Sonia M. Suter
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Sonia M. Suter has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dov Fox
University of San Diego School of Law , 5998 Alcalá Park, San Diego, CA 92110, USA
2 shared publications- Aaron M. Scherer
University of Iowa
1 shared publication Amy Koopmann
University of Iowa College of Law , 280 Boyd Law Building, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA
1 shared publication- Anya E. R. Prince
University of Iowa College of Law
1 shared publication Anya Prince
University of Iowa College of Law
1 shared publicationBenjamin Berkman
Department of Bioethics , National Institutes of Health, National Human Genome Research Institute, 10 Center Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
IVG in a Post-Dobbs/Skrmetti World: Parentage, Personhood & Regulation
In vitro gametogenesis (IVG) would enable people to procreate in much the way that in vitro fertilization (IVF) does. And therefore, it raises similar legal issues. First, IVG can involve multiple people, raising legal questions about parentage. For gay or single men, a surrogate would be needed to gestate the embryo; for single people, there would only be one parent. Second, the status of the resulting embryo may be a contested matter, with some jurisdictions treating them as persons, others as property, and finally others as something in between. Third, the regulation of IVG may draw from abortion law principles, be unique, or lie somewhere in between. Finally, IVG will raise concerns about equal access and reproductive justice. Many states may not mandate coverage for IVG, just as they fail to for IVF. Access concerns may be heightened for same-sex couples and single people.All of these issues will be resolved in a climate of growing hostility toward the LGBTA+ communities and a legal framework shaped by both Dobbs and Skrmetti. On the question of embryo status, Dobbs could easily be interpreted to permit recognition of legal personhood. On the question of equality, given that IVG allows same-sex couples to have genetically related children and single individuals to procreate without anyone else’s genetic material, states may prohibit these uses under the guise of medical concerns, which Dobbs and Skrmetti likely permit. The chapter provides cautious recommendations on how states should approach IVG regulation.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessIVG in a Post-Dobbs/Skrmetti World: Parentage, Personhood & Regulation
In vitro gametogenesis (IVG) would enable people to procreate in much the way that in vitro fertilization (IVF) does. And therefore, it raises similar legal issues. First, IVG can involve multiple people, raising legal questions about parentage. For gay or single men, a surrogate would be needed to gestate the embryo; for single people, there would only be one parent. Second, the status of the resulting embryo may be a contested matter, with some jurisdictions treating them as persons, others as property, and finally others as something in between. Third, the regulation of IVG may draw from abortion law principles, be unique, or lie somewhere in between. Finally, IVG will raise concerns about equal access and reproductive justice. Many states may not mandate coverage for IVG, just as they fail to for IVF. Access concerns may be heightened for same-sex couples and single people.All of these issues will be resolved in a climate of growing hostility toward the LGBTA+ communities and a legal framework shaped by both Dobbs and Skrmetti. On the question of embryo status, Dobbs could easily be interpreted to permit recognition of legal personhood. On the question of equality, given that IVG allows same-sex couples to have genetically related children and single individuals to procreate without anyone else’s genetic material, states may prohibit these uses under the guise of medical concerns, which Dobbs and Skrmetti likely permit. The chapter provides cautious recommendations on how states should approach IVG regulation.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Law and the Biosciences
- Vol. 13 (1)
Putting the L in ELSI: legal methods for bioethics research
Lawyers and law professors are increasingly involved in interdisciplinary scientific teams and grant research to answer ethical, legal and policy questions related to biomedical topics. Yet, the methods that lawyers use to conduct legal research and analysis are not always familiar to scientists and social scientists conducting peer review of a proposed project with legal aims or a publication reporting a legal study. To better facilitate interdisciplinary ethical, legal, and social implications collaboration, there is a need to better explain how legal research methodologies can provide robust tools to address a range of nuanced biomedical questions. This paper explores legal research and analysis methodologies relevant to federally funded research and scientific inquiry. It sets out different ways that legal research and analysis can advance and support biomedical, bioethics, and health law research and then demonstrates how these benefits can be realized using case studies from existing literature.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Law and the Biosciences
- Vol. 13 (1)
Open AccessPutting the L in ELSI: legal methods for bioethics research
