Rahul Chatterjee
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Rahul Chatterjee has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Naman Gupta
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA
4 shared publications - David Youssef
Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA
2 shared publications - Julia Nonnenkamp
Department of Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA
2 shared publications - Kayleigh Cowan
Disability Rights Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, USA
2 shared publications - Kyle Huang
Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA
2 shared publications - Matthew Berland
University of Wisconsin‐Madison Madison Wisconsin USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-26
“I’m trying not to get hacked:” How Adults with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities Navigate Security and Privacy Notifications
- 24 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-26
Open Access“I’m trying not to get hacked:” How Adults with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities Navigate Security and Privacy Notifications
- Open Access
- 9 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 100-106
BREAK-IT: Understanding Novice Approaches to an Attack Challenge Task
With increasing reliance on computing systems and the growing frequency of cybersecurity incidents, it is important for CS undergraduates to develop foundational security skills before entering professional roles. In particular, students should be able to recognize and reason about potential security vulnerabilities in software. However, existing approaches to integrating security into the CS curriculum often emphasize narrow areas such as secure coding or highly technical topics like cryptography or software security, rather than fostering a broader perception of security threats. In this paper, we examine how undergraduates conceptualize and identify security threats by analyzing how they attempt to find ''attacks'' in other students' code. We conducted a think-aloud study with 15 CS undergraduates at a US-based R1 institution who had no formal training in computer security. Participants analyzed peer-developed text-based video game implementations to identify potential vulnerabilities, drawing on their prior experience implementing a similar game in an earlier ''Build-It'' task. Our analysis shows that students employed systematic, hypothesis-driven strategies, including unit testing, edge-case exploration, and controlled experimentation, while also drawing on prior experiences both inside and outside the classroom. Although most students attempted to validate whether an attack was successful, several stopped after identifying a single vulnerability, leaving additional issues unexplored. Based on these findings, we offer recommendations for CS instructors and curriculum committees on integrating foundational security concepts into programming assignments to help students better recognize and reason about computer security threats.
- 9 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 100-106
Open AccessBREAK-IT: Understanding Novice Approaches to an Attack Challenge Task
With increasing reliance on computing systems and the growing frequency of cybersecurity incidents, it is important for CS undergraduates to develop foundational security skills before entering professional roles. In particular, students should be able to recognize and reason about potential security vulnerabilities in software. However, existing approaches to integrating security into the CS curriculum often emphasize narrow areas such as secure coding or highly technical topics like cryptography or software security, rather than fostering a broader perception of security threats. In this paper, we examine how undergraduates conceptualize and identify security threats by analyzing how they attempt to find ''attacks'' in other students' code. We conducted a think-aloud study with 15 CS undergraduates at a US-based R1 institution who had no formal training in computer security. Participants analyzed peer-developed text-based video game implementations to identify potential vulnerabilities, drawing on their prior experience implementing a similar game in an earlier ''Build-It'' task. Our analysis shows that students employed systematic, hypothesis-driven strategies, including unit testing, edge-case exploration, and controlled experimentation, while also drawing on prior experiences both inside and outside the classroom. Although most students attempted to validate whether an attack was successful, several stopped after identifying a single vulnerability, leaving additional issues unexplored. Based on these findings, we offer recommendations for CS instructors and curriculum committees on integrating foundational security concepts into programming assignments to help students better recognize and reason about computer security threats.
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4304-4318
Hidden in Plain Bytes: Investigating Interpersonal Account Compromise with Data Exports
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4304-4318
Open AccessHidden in Plain Bytes: Investigating Interpersonal Account Compromise with Data Exports
- Open Access
- 16 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction
- Vol. 9 (7) , 1-32
Legal Evidence of Technology-Facilitated Abuse in Wisconsin: Surfacing Barriers Within and Beyond the Courtroom
Abusers routinely use technology to spy on and harass their targets. This harmful behavior is known as technology-facilitated abuse , or tech abuse. Survivors of tech abuse may turn to the legal system for safety and security, and to do so, they need evidence of tech abuse. However, prior work indicates challenges to collecting evidence of tech abuse and using it in legal proceedings. Thus, in this work, we study legal evidence used by survivors of tech abuse in Wisconsin, USA. We report on qualitative interviews and focus groups with 19 legal support providers who work with survivors seeking protective orders, divorces, and criminal charges. Our findings surface current practices that survivors and legal support providers use to prepare and present evidence of tech abuse in Wisconsin and the challenges they face. For example, survivors struggle to collect evidence of covert monitoring and surveillance. When they can collect evidence, it is often difficult to connect that evidence to the abuser due to the anonymous nature of many forms of tech abuse. In court, evidence of tech abuse is frequently challenged and vulnerable to objections and counter-evidence. And at the end of a proceeding, it's not uncommon for a judge to determine that the tech abuse does not meet the statutes. Informed by these results, we encourage CSCW and HCI researchers to work towards designing and deploying sociotechnical solutions that support survivors' use of evidence, in careful collaboration with advocates, legal experts, and survivors.
