Michael Jaemin Kim
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Michael Jaemin Kim has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jung Ho Ahn
Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
9 shared publications - Nam Sung Kim
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, USA
7 shared publications - Hwayong Nam
Seoul National University
5 shared publications - Jaehyun Park
Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
5 shared publications - Minbok Wi
Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
5 shared publications - Chihun Song
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 10 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 24 (2) , 217-220
Per-Row Activation Counting on Real Hardware: Demystifying Performance Overheads
Per-Row Activation Counting (PRAC), a DRAM read disturbance mitigation method, modifies key DRAM timing parameters, reportedly causing significant performance overheads in simulator-based studies. However, given known discrepancies between simulators and real hardware, real-machine experiments are vital for accurate PRAC performance estimation. We present the first real-machine performance analysis of PRAC. After verifying timing modifications on the latest CPUs using microbenchmarks, our analysis shows that PRAC's average and maximum overheads are just 1.06% and 3.28% for the SPEC CPU2017 workloads—up to 9.15× lower than simulator-based reports. Further, we show that the close page policy minimizes this overhead by effectively hiding the elongated DRAM row precharge operations due to PRAC from the critical path.
- 10 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 24 (2) , 217-220
Per-Row Activation Counting on Real Hardware: Demystifying Performance Overheads
Per-Row Activation Counting (PRAC), a DRAM read disturbance mitigation method, modifies key DRAM timing parameters, reportedly causing significant performance overheads in simulator-based studies. However, given known discrepancies between simulators and real hardware, real-machine experiments are vital for accurate PRAC performance estimation. We present the first real-machine performance analysis of PRAC. After verifying timing modifications on the latest CPUs using microbenchmarks, our analysis shows that PRAC's average and maximum overheads are just 1.06% and 3.28% for the SPEC CPU2017 workloads—up to 9.15× lower than simulator-based reports. Further, we show that the close page policy minimizes this overhead by effectively hiding the elongated DRAM row precharge operations due to PRAC from the critical path.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 604-621
M5: Mastering Page Migration and Memory Management for CXL-based Tiered Memory Systems
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 604-621
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessM5: Mastering Page Migration and Memory Management for CXL-based Tiered Memory Systems
- Open Access
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 637-652
Marionette: A RowHammer Attack via Row Coupling
A body of recent work has revealed that two different rows in a DRAM bank, from the perspective of a processor-memory interface, are connected to the same wordline but two separate row buffers (bitline sense amplifiers) in certain DRAM chips. Such a pair of rows is referred to as a ''coupled-row pair.'' Coupled-row pairs pose a substantial security threat as RowHammer bitflips can be caused not only by the conventional, adjacent aggressor rows but also by their coupled rows that are distant in physical address We investigate the impact of a coupled row on both FPGA-based infrastructure and server systems. In RowHammer attacks, coupled rows have hammering strength nearly identical to aggressor rows, with these attacks invisible to conventional, processor-side mitigation solutions. By exploiting these observations, we present Marionette, a new type of RowHammer attack that exploits coupled rows to extend the existing RowHammer attack surface. First, coupled rows enable an attacker to evade two types of existing software-based RowHammer defenses: tracking- and isolation-based defenses. We induce RowHammer bitflips successfully against tracking-based RowHammer defenses by silently hammering coupled rows. We also identify the feasibility of RowHammer bitflips in an isolation-based inter-VM RowHammer defense by breaking DRAM-subarray-level isolation. Second, we successfully conduct an existing RowHammer exploit in a server under the tracking-based RowHammer defense. In a native server system, Marionette enhances the success rate of the RowHammer exploit by up to 1.66x. Lastly, we explore lightweight mitigation schemes for Marionette by exposing the coupled-row relationship to systems.
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 637-652
Open AccessMarionette: A RowHammer Attack via Row Coupling
A body of recent work has revealed that two different rows in a DRAM bank, from the perspective of a processor-memory interface, are connected to the same wordline but two separate row buffers (bitline sense amplifiers) in certain DRAM chips. Such a pair of rows is referred to as a ''coupled-row pair.'' Coupled-row pairs pose a substantial security threat as RowHammer bitflips can be caused not only by the conventional, adjacent aggressor rows but also by their coupled rows that are distant in physical address We investigate the impact of a coupled row on both FPGA-based infrastructure and server systems. In RowHammer attacks, coupled rows have hammering strength nearly identical to aggressor rows, with these attacks invisible to conventional, processor-side mitigation solutions. By exploiting these observations, we present Marionette, a new type of RowHammer attack that exploits coupled rows to extend the existing RowHammer attack surface. First, coupled rows enable an attacker to evade two types of existing software-based RowHammer defenses: tracking- and isolation-based defenses. We induce RowHammer bitflips successfully against tracking-based RowHammer defenses by silently hammering coupled rows. We also identify the feasibility of RowHammer bitflips in an isolation-based inter-VM RowHammer defense by breaking DRAM-subarray-level isolation. Second, we successfully conduct an existing RowHammer exploit in a server under the tracking-based RowHammer defense. In a native server system, Marionette enhances the success rate of the RowHammer exploit by up to 1.66x. Lastly, we explore lightweight mitigation schemes for Marionette by exposing the coupled-row relationship to systems.
