation changes stocking incentives and customer outcomes.
- 26 October 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
Managing Newsvendors via Demand Shifting
How Demand Allocation Shapes Inventory Decisions Online platforms that fulfill orders for independent sellers often bear inventory costs without choosing how much sellers stock. In the paper “Managing Newsvendors via Demand Shifting,” Yilun Chen and Jiaqi Lu study how reallocating customer demand among substitutable products can influence sellers’ inventory decisions. The platform commits to a demand-shifting rule that effectively alters the demand distribution perceived by the sellers. Its optimal rule reduces demand fluctuations around a target inventory level, making that level attractive to sellers and pooling demand risk across them. The authors characterize this rule in closed form. When shifting demand is inexpensive, the platform can achieve the profit available under centralized inventory control, whereas sellers and customers also benefit. However, when shifting is costly and inventory is expensive for the platform, its optimal intervention can reduce customer service levels. The findings show why platforms should assess how demand allocation changes stocking incentives and customer outcomes.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 74 (2) , 788-803
Feature-Based Dynamic Matching
SOAR ing to Optimality: Smarter Matching Algorithms for On-Demand Platforms In “Feature-Based Dynamic Matching,” Y. Chen, Y. Kanoria, A. Kumar, and W. Zhang study dynamic two-sided matching where both customers and service providers are characterized by high-dimensional feature vectors, motivated by platforms like on-demand home services. A key finding is that myopic greedy policies—which match each customer to the best available provider—can be highly suboptimal. The authors introduce SOAR (simulate-optimize-assign-repeat), a forward-looking algorithm that balances immediate match quality against preserving valuable supply for future arrivals. Through a novel analytical framework connecting dynamic matching to empirical optimal transport, they prove SOAR achieves near-optimal regret scaling under various distributional assumptions, establishing fundamental performance limits for feature-based matching problems and as a by-product resolve an open problem from prior work on dynamic spatial matching.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 74 (2) , 788-803
Top Cited PapersFeature-Based Dynamic Matching
SOAR ing to Optimality: Smarter Matching Algorithms for On-Demand Platforms In “Feature-Based Dynamic Matching,” Y. Chen, Y. Kanoria, A. Kumar, and W. Zhang study dynamic two-sided matching where both customers and service providers are characterized by high-dimensional feature vectors, motivated by platforms like on-demand home services. A key finding is that myopic greedy policies—which match each customer to the best available provider—can be highly suboptimal. The authors introduce SOAR (simulate-optimize-assign-repeat), a forward-looking algorithm that balances immediate match quality against preserving valuable supply for future arrivals. Through a novel analytical framework connecting dynamic matching to empirical optimal transport, they prove SOAR achieves near-optimal regret scaling under various distributional assumptions, establishing fundamental performance limits for feature-based matching problems and as a by-product resolve an open problem from prior work on dynamic spatial matching.
- 10 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Incentivizing Resource Pooling
Resource pooling improves system efficiency drastically in large stochastic systems, but its effective implementation in decentralized systems remains relatively underexplored. This paper studies how to incentivize resource pooling when agents are self-interested, and their states are private information. Our primary motivation is applications in the design of decentralized computing markets, among others. We study a standard multiserver queueing model in which each server is associated with an [ ] queue and aims to minimize its time-average job holding and processing costs. We design a simple token-based mechanism where servers can earn tokens by offering help and spend tokens to request help from other servers, all in their self-interest. The mechanism induces a complex game among servers. We employ the fluid mean-field equilibrium (FMFE) concept to analyze the system, combining mean-field approximation with fluid relaxation. This framework enables us to derive a closed-form characterization of servers’ FMFE strategies. We show that these FMFE strategies approximate well the servers’ rational behavior. We leverage this framework to optimize the design of the mechanism and present our main results: As the number of servers increases, the proposed mechanism incentivizes complete resource pooling—that is, the system dynamics and performance under our mechanism match those under centralized control. Finally, we show that our mechanism achieves the first-best performance even when helping others incurs higher job processing costs and remains nearly optimal in settings with heterogeneous servers. This paper was accepted by Omar Besbes, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: Y. Chen acknowledges the support by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [Grants NSFC-72501250 and NSFC-72394361] and by the Guangdong Key Lab of Mathematical Foundations for Artificial Intelligence. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03550 .