- 16 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction
- Vol. 9 (7) , 1-32
Open AccessLegal Evidence of Technology-Facilitated Abuse in Wisconsin: Surfacing Barriers Within and Beyond the Courtroom
Abusers routinely use technology to spy on and harass their targets. This harmful behavior is known as technology-facilitated abuse , or tech abuse. Survivors of tech abuse may turn to the legal system for safety and security, and to do so, they need evidence of tech abuse. However, prior work indicates challenges to collecting evidence of tech abuse and using it in legal proceedings. Thus, in this work, we study legal evidence used by survivors of tech abuse in Wisconsin, USA. We report on qualitative interviews and focus groups with 19 legal support providers who work with survivors seeking protective orders, divorces, and criminal charges. Our findings surface current practices that survivors and legal support providers use to prepare and present evidence of tech abuse in Wisconsin and the challenges they face. For example, survivors struggle to collect evidence of covert monitoring and surveillance. When they can collect evidence, it is often difficult to connect that evidence to the abuser due to the anonymous nature of many forms of tech abuse. In court, evidence of tech abuse is frequently challenged and vulnerable to objections and counter-evidence. And at the end of a proceeding, it's not uncommon for a judge to determine that the tech abuse does not meet the statutes. Informed by these results, we encourage CSCW and HCI researchers to work towards designing and deploying sociotechnical solutions that support survivors' use of evidence, in careful collaboration with advocates, legal experts, and survivors.
- Open Access
- 2 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 16-26
Do CS Undergraduates Show Evidence of a Security Mindset without Formal Coursework? An Exploratory Qualitative Study
- 2 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 16-26
Open AccessDo CS Undergraduates Show Evidence of a Security Mindset without Formal Coursework? An Exploratory Qualitative Study
- Open Access
- 21 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
- Vol. 21 (2) , 1-23
Camouflage: Utility-Aware Obfuscation for Accurate Simulation of Sensitive Program Traces
Trace-based simulation is a widely used methodology for system design exploration. It relies on realistic traces that represent a range of behaviors necessary to be evaluated, containing a lot of information about the application, its inputs and the underlying system on which it was generated. Consequently, generating traces from real-world executions risks leakage of sensitive information. To prevent this, traces can be obfuscated before release. However, this can undermine their ideal utility, i.e., how realistically a program behavior was captured. To address this, we propose Camouflage, a novel obfuscation framework, designed with awareness of the necessary architectural properties required to preserve trace utility , while ensuring secrecy of the inputs used to generate the trace. Focusing on memory access traces, our extensive evaluation on various benchmarks shows that camouflaged traces preserve the performance measurements of the original execution, with an average τ correlation of 0.66. We model input secrecy as an input indistinguishability problem and show that the average security loss is 7.8%, which is better than traces generated from the state-of-the-art.
- 21 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
- Vol. 21 (2) , 1-23
Open AccessCamouflage: Utility-Aware Obfuscation for Accurate Simulation of Sensitive Program Traces
Trace-based simulation is a widely used methodology for system design exploration. It relies on realistic traces that represent a range of behaviors necessary to be evaluated, containing a lot of information about the application, its inputs and the underlying system on which it was generated. Consequently, generating traces from real-world executions risks leakage of sensitive information. To prevent this, traces can be obfuscated before release. However, this can undermine their ideal utility, i.e., how realistically a program behavior was captured. To address this, we propose Camouflage, a novel obfuscation framework, designed with awareness of the necessary architectural properties required to preserve trace utility , while ensuring secrecy of the inputs used to generate the trace. Focusing on memory access traces, our extensive evaluation on various benchmarks shows that camouflaged traces preserve the performance measurements of the original execution, with an average τ correlation of 0.66. We model input secrecy as an input indistinguishability problem and show that the average security loss is 7.8%, which is better than traces generated from the state-of-the-art.