- 21 March 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 24 (1) , 97-100
X-PPR: Post Package Repair for CXL Memory
CXL is an emerging interface that can cost-efficiently expand the capacity and bandwidth of servers, recycling DRAM modules from retired servers. Such DRAM modules, however, will likely have many uncorrectable faulty words due to years of strenuous use in datacenters. To repair faulty words in the field, a few solutions based on Post Package Repair (PPR) and memory offlining have been proposed. Nonetheless, they are either unable to fix thousands of faulty words or prone to causing severe memory fragmentation, as they operate at the granularity of DRAM row and memory page addresses, respectively. In this work, for cost-efficient use of recycled DRAM modules with thousands of faulty words, we propose CXL-PPR (X-PPR), exploiting the CXL's support for near-memory processing and variable memory access latency. We demonstrate that X-PPR implemented in a commercial CXL device with DDR4 DRAM modules can handle a faulty bit probability that is $3.3 \times 10^{4}$ higher than ECC for a 512GB DRAM module. Meanwhile, X-PPR negligibly degrades the performance of popular memory-intensive benchmarks, which is achieved through two mechanisms designed in X-PPR to minimize the performance impact of additional DRAM accesses required for repairing faulty words.
- 21 March 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 24 (1) , 97-100
X-PPR: Post Package Repair for CXL Memory
CXL is an emerging interface that can cost-efficiently expand the capacity and bandwidth of servers, recycling DRAM modules from retired servers. Such DRAM modules, however, will likely have many uncorrectable faulty words due to years of strenuous use in datacenters. To repair faulty words in the field, a few solutions based on Post Package Repair (PPR) and memory offlining have been proposed. Nonetheless, they are either unable to fix thousands of faulty words or prone to causing severe memory fragmentation, as they operate at the granularity of DRAM row and memory page addresses, respectively. In this work, for cost-efficient use of recycled DRAM modules with thousands of faulty words, we propose CXL-PPR (X-PPR), exploiting the CXL's support for near-memory processing and variable memory access latency. We demonstrate that X-PPR implemented in a commercial CXL device with DDR4 DRAM modules can handle a faulty bit probability that is $3.3 \times 10^{4}$ higher than ECC for a 512GB DRAM module. Meanwhile, X-PPR negligibly degrades the performance of popular memory-intensive benchmarks, which is achieved through two mechanisms designed in X-PPR to minimize the performance impact of additional DRAM accesses required for repairing faulty words.
- 11 November 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Embedded Systems Letters
- Vol. 17 (3) , 192-195
Hechi: A Hybrid Approach for Efficient Memory Reclamation Techniques in Mobile Systems
Application startup time, the time it takes for an application to become visible to the user from startup, is a crucial factor affecting user experience in mobile systems. The startup time of applications switching from the background (switching time) depends largely on the number of pages read from storage. When an application starts for the first time or reloads after being killed, it suffers from longer startup time (cold-launch time) as it begins from scratch. To mitigate this, minimizing application kills while retaining essential data in main memory can help, but it involves a trade-off: reclaiming more file-backed pages (pages) slows down switching due to the overhead of fetching them from storage, while reclaiming more anonymous pages (pages) that not associated with any file risks app termination due to limited swap space. addresses this trade-off using a hybrid memory reclamation approach. By deprioritizing the reclamation of essential file pages and dynamically adjusting the reclamation ratio of the two types of pages based on system states, improves startup time by up to 17%.