Lawyers and law professors are increasingly involved in interdisciplinary scientific teams and grant research to answer ethical, legal and policy questions related to biomedical topics. Yet, the methods that lawyers use to conduct legal research and analysis are not always familiar to scientists and social scientists conducting peer review of a proposed project with legal aims or a publication reporting a legal study. To better facilitate interdisciplinary ethical, legal, and social implications collaboration, there is a need to better explain how legal research methodologies can provide robust tools to address a range of nuanced biomedical questions. This paper explores legal research and analysis methodologies relevant to federally funded research and scientific inquiry. It sets out different ways that legal research and analysis can advance and support biomedical, bioethics, and health law research and then demonstrates how these benefits can be realized using case studies from existing literature.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
- Vol. 38 (2 Symposiu) , 463-478
Choosing Your "Healthiest" Embryo After Dobbs: Polygenic Screening and Distinctive Challenges for Truth in Advertising and Informed Consent
Polygenic embryo screening (PES) analyzes embryos for hundreds or thousands of genomic loci to generate risk scores that estimate genetic susceptibility compared to the general population. It is marketed directly to consumers. Companies focus mostly on medical conditions, sometimes in ways that oversell its advantages and efficacy, encouraging fertility patients to “choose your healthiest embryo” and “protect your future child from genetic risks. These claims trade on norms of children’s health and good parenting and reinforces those normative ideals. It is easy to assume that PES will be constrained in practice by its clinical limitations and high cost, not to mention the medical risks of extracting eggs and the liability risks associated with handling embryos to screen and select among. What this conventional wisdom misses is how inflated advertising could exacerbate other legal and social forces to expand its use. Since the fall of Roe v. Wade, over a dozen states have banned abortion, forcing some people to give birth to children they would not otherwise have had. Others who are denied the abortion choice may seek to recover this lost sense of agency over their reproductive lives in other ways. This article examines the risks of decision fatigue and choice overload that PES presents prospective parents with, and the distinctive challenges that PES poses for legal liability over matters of truth in advertising and informed consent.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
- Vol. 38 (2 Symposiu) , 463-478
Open AccessChoosing Your "Healthiest" Embryo After Dobbs: Polygenic Screening and Distinctive Challenges for Truth in Advertising and Informed Consent
Polygenic embryo screening (PES) analyzes embryos for hundreds or thousands of genomic loci to generate risk scores that estimate genetic susceptibility compared to the general population. It is marketed directly to consumers. Companies focus mostly on medical conditions, sometimes in ways that oversell its advantages and efficacy, encouraging fertility patients to “choose your healthiest embryo” and “protect your future child from genetic risks. These claims trade on norms of children’s health and good parenting and reinforces those normative ideals. It is easy to assume that PES will be constrained in practice by its clinical limitations and high cost, not to mention the medical risks of extracting eggs and the liability risks associated with handling embryos to screen and select among. What this conventional wisdom misses is how inflated advertising could exacerbate other legal and social forces to expand its use. Since the fall of Roe v. Wade, over a dozen states have banned abortion, forcing some people to give birth to children they would not otherwise have had. Others who are denied the abortion choice may seek to recover this lost sense of agency over their reproductive lives in other ways. This article examines the risks of decision fatigue and choice overload that PES presents prospective parents with, and the distinctive challenges that PES poses for legal liability over matters of truth in advertising and informed consent.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Law and the Biosciences
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-73
Why reason-based abortion bans are not a remedy against eugenics: an empirical study
In Box v Planned Parenthood, Justice Thomas wrote an impassioned concurrence describing abortions based on sex, disability or race as a form of ‘modern-day eugenics’. He defended the challenged Indiana reason-based abortion (RBA) ban as a necessary antidote to these practices. Inspired by this concurrence, legislatures have increasingly enacted similar bills and statutes allegedly as a prophylactic to ‘eugenics’, its underlying discrimination, and the racial disparities eugenics caused. This article tests my hypothesis that this legislative focus on eugenics is largely performative, rather than evidence of true concern about the discrimination and disparities underlying eugenics. My research examined state laws in several areas that fall within narrow and broad understandings of eugenics to determine whether states with RBA bans have implemented policies to counteract eugenics more broadly. My analysis shows that they generally have not. Instead, the apparent motivation is to commandeer concerns about eugenics to restrict reproductive rights. This legislative mission is hypocritical, and it harms the very groups impacted by the eugenics movements—minorities, women, people with disabilities, the LGBTQ+ community, and immigrants. Ultimately, it has led us to Dobbs, which makes everyone vulnerable to the eugenics policies Thomas condemns by undercutting previous constitutional protections against eugenics.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Law and the Biosciences