- 10 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Incentivizing Resource Pooling
Resource pooling improves system efficiency drastically in large stochastic systems, but its effective implementation in decentralized systems remains relatively underexplored. This paper studies how to incentivize resource pooling when agents are self-interested, and their states are private information. Our primary motivation is applications in the design of decentralized computing markets, among others. We study a standard multiserver queueing model in which each server is associated with an [ ] queue and aims to minimize its time-average job holding and processing costs. We design a simple token-based mechanism where servers can earn tokens by offering help and spend tokens to request help from other servers, all in their self-interest. The mechanism induces a complex game among servers. We employ the fluid mean-field equilibrium (FMFE) concept to analyze the system, combining mean-field approximation with fluid relaxation. This framework enables us to derive a closed-form characterization of servers’ FMFE strategies. We show that these FMFE strategies approximate well the servers’ rational behavior. We leverage this framework to optimize the design of the mechanism and present our main results: As the number of servers increases, the proposed mechanism incentivizes complete resource pooling—that is, the system dynamics and performance under our mechanism match those under centralized control. Finally, we show that our mechanism achieves the first-best performance even when helping others incurs higher job processing costs and remains nearly optimal in settings with heterogeneous servers. This paper was accepted by Omar Besbes, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: Y. Chen acknowledges the support by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [Grants NSFC-72501250 and NSFC-72394361] and by the Guangdong Key Lab of Mathematical Foundations for Artificial Intelligence. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03550 .
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 578-579
Incentivizing Resource Pooling
Resource pooling improves system efficiency drastically in large stochastic systems, but its effective implementation in decentralized systems remains relatively underexplored. In this paper, we study the problem of incentivizing resourcing pooling when agents are self-interested, and their states are private information. Specifically, we study a standard multi-server queueing model in which each server is associated with an M/M/1 queue and aims to minimize its time-average job holding and processing costs. Our primary motivation is applications in the design of decentralized computing markets (potentially implemented on blockchains), among others. We develop a simple token-based mechanism to incentivize resource pooling when servers' states and actions are private information. In our mechanism, a server can request help from others for serving its jobs at the cost of one token per requested job at any time. Meanwhile, a server can allocate its next unit of available computing power to help others and earn a token with a pre-determined probability. Decisions regarding the request and provision of help are made by each server based on its self-interest. The mechanism matches servers providing help to those requesting help in a first-come-first-serve order by managing a (virtual) shared pool, which a smart contract can achieve. The mechanism introduces a complex incomplete-information, dynamic game among servers that is challenging to analyze. To address this, we employ the fluid mean-field equilibrium (FMFE) concept to analyze the system, combining mean-field approximation with fluid relaxation. This framework enables us to derive a closed-form characterization of a server's best response in FMFE. Moreover, we show that these FMFE strategies approximate well the servers' rational behavior as the number of servers grows large, justifying our approximation methodology. We leverage this framework to optimize the design of the mechanism and present our main results: As the number of servers increases, the proposed mechanism incentivizes complete resource pooling---that is, the system dynamics and performance under our mechanism match those under centralized control. Finally, we show that our mechanism achieves the first-best performance even when helping others incurs higher job processing costs and remains nearly optimal in settings with heterogeneous servers. The full version of this paper is available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4586771.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 578-579
Open AccessIncentivizing Resource Pooling
Resource pooling improves system efficiency drastically in large stochastic systems, but its effective implementation in decentralized systems remains relatively underexplored. In this paper, we study the problem of incentivizing resourcing pooling when agents are self-interested, and their states are private information. Specifically, we study a standard multi-server queueing model in which each server is associated with an M/M/1 queue and aims to minimize its time-average job holding and processing costs. Our primary motivation is applications in the design of decentralized computing markets (potentially implemented on blockchains), among others. We develop a simple token-based mechanism to incentivize resource pooling when servers' states and actions are private information. In our mechanism, a server can request help from others for serving its jobs at the cost of one token per requested job at any time. Meanwhile, a server can allocate its next unit of available computing power to help others and earn a token with a pre-determined probability. Decisions regarding the request and provision of help are made by each server based on its self-interest. The mechanism matches servers providing help to those requesting help in a first-come-first-serve order by managing a (virtual) shared pool, which a smart contract can achieve. The mechanism introduces a complex incomplete-information, dynamic game among servers that is challenging to analyze. To address this, we employ the fluid mean-field equilibrium (FMFE) concept to analyze the system, combining mean-field approximation with fluid relaxation. This framework enables us to derive a closed-form characterization of a server's best response in FMFE. Moreover, we show that these FMFE strategies approximate well the servers' rational behavior as the number of servers grows large, justifying our approximation methodology. We leverage this framework to optimize the design of the mechanism and present our main results: As the number of servers increases, the proposed mechanism incentivizes complete resource pooling---that is, the system dynamics and performance under our mechanism match those under centralized control. Finally, we show that our mechanism achieves the first-best performance even when helping others incurs higher job processing costs and remains nearly optimal in settings with heterogeneous servers. The full version of this paper is available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4586771.