- 11 November 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Embedded Systems Letters
- Vol. 17 (3) , 192-195
Hechi: A Hybrid Approach for Efficient Memory Reclamation Techniques in Mobile Systems
Application startup time, the time it takes for an application to become visible to the user from startup, is a crucial factor affecting user experience in mobile systems. The startup time of applications switching from the background (switching time) depends largely on the number of pages read from storage. When an application starts for the first time or reloads after being killed, it suffers from longer startup time (cold-launch time) as it begins from scratch. To mitigate this, minimizing application kills while retaining essential data in main memory can help, but it involves a trade-off: reclaiming more file-backed pages (pages) slows down switching due to the overhead of fetching them from storage, while reclaiming more anonymous pages (pages) that not associated with any file risks app termination due to limited swap space. addresses this trade-off using a hybrid memory reclamation approach. By deprioritizing the reclamation of essential file pages and dynamically adjusting the reclamation ratio of the two types of pages based on system states, improves startup time by up to 17%.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 27 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 103-119
AttAcc! Unleashing the Power of PIM for Batched Transformer-based Generative Model Inference
- 27 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 103-119
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessAttAcc! Unleashing the Power of PIM for Batched Transformer-based Generative Model Inference
- Open Access
- 27 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 981-998
TAROT: A CXL SmartNIC-Based Defense Against Multi-bit Errors by Row-Hammer Attacks
Row Hammer (RH) has been demonstrated as a security vulnerability in modern systems. Although commodity CPUs can handle RH-induced single-bit errors in DRAM through ECC, RH can still give rise to multi-bit uncorrectable errors (UEs) and crash the systems. Meanwhile, recent work has indicated that the DRAM cells vulnerable to RH are determined by manufacturing imperfections and resulting defects. Taking one step further from the recent work, we first conduct RH experiments on contemporary DRAM modules for 3 weeks. This demonstrates that RH-induced UEs occur only at specific DRAM addresses (RH-UE-vulnerable addresses) and the percentage of such addresses is small in these DRAM modules. Second, to protect the systems from RH-induced UEs, we propose two RH defense solutions: H- and S-TAROT (TArgeted ROw-Hammer Therapy). H-TAROT is a software-based solution running on the host CPU. It obtains RH-UE-vulnerable addresses during the system boot and then periodically accesses such addresses before UEs may occur. Since it accesses only a small percentage of addresses, it does not incur a notable performance penalty for throughput applications (e.g., a 1.5% increase in execution time of the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite running on a system even with 128GB of DRAM). Yet, it imposes a significant performance penalty on latency-sensitive applications (e.g., a 28.2% increase in tail latency of Redis). To minimize the performance penalty, for a system with a SmartNIC (SNIC), S-TAROT offloads H-TAROT from the host CPU to the SNIC CPU. Our experiment shows that S-TAROT increases the execution time and tail latency of the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite and Redis by only 0.1% and 1.0%, respectively.
- 27 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 981-998
Open AccessTAROT: A CXL SmartNIC-Based Defense Against Multi-bit Errors by Row-Hammer Attacks
Row Hammer (RH) has been demonstrated as a security vulnerability in modern systems. Although commodity CPUs can handle RH-induced single-bit errors in DRAM through ECC, RH can still give rise to multi-bit uncorrectable errors (UEs) and crash the systems. Meanwhile, recent work has indicated that the DRAM cells vulnerable to RH are determined by manufacturing imperfections and resulting defects. Taking one step further from the recent work, we first conduct RH experiments on contemporary DRAM modules for 3 weeks. This demonstrates that RH-induced UEs occur only at specific DRAM addresses (RH-UE-vulnerable addresses) and the percentage of such addresses is small in these DRAM modules. Second, to protect the systems from RH-induced UEs, we propose two RH defense solutions: H- and S-TAROT (TArgeted ROw-Hammer Therapy). H-TAROT is a software-based solution running on the host CPU. It obtains RH-UE-vulnerable addresses during the system boot and then periodically accesses such addresses before UEs may occur. Since it accesses only a small percentage of addresses, it does not incur a notable performance penalty for throughput applications (e.g., a 1.5% increase in execution time of the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite running on a system even with 128GB of DRAM). Yet, it imposes a significant performance penalty on latency-sensitive applications (e.g., a 28.2% increase in tail latency of Redis). To minimize the performance penalty, for a system with a SmartNIC (SNIC), S-TAROT offloads H-TAROT from the host CPU to the SNIC CPU. Our experiment shows that S-TAROT increases the execution time and tail latency of the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite and Redis by only 0.1% and 1.0%, respectively.