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-73
Open AccessWhy reason-based abortion bans are not a remedy against eugenics: an empirical study
In Box v Planned Parenthood, Justice Thomas wrote an impassioned concurrence describing abortions based on sex, disability or race as a form of ‘modern-day eugenics’. He defended the challenged Indiana reason-based abortion (RBA) ban as a necessary antidote to these practices. Inspired by this concurrence, legislatures have increasingly enacted similar bills and statutes allegedly as a prophylactic to ‘eugenics’, its underlying discrimination, and the racial disparities eugenics caused. This article tests my hypothesis that this legislative focus on eugenics is largely performative, rather than evidence of true concern about the discrimination and disparities underlying eugenics. My research examined state laws in several areas that fall within narrow and broad understandings of eugenics to determine whether states with RBA bans have implemented policies to counteract eugenics more broadly. My analysis shows that they generally have not. Instead, the apparent motivation is to commandeer concerns about eugenics to restrict reproductive rights. This legislative mission is hypocritical, and it harms the very groups impacted by the eugenics movements—minorities, women, people with disabilities, the LGBTQ+ community, and immigrants. Ultimately, it has led us to Dobbs, which makes everyone vulnerable to the eugenics policies Thomas condemns by undercutting previous constitutional protections against eugenics.
- Open Access
- 10 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Goldilocks Conundrum: Disclosing Discrimination Risks in Informed Consent
Informed consent is a foundational ethical and legal principle in human subjects research and clinical care. Yet, there is extensive debate over how much information must be disclosed to meet ethical goals and legal requirements, especially about non-medical risks. In this online, survey-based experiment of a diverse sample of the US general population, we explored one aspect of this debate by testing whether the level of detail included in informed consent regarding genetic anti-discrimination protections alters individuals’ willingness to participate in a hypothetical research study and their concerns regarding genetic discrimination. Participants were randomized to receive sample informed consent language with one of three levels of disclosure regarding the protections and limitations of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimation Act (GINA). Our sample (n=1195) had a mean age of 45.9 (SD=17.9) years and 40% with ≤ high school education. It was 51.3% female and 36.7% non-Hispanic White. On average, those who received consent language with none of GINA’s limitations highlighted were more willing to participate than those who were warned about various gaps in GINA. They also had significantly lower perceived risk of discrimination than those presented with the most information about limitations. Our study found that providing more comprehensive information about GINA notably increased discrimination concerns and lessened willingness to participate in the hypothetical studies, highlighting the need for clinicians and researchers to thoughtfully consider how to disclose anti-discrimination risks in informed consent.
- 10 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Goldilocks Conundrum: Disclosing Discrimination Risks in Informed Consent
Informed consent is a foundational ethical and legal principle in human subjects research and clinical care. Yet, there is extensive debate over how much information must be disclosed to meet ethical goals and legal requirements, especially about non-medical risks. In this online, survey-based experiment of a diverse sample of the US general population, we explored one aspect of this debate by testing whether the level of detail included in informed consent regarding genetic anti-discrimination protections alters individuals’ willingness to participate in a hypothetical research study and their concerns regarding genetic discrimination. Participants were randomized to receive sample informed consent language with one of three levels of disclosure regarding the protections and limitations of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimation Act (GINA). Our sample (n=1195) had a mean age of 45.9 (SD=17.9) years and 40% with ≤ high school education. It was 51.3% female and 36.7% non-Hispanic White. On average, those who received consent language with none of GINA’s limitations highlighted were more willing to participate than those who were warned about various gaps in GINA. They also had significantly lower perceived risk of discrimination than those presented with the most information about limitations. Our study found that providing more comprehensive information about GINA notably increased discrimination concerns and lessened willingness to participate in the hypothetical studies, highlighting the need for clinicians and researchers to thoughtfully consider how to disclose anti-discrimination risks in informed consent.
