Garance Genicot
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Garance Genicot has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Abigail Barr
Department of Economics University of Oxford Manor Road OX1 3UQ. Oxford
1 shared publication - Carolina Concha-Arriagada
Columbia University
1 shared publication - Debraj Ray
New York University
1 shared publication - Sarah Dolfin
Mathematica Inc, Princeton, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-29
Upward Mobility in Developing Countries
- 1 May 2010
- Published by Wiley in Review of Development Economics
- Vol. 14 (2) , 343-359
What Do Networks Do? The Role of Networks on Migration and “Coyote” Use
- 1 May 2010
- Published by Wiley in Review of Development Economics
- Vol. 14 (2) , 343-359
What Do Networks Do? The Role of Networks on Migration and “Coyote” Use
- 1 December 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 6 (6) , 1151-1185
Risk Sharing, Commitment, and Information: An Experimental Analysis
This paper describes and analyzes the results of a unique field experiment especially designed to test the effects of the level of commitment and information available to individuals when sharing risk. We find that limiting exogenously provided commitment is associated with less risk sharing, whereas limiting information on defections can be associated with more risk sharing. These results can be understood by distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, and by recognizing that social sanctions are costly to inflict or that individuals suffer from time-inconsistent preferences. Comparing the groups formed within our experiment with the real life risk-sharing networks in a few villages allows us to test the external validity of our experiment and suggests that the results are salient to our understanding of risk-sharing arrangements observed in developing countries
- 1 December 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 6 (6) , 1151-1185
Risk Sharing, Commitment, and Information: An Experimental Analysis
This paper describes and analyzes the results of a unique field experiment especially designed to test the effects of the level of commitment and information available to individuals when sharing risk. We find that limiting exogenously provided commitment is associated with less risk sharing, whereas limiting information on defections can be associated with more risk sharing. These results can be understood by distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, and by recognizing that social sanctions are costly to inflict or that individuals suffer from time-inconsistent preferences. Comparing the groups formed within our experiment with the real life risk-sharing networks in a few villages allows us to test the external validity of our experiment and suggests that the results are salient to our understanding of risk-sharing arrangements observed in developing countries