- Open Access
- 11 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-12
A Critical Analysis of the Prevalence of Technology-Facilitated Abuse in US College Students
The ubiquitous use of technology by college students makes them vulnerable to harassment, harm, and intimidation via technological means. We evaluate the prevalence of such technology-facilitated abuse (TFA) among college students in the USA using a critical, feminist, and trauma-informed lens, which is essential to inform policymakers and advocates who support students. We surveyed 776 college students in a large R1 university located in the Midwest region of the USA to examine the prevalence of TFA faced by students marginalized by socio-economic factors, the support sought by student survivors, and the efficacy of support structures. Our findings indicate that 70% students experience TFA, but more than half of them do not seek support. Among the survivors who seek support, 93% students solely rely on informal resources like friends and family, and 6% solely seek support from formal networks such as survivor services or law enforcement. Therefore, we call on policymakers to direct attention to TFA, create tailored interventions to support marginalized students and propose campus-wide campaigns to spread awareness among college students.
- 11 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-12
Open AccessA Critical Analysis of the Prevalence of Technology-Facilitated Abuse in US College Students
The ubiquitous use of technology by college students makes them vulnerable to harassment, harm, and intimidation via technological means. We evaluate the prevalence of such technology-facilitated abuse (TFA) among college students in the USA using a critical, feminist, and trauma-informed lens, which is essential to inform policymakers and advocates who support students. We surveyed 776 college students in a large R1 university located in the Midwest region of the USA to examine the prevalence of TFA faced by students marginalized by socio-economic factors, the support sought by student survivors, and the efficacy of support structures. Our findings indicate that 70% students experience TFA, but more than half of them do not seek support. Among the survivors who seek support, 93% students solely rely on informal resources like friends and family, and 6% solely seek support from formal networks such as survivor services or law enforcement. Therefore, we call on policymakers to direct attention to TFA, create tailored interventions to support marginalized students and propose campus-wide campaigns to spread awareness among college students.
- Open Access
- 10 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 524-538
MASCARA : Systematically Generating Memorable And Secure Passphrases
- 10 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 524-538
Open AccessMASCARA : Systematically Generating Memorable And Secure Passphrases
- Open Access
- 23 August 2021
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43-49
BlindTLS
Governments across the globe limit which sites their citizens can visit by employing multiple kinds of censorship techniques for different types of traffic. ISPs have been able to effectively censor HTTPS traffic by inspecting the TLS handshake which leaks the domain being visited. TLS1.3 attempts to solve this with a proposed ESNI extension which encrypts the SNI (server name indication) value. Since ESNI is optional, ISPs have been known to simply drop handshakes that attempt to use it; SNI based censorship is therefore still a problem even in TLS1.3. We present BlindTLS, a technique that hides the true SNI value in TLS1.2. BlindTLS requires no server modifications and expects only minimal (existing) external infrastructure to circumvent TLS-based censorship. We evaluate and show that BlindTLS is able to successfully provide access to a majority of websites blocked by a real-world ISP with minimal performance overhead.
- 23 August 2021
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43-49
Open AccessBlindTLS
Governments across the globe limit which sites their citizens can visit by employing multiple kinds of censorship techniques for different types of traffic. ISPs have been able to effectively censor HTTPS traffic by inspecting the TLS handshake which leaks the domain being visited. TLS1.3 attempts to solve this with a proposed ESNI extension which encrypts the SNI (server name indication) value. Since ESNI is optional, ISPs have been known to simply drop handshakes that attempt to use it; SNI based censorship is therefore still a problem even in TLS1.3. We present BlindTLS, a technique that hides the true SNI value in TLS1.2. BlindTLS requires no server modifications and expects only minimal (existing) external infrastructure to circumvent TLS-based censorship. We evaluate and show that BlindTLS is able to successfully provide access to a majority of websites blocked by a real-world ISP with minimal performance overhead.