- 1 February 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Fertility and Sterility
- Vol. 115 (2) , 282-289
Legal challenges in reproductive genetics
- 1 February 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Fertility and Sterility
- Vol. 115 (2) , 282-289
Legal challenges in reproductive genetics
- 23 September 2019
- Published by Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives in Medicine
- Vol. 10 (4) , a036665
Legal Challenges in Genetics, Including Duty to Warn and Genetic Discrimination
This review will explore two legal issues in genetic counseling: genetic discrimination and the duty to warn. It emphasizes the complexity and variability of federal and state genetic nondiscrimination protections in the United States and how the many gaps in such protections may affect people pursuing genetic testing. The limited law addressing legal obligations genetic counselors owe at-risk relatives likely does not require counselors to warn relatives directly about genetic risks. Whether it permits them to make such disclosures, however, is more uncertain and may depend on the jurisdiction.
- 23 September 2019
- Published by Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives in Medicine
- Vol. 10 (4) , a036665
Legal Challenges in Genetics, Including Duty to Warn and Genetic Discrimination
This review will explore two legal issues in genetic counseling: genetic discrimination and the duty to warn. It emphasizes the complexity and variability of federal and state genetic nondiscrimination protections in the United States and how the many gaps in such protections may affect people pursuing genetic testing. The limited law addressing legal obligations genetic counselors owe at-risk relatives likely does not require counselors to warn relatives directly about genetic risks. Whether it permits them to make such disclosures, however, is more uncertain and may depend on the jurisdiction.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Law and the Biosciences
- Vol. 5 (3) , 495-526
GINA at 10 years: the battle over ‘genetic information’ continues in court
Ten years ago, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (‘GINA’) came into law. While it was unclear how prevalent genetic discrimination was, GINA was enacted preemptively to prevent discrimination in insurance and employment. It also created uniform protections to remedy a confusing patchwork of state and federal protections. Finally, Congress hoped GINA would allay public fears of genetic discrimination that discouraged people from undergoing genetic testing and participating in genetics research. To address those fears, Congress enacted robust protections against genetic discrimination in health insurance and employment, in part, by defining ‘genetic information’ as broadly as possible. Over the last ten years, however, the courts have been battling over the meaning of ‘genetic information’. One interpretive approach adheres strictly to GINA's statutory language; the second interprets the definition restrictively and contrary to the plain meaning of GINA and its underlying goals. While this interpretive conflict demonstrates the difficulty of distinguishing genetic information from non-medical information, this article argues for the broader interpretation. Such an interpretation reflects Congress's choice among imperfect definitional options and it furthers the goal of creating strong protections in health insurance and employment. Finally, definitional consistency is necessary to achieve uniform protections against genetic discrimination.