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 577
Managing Newsvendors: A Demand Mechanism
The increasingly prevalent "fulfillment by platform" practice in the digital economy (e.g, Fulfillment by Amazon launched in 2006, JD marketplace in 2010, Fulfilled by Sears in 2013, Fulfillment by Shopee in 2022) presents platforms with the unique challenge of managing their third-party sellers' self-interested inventory decision-making. In this work, motivated by the platform's natural matchmaking mechanism, we explore a novel idea to mitigate this challenge via a demand mechanism called demand nudging. Demand nudging is a proactive conduct of product substitution among substitutable sellers through offering coupons to customers, hence nudging their preferences and the sellers' demands. Demand nudging shapes the sellers' perceived demands, and incentivizes them to make platform-favorable inventory decisions. To this end, we study a stylized Stackelberg game between a platform and a continuum of third-party sellers selling substitutable products on the platform. The platform aims to design a demand nudging policy to maximize profit, while the sellers, in response, determine their inventory according to the post-nudge demand in a newsvendor manner. Our paper sheds light on the following important questions. 1) Whether and how do demand nudging mechanisms help with the decentralized inventory management challenge arising in FBP? 2) How does this mechanism affect market participants, given both its positive effect of risk pooling and negative effect of possibly nudging away the sellers' demands? 3) How does this novel mechanism compare with other existing approaches such as pricing and contract design? We establish in closed form the platform's optimal policy. It employs a simple defluctuating cut-off structure and resembles risk pooling in the centralization setting where the platform can make joint demand-substitution and inventory decisions. We show that this control is always Pareto-improving for both the platform and the seller under a mild condition despite its power on the off-equilibrium path. Furthermore, when the products are substitutable enough, the platform-optimal demand nudging is win-win-win for all parties (the platform, the sellers, the customers), and the platform can achieve its centralization benchmark. On the contrary, if the products are not substitutable enough, the platform's service level to the customers may, in certain primitive regimes, decrease. This mechanism is orthogonal to traditional supply chain management approaches, meaning that the platform can simultaneously implement demand nudging and other approaches such as pricing and contract design, and enjoy the benefit from both. The full version of this paper is available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4727705.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 577
Open AccessManaging Newsvendors: A Demand Mechanism
The increasingly prevalent "fulfillment by platform" practice in the digital economy (e.g, Fulfillment by Amazon launched in 2006, JD marketplace in 2010, Fulfilled by Sears in 2013, Fulfillment by Shopee in 2022) presents platforms with the unique challenge of managing their third-party sellers' self-interested inventory decision-making. In this work, motivated by the platform's natural matchmaking mechanism, we explore a novel idea to mitigate this challenge via a demand mechanism called demand nudging. Demand nudging is a proactive conduct of product substitution among substitutable sellers through offering coupons to customers, hence nudging their preferences and the sellers' demands. Demand nudging shapes the sellers' perceived demands, and incentivizes them to make platform-favorable inventory decisions. To this end, we study a stylized Stackelberg game between a platform and a continuum of third-party sellers selling substitutable products on the platform. The platform aims to design a demand nudging policy to maximize profit, while the sellers, in response, determine their inventory according to the post-nudge demand in a newsvendor manner. Our paper sheds light on the following important questions. 1) Whether and how do demand nudging mechanisms help with the decentralized inventory management challenge arising in FBP? 2) How does this mechanism affect market participants, given both its positive effect of risk pooling and negative effect of possibly nudging away the sellers' demands? 3) How does this novel mechanism compare with other existing approaches such as pricing and contract design? We establish in closed form the platform's optimal policy. It employs a simple defluctuating cut-off structure and resembles risk pooling in the centralization setting where the platform can make joint demand-substitution and inventory decisions. We show that this control is always Pareto-improving for both the platform and the seller under a mild condition despite its power on the off-equilibrium path. Furthermore, when the products are substitutable enough, the platform-optimal demand nudging is win-win-win for all parties (the platform, the sellers, the customers), and the platform can achieve its centralization benchmark. On the contrary, if the products are not substitutable enough, the platform's service level to the customers may, in certain primitive regimes, decrease. This mechanism is orthogonal to traditional supply chain management approaches, meaning that the platform can simultaneously implement demand nudging and other approaches such as pricing and contract design, and enjoy the benefit from both. The full version of this paper is available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4727705.
