Sebastian Köhler
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Sebastian Köhler has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ivan Martinovic
University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
5 shared publications - Martin Strohmeier
OpenSky Network
5 shared publications - Simon Birnbach
University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
5 shared publications - Joshua Smailes
University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
3 shared publications - Salkield
University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
3 shared publications - Kasper Rasmussen
University of Oxford
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 22-33
SideDish: Low-Cost Anti-Spoofing Countermeasure for Satellite Data Communications
- 29 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 22-33
Open AccessSideDish: Low-Cost Anti-Spoofing Countermeasure for Satellite Data Communications
- Open Access
- 29 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
- Vol. 29 (1) , 1-35
SatIQ: Extensible and Stable Satellite Authentication using Hardware Fingerprinting
As satellite systems become a greater part of critical infrastructure, they have become a significantly more appealing target for attacks. The availability of cheap off-the-shelf radio hardware has made signal spoofing and physical layer attacks more accessible than ever to a wide range of adversaries, from hobbyists to nation-state actors. Legacy systems are particularly vulnerable due to their lack of cryptographic security, and cannot be patched to support novel security measures. In this article, we use radio transmitter fingerprinting to authenticate satellite downlinks, using characteristics of the transmitter hardware expressed as impairments on the physical layer radio signal. Our SatIQ system employs a Siamese neural network and an autoencoder to extract an efficient encoding of message headers that preserves identifying information. We focus on high sample rate fingerprinting, making device fingerprints difficult to forge without similarly high sample rate transmitting hardware. We collected 10290000 messages from the Iridium satellite constellation at 25 MS/s, and demonstrate that the SatIQ model trained on this data maintains performance over time without retraining, and can be used on new transmitters with no impact on performance. We analyze the system’s robustness against weather and signal factors, and demonstrate its effectiveness under attack, achieving an Equal Error Rate of 0.072 and ROC AUC of 0.960. We conclude that our techniques are useful for building fingerprinting systems that are effective at authenticating satellite communication, maintain performance over time and across satellite replacement, and provide robustness against spoofing and replay by raising the required budget for attacks.
- 29 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
- Vol. 29 (1) , 1-35
Open AccessSatIQ: Extensible and Stable Satellite Authentication using Hardware Fingerprinting
As satellite systems become a greater part of critical infrastructure, they have become a significantly more appealing target for attacks. The availability of cheap off-the-shelf radio hardware has made signal spoofing and physical layer attacks more accessible than ever to a wide range of adversaries, from hobbyists to nation-state actors. Legacy systems are particularly vulnerable due to their lack of cryptographic security, and cannot be patched to support novel security measures. In this article, we use radio transmitter fingerprinting to authenticate satellite downlinks, using characteristics of the transmitter hardware expressed as impairments on the physical layer radio signal. Our SatIQ system employs a Siamese neural network and an autoencoder to extract an efficient encoding of message headers that preserves identifying information. We focus on high sample rate fingerprinting, making device fingerprints difficult to forge without similarly high sample rate transmitting hardware. We collected 10290000 messages from the Iridium satellite constellation at 25 MS/s, and demonstrate that the SatIQ model trained on this data maintains performance over time without retraining, and can be used on new transmitters with no impact on performance. We analyze the system’s robustness against weather and signal factors, and demonstrate its effectiveness under attack, achieving an Equal Error Rate of 0.072 and ROC AUC of 0.960. We conclude that our techniques are useful for building fingerprinting systems that are effective at authenticating satellite communication, maintain performance over time and across satellite replacement, and provide robustness against spoofing and replay by raising the required budget for attacks.
- Open Access
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 147-159
Ripple: Software-Only Detection of Signal Injection Attacks in Drone Temperature Sensors
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 147-159
Open AccessRipple: Software-Only Detection of Signal Injection Attacks in Drone Temperature Sensors
- Open Access
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 160-171
SpaceJam: Protocol-aware Jamming Attacks against Space Communications
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 160-171
Open AccessSpaceJam: Protocol-aware Jamming Attacks against Space Communications
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 608-621
Watch This Space: Securing Satellite Communication through Resilient Transmitter Fingerprinting
Due to an increase in the availability of cheap off-the-shelf radio hardware, signal spoofing and replay attacks on satellite ground systems have become more accessible than ever. This is particularly a problem for legacy systems, many of which do not offer cryptographic security and cannot be patched to support novel security measures. Therefore, in this paper we explore radio transmitter fingerprinting in the context of satellite systems. We introduce the SatIQ system, proposing novel techniques for authenticating transmissions using characteristics of the transmitter hardware expressed as impairments on the downlinked radio signal. We look in particular at high sample rate fingerprinting, making device fingerprints difficult to forge without similarly high sample rate transmitting hardware, thus raising the required budget for spoofing and replay attacks. We also examine the difficulty of this approach with high levels of atmospheric noise and multipath scattering, and analyze potential solutions to this problem. We focus on the Iridium satellite constellation, for which we collected 1705202 messages at a sample rate of 25 MS/s. We use this data to train a fingerprinting model consisting of an autoencoder combined with a Siamese neural network, enabling the model to learn an efficient encoding of the message headers that preserves identifying information. We demonstrate the fingerprinting system's robustness under attack by replaying messages using a Software-Defined Radio, achieving an Equal Error Rate of 0.120, and ROC AUC of 0.946. Finally, we analyze its stability over time by introducing a time gap between training and testing data, and its extensibility by introducing new transmitters which have not been seen before. We conclude that our techniques are useful for building fingerprinting systems that are stable over time, can be used immediately with new transmitters without retraining, and provide robustness against spoofing and replay attacks by raising the required budget for attacks.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 608-621
Open AccessWatch This Space: Securing Satellite Communication through Resilient Transmitter Fingerprinting
Due to an increase in the availability of cheap off-the-shelf radio hardware, signal spoofing and replay attacks on satellite ground systems have become more accessible than ever. This is particularly a problem for legacy systems, many of which do not offer cryptographic security and cannot be patched to support novel security measures. Therefore, in this paper we explore radio transmitter fingerprinting in the context of satellite systems. We introduce the SatIQ system, proposing novel techniques for authenticating transmissions using characteristics of the transmitter hardware expressed as impairments on the downlinked radio signal. We look in particular at high sample rate fingerprinting, making device fingerprints difficult to forge without similarly high sample rate transmitting hardware, thus raising the required budget for spoofing and replay attacks. We also examine the difficulty of this approach with high levels of atmospheric noise and multipath scattering, and analyze potential solutions to this problem. We focus on the Iridium satellite constellation, for which we collected 1705202 messages at a sample rate of 25 MS/s. We use this data to train a fingerprinting model consisting of an autoencoder combined with a Siamese neural network, enabling the model to learn an efficient encoding of the message headers that preserves identifying information. We demonstrate the fingerprinting system's robustness under attack by replaying messages using a Software-Defined Radio, achieving an Equal Error Rate of 0.120, and ROC AUC of 0.946. Finally, we analyze its stability over time by introducing a time gap between training and testing data, and its extensibility by introducing new transmitters which have not been seen before. We conclude that our techniques are useful for building fingerprinting systems that are stable over time, can be used immediately with new transmitters without retraining, and provide robustness against spoofing and replay attacks by raising the required budget for attacks.
- Open Access
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 341-352
Satellite Spoofing from A to Z: On the Requirements of Satellite Downlink Overshadowing Attacks
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 341-352
Open AccessSatellite Spoofing from A to Z: On the Requirements of Satellite Downlink Overshadowing Attacks