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Law and the Biosciences
- Vol. 5 (3) , 495-526
Open AccessGINA at 10 years: the battle over ‘genetic information’ continues in court
Ten years ago, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (‘GINA’) came into law. While it was unclear how prevalent genetic discrimination was, GINA was enacted preemptively to prevent discrimination in insurance and employment. It also created uniform protections to remedy a confusing patchwork of state and federal protections. Finally, Congress hoped GINA would allay public fears of genetic discrimination that discouraged people from undergoing genetic testing and participating in genetics research. To address those fears, Congress enacted robust protections against genetic discrimination in health insurance and employment, in part, by defining ‘genetic information’ as broadly as possible. Over the last ten years, however, the courts have been battling over the meaning of ‘genetic information’. One interpretive approach adheres strictly to GINA's statutory language; the second interprets the definition restrictively and contrary to the plain meaning of GINA and its underlying goals. While this interpretive conflict demonstrates the difficulty of distinguishing genetic information from non-medical information, this article argues for the broader interpretation. Such an interpretation reflects Congress's choice among imperfect definitional options and it furthers the goal of creating strong protections in health insurance and employment. Finally, definitional consistency is necessary to achieve uniform protections against genetic discrimination.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Law and the Biosciences
- Vol. 5 (2) , 262-300
The tyranny of choice: reproductive selection in the future
This article explores the enormous challenges to reproductive decision making that could result from two emerging technologies: the potential capacity to create vast numbers of embryos for preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the ability to obtain ever more predictive information about the embryo. Together these technologies could change our reproductive experience, exacerbate existing inequities, and profoundly affect reproductive decision making. Simply comprehending the dizzying amounts of predictive information about the health and traits of future children will overwhelm future parents. But trying to choose embryos with the ‘best’ combination of genetic variants could be paralyzing. Nevertheless, numerous pressures will make this technology alluring, compelling providers to develop remedies to assist future parents with these difficult reproductive decisions. The remedies, however, will create their own challenges. Some might test the limits of reproductive autonomy and heighten social inequities. A particularly vexing remedy would be the development of algorithms for embryo selection, which could routinize reproductive decisions, reduce societal diversity, exacerbate ‘choice overload’ effects, challenge professional norms, and raise the specter of eugenics. Ultimately, this article is a cautionary tale urging circumspection as technological advancements seem to propel us inevitably toward a reproductive future that could create a tyranny of choice.
- 1 August 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Law and the Biosciences
- Vol. 5 (2) , 262-300
Open AccessThe tyranny of choice: reproductive selection in the future
This article explores the enormous challenges to reproductive decision making that could result from two emerging technologies: the potential capacity to create vast numbers of embryos for preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the ability to obtain ever more predictive information about the embryo. Together these technologies could change our reproductive experience, exacerbate existing inequities, and profoundly affect reproductive decision making. Simply comprehending the dizzying amounts of predictive information about the health and traits of future children will overwhelm future parents. But trying to choose embryos with the ‘best’ combination of genetic variants could be paralyzing. Nevertheless, numerous pressures will make this technology alluring, compelling providers to develop remedies to assist future parents with these difficult reproductive decisions. The remedies, however, will create their own challenges. Some might test the limits of reproductive autonomy and heighten social inequities. A particularly vexing remedy would be the development of algorithms for embryo selection, which could routinize reproductive decisions, reduce societal diversity, exacerbate ‘choice overload’ effects, challenge professional norms, and raise the specter of eugenics. Ultimately, this article is a cautionary tale urging circumspection as technological advancements seem to propel us inevitably toward a reproductive future that could create a tyranny of choice.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Law and the Biosciences
- Vol. 3 (2) , 436-444
The End of Sex and the Future of Human Reproduction
The End of Sex: and the Future of Human Reproduction promises, with its title alone, to be an intriguing and provocative book. I have delighted in telling people that I was reading a book about the end of sex just to witness their inevitable raised eyebrows and quizzical looks. For anyone familiar with the scholarship and lectures of Professor Henry Greely, the choice of title should come as no surprise. It is witty and provocative (‘the end of sex?!’), but also informative, letting the reader know in a few short words that the book is really about how humans will reproduce in the future, not whether human sexual activity will come to an end. And, of course, it is a play on the word ‘sex’, which has many different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. Professor Greely makes this point clear early on. In the second paragraph of the introduction, he states that the book is
- 1 August 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Law and the Biosciences
- Vol. 3 (2) , 436-444
Open AccessThe End of Sex and the Future of Human Reproduction
The End of Sex: and the Future of Human Reproduction promises, with its title alone, to be an intriguing and provocative book. I have delighted in telling people that I was reading a book about the end of sex just to witness their inevitable raised eyebrows and quizzical looks. For anyone familiar with the scholarship and lectures of Professor Henry Greely, the choice of title should come as no surprise. It is witty and provocative (‘the end of sex?!’), but also informative, letting the reader know in a few short words that the book is really about how humans will reproduce in the future, not whether human sexual activity will come to an end. And, of course, it is a play on the word ‘sex’, which has many different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. Professor Greely makes this point clear early on. In the second paragraph of the introduction, he states that the book is