- Open Access
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 451
Feature Based Dynamic Matching
Motivated by matching platforms that match agents in a centralized manner, we introduce a model of dynamic two-sided matching where both demand and supply are heterogeneous with many types and the pool of supply units is limited. We model heterogeneity on the two sides of the market by i.i.d. demand weight vectors and i.i.d. supply feature vectors, with possibly different distributions. The matching of a demand-supply pair generates a utility that depends on their weight and feature vectors. To reflect the realistic structure of a heterogeneous matching market while also avoid impossibility results, we consider various levels of assumptions (in particular, the spatial structure) on matching utilities and feature distributions. The goal of the centralized platform is to dynamically assign supply units to sequentially arriving demand units in order to maximize utility. Many popular heuristic policies are either sub-optimal (like the myopic policy) or computationally inefficient (like the certainty equivalent policy). We propose a forward-looking supply-aware policy dubbed Simulate-Optimize-Assign-Repeat (SOAR) that combines practicality and strong theoretical guarantee. Inspired by model predictive control (MPC), SOAR leverages the power of simulation to balance between producing immediate high match utility and preserving valuable supply for future demands. We use regret as our performance metric for matching policies, specifically the additive loss relative to the utility per match achievable in the continuum limit (n → ∞). Under mild regularity assumptions on the offline matching instances, we prove that SOAR achieves the optimal regret scaling (up to a log factor). We further characterize the optimal regret scaling for interesting classes of problems with additional model structure, in particular, two classes of utility functions: (i) the "spatial utilities", namely the negative p-th power of the Euclidean distance between the supply and demand vectors where p ≥ 1; and (ii) the dot-product utility (equivalently p = 2 of (i)), and two classes of distributions: (i) both supply and demand distributions are smooth (a more stringent assumption) and (ii) supply and demand distributions are supported over compact sets (a mild assumption). En route to proving our guarantees we develop a novel framework for analyzing the performance of our SOAR policy which may be of wider applicability and independent interest. As a corollary of our techniques, we also resolve an open problem posed in Kanoria 2022.
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 451
Open AccessFeature Based Dynamic Matching
Motivated by matching platforms that match agents in a centralized manner, we introduce a model of dynamic two-sided matching where both demand and supply are heterogeneous with many types and the pool of supply units is limited. We model heterogeneity on the two sides of the market by i.i.d. demand weight vectors and i.i.d. supply feature vectors, with possibly different distributions. The matching of a demand-supply pair generates a utility that depends on their weight and feature vectors. To reflect the realistic structure of a heterogeneous matching market while also avoid impossibility results, we consider various levels of assumptions (in particular, the spatial structure) on matching utilities and feature distributions. The goal of the centralized platform is to dynamically assign supply units to sequentially arriving demand units in order to maximize utility. Many popular heuristic policies are either sub-optimal (like the myopic policy) or computationally inefficient (like the certainty equivalent policy). We propose a forward-looking supply-aware policy dubbed Simulate-Optimize-Assign-Repeat (SOAR) that combines practicality and strong theoretical guarantee. Inspired by model predictive control (MPC), SOAR leverages the power of simulation to balance between producing immediate high match utility and preserving valuable supply for future demands. We use regret as our performance metric for matching policies, specifically the additive loss relative to the utility per match achievable in the continuum limit (n → ∞). Under mild regularity assumptions on the offline matching instances, we prove that SOAR achieves the optimal regret scaling (up to a log factor). We further characterize the optimal regret scaling for interesting classes of problems with additional model structure, in particular, two classes of utility functions: (i) the "spatial utilities", namely the negative p-th power of the Euclidean distance between the supply and demand vectors where p ≥ 1; and (ii) the dot-product utility (equivalently p = 2 of (i)), and two classes of distributions: (i) both supply and demand distributions are smooth (a more stringent assumption) and (ii) supply and demand distributions are supported over compact sets (a mild assumption). En route to proving our guarantees we develop a novel framework for analyzing the performance of our SOAR policy which may be of wider applicability and independent interest. As a corollary of our techniques, we also resolve an open problem posed in Kanoria 2022.