- Open Access
- 28 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 986-1001
How to Kill the Second Bird with One ECC: The Pursuit of Row Hammer Resilient DRAM
Error-correcting code (ECC) has been widely used in DRAM-based memory systems to address the exacerbating random errors following the fabrication process scaling. However, ECCs including the strong form of Chipkill have not been so effective against Row Hammer (RH), which incurs bursts of errors discretely corrupting the whole row beyond the ECC correction capability. We propose Cube, a novel chip-wise physical to DRAM address randomization scheme that leverages the abundant detection capability of on-die-ECC (OECC) and correction capability of Chipkill against RH. Cube allows for synergistic cooperation between ECC, probabilistic RH-protection schemes, and the system with minimal to no modification for each. First, Cube scrambles the rows of each chip using a boot-time key in a way that distributes RH victims to multiple Chipkill codewords. Second, Cube utilizes the newly observed distinct RH error characteristics from real DRAM chips, to swiftly diagnose the RH victim rows using the error profile from OECC scrubbing, and even correct it leveraging Chipkill. When combined, Cube decreases the failure probability of PARA and a state-of-the-art RH protection scheme SRS by up to 10− 25. At a target failure probability of 10− 10 per year on a DDR5 rank under the RH threshold of 2K, Cube reduces the performance and table size overhead of SRS by up to 24.3% and 39.9%, respectively.
- 28 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 986-1001
Open AccessHow to Kill the Second Bird with One ECC: The Pursuit of Row Hammer Resilient DRAM
Error-correcting code (ECC) has been widely used in DRAM-based memory systems to address the exacerbating random errors following the fabrication process scaling. However, ECCs including the strong form of Chipkill have not been so effective against Row Hammer (RH), which incurs bursts of errors discretely corrupting the whole row beyond the ECC correction capability. We propose Cube, a novel chip-wise physical to DRAM address randomization scheme that leverages the abundant detection capability of on-die-ECC (OECC) and correction capability of Chipkill against RH. Cube allows for synergistic cooperation between ECC, probabilistic RH-protection schemes, and the system with minimal to no modification for each. First, Cube scrambles the rows of each chip using a boot-time key in a way that distributes RH victims to multiple Chipkill codewords. Second, Cube utilizes the newly observed distinct RH error characteristics from real DRAM chips, to swiftly diagnose the RH victim rows using the error profile from OECC scrubbing, and even correct it leveraging Chipkill. When combined, Cube decreases the failure probability of PARA and a state-of-the-art RH protection scheme SRS by up to 10− 25. At a target failure probability of 10− 10 per year on a DDR5 rank under the RH threshold of 2K, Cube reduces the performance and table size overhead of SRS by up to 24.3% and 39.9%, respectively.
- 17 July 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 22 (2) , 89-92
X-ray: Discovering DRAM Internal Structure and Error Characteristics by Issuing Memory Commands
The demand for accurate information about the internal structure and characteristics of dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) has been on the rise. Recent studies have explored the structure and characteristics of DRAM to improve processing in memory, enhance reliability, and mitigate a vulnerability known as rowhammer. However, DRAM manufacturers only disclose limited information through official documents, making it difficult to find specific information about actual DRAM devices. This paper presents reliable findings on the internal structure and characteristics of DRAM using activate-induced bitflips (AIBs), retention time test, and row-copy operation. While previous studies have attempted to understand the internal behaviors of DRAM devices, they have only shown results without identifying the causes or have analyzed DRAM modules rather than individual chips. We first uncover the size, structure, and operation of DRAM subarrays and verify our findings on the characteristics of DRAM. Then, we correct misunderstood information related to AIBs and demonstrate experimental results supporting the cause of rowhammer. We expect that the information we uncover about the structure, behavior, and characteristics of DRAM will help future DRAM research.
- 17 July 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 22 (2) , 89-92
X-ray: Discovering DRAM Internal Structure and Error Characteristics by Issuing Memory Commands
The demand for accurate information about the internal structure and characteristics of dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) has been on the rise. Recent studies have explored the structure and characteristics of DRAM to improve processing in memory, enhance reliability, and mitigate a vulnerability known as rowhammer. However, DRAM manufacturers only disclose limited information through official documents, making it difficult to find specific information about actual DRAM devices. This paper presents reliable findings on the internal structure and characteristics of DRAM using activate-induced bitflips (AIBs), retention time test, and row-copy operation. While previous studies have attempted to understand the internal behaviors of DRAM devices, they have only shown results without identifying the causes or have analyzed DRAM modules rather than individual chips. We first uncover the size, structure, and operation of DRAM subarrays and verify our findings on the characteristics of DRAM. Then, we correct misunderstood information related to AIBs and demonstrate experimental results supporting the cause of rowhammer. We expect that the information we uncover about the structure, behavior, and characteristics of DRAM will help future DRAM research.