Naorin Hossain
Naorin Hossain has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Margaret Martonosi
Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
3 shared publications - Alper Buyuktosunoglu
IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
2 shared publications - John-David Wellman
IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
2 shared publications - Pradip Bose
IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1-26
TEMpesT: Testing Empirically for Memory Transistency
Ensuring correct execution of programs running on today’s parallel systems becomes difficult when memory is shared across several processing units. Memory consistency models (MCMs) were defined to provide a contract between different levels of the hardware-software stack to specify shared memory access orderings for correct implementations. However, instruction set architecture (ISA) MCMs traditionally only reason about the program-visible impacts of shared memory accesses for user-facing program instructions. In virtual memory systems though, there are additional hardware and operating system (OS) level shared memory accesses that can occur to facilitate address translation and may impact the program execution. Memory transistency models (MTMs) were thus coined to define a superset of MCMs that additionally account for underlying virtual memory operations. However, MTM implementations are complex as they are managed across the hardware and OS, making them difficult to specify. In such cases, empirical testing is the usual approach for effective validation of a specification. However, empirical MTM testing is challenging due to the complex ordering relationships between hardware, OS, and user-level operations, as well as the inability to explicitly run and control virtual memory operations with user-level programs. While many MCM testing tools exist and have been used to uncover system bugs, there is no existing work on developing systematic MTM testing techniques, nor has there been any analysis of how effective such techniques are. In this work, we introduce TEMpesT, the first full-system framework that uses ISA-agnostic techniques for performing fuzz testing for MTMs across both hardware and OS levels. TEMpesT uses enhanced litmus tests (ELTs) with novel targeted user-level MTM fuzzing techniques to induce virtual memory operations and coax out corner case behaviors. We used TEMpesT to validate the formal MTM specification \({\tt x86t{_{-}\!}elt}\) on an Intel x86 system running Linux. Our results show TEMpesT’s techniques are able to induce high outcome variety, resulting in 94% of all possible outcomes being observed with just 10,000 iterations of each ELT synthesized for \({\tt x86t{_{-}\!}elt}\) , outperforming prior methodology by 5.8×. This article also introduces MTM mutation tests that we used to evaluate TEMpesT’s fuzzing techniques and demonstrate effective MTM bug detection.- 16 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1-26
Open AccessTEMpesT: Testing Empirically for Memory Transistency
Ensuring correct execution of programs running on today’s parallel systems becomes difficult when memory is shared across several processing units. Memory consistency models (MCMs) were defined to provide a contract between different levels of the hardware-software stack to specify shared memory access orderings for correct implementations. However, instruction set architecture (ISA) MCMs traditionally only reason about the program-visible impacts of shared memory accesses for user-facing program instructions. In virtual memory systems though, there are additional hardware and operating system (OS) level shared memory accesses that can occur to facilitate address translation and may impact the program execution. Memory transistency models (MTMs) were thus coined to define a superset of MCMs that additionally account for underlying virtual memory operations. However, MTM implementations are complex as they are managed across the hardware and OS, making them difficult to specify. In such cases, empirical testing is the usual approach for effective validation of a specification. However, empirical MTM testing is challenging due to the complex ordering relationships between hardware, OS, and user-level operations, as well as the inability to explicitly run and control virtual memory operations with user-level programs. While many MCM testing tools exist and have been used to uncover system bugs, there is no existing work on developing systematic MTM testing techniques, nor has there been any analysis of how effective such techniques are. In this work, we introduce TEMpesT, the first full-system framework that uses ISA-agnostic techniques for performing fuzz testing for MTMs across both hardware and OS levels. TEMpesT uses enhanced litmus tests (ELTs) with novel targeted user-level MTM fuzzing techniques to induce virtual memory operations and coax out corner case behaviors. We used TEMpesT to validate the formal MTM specification \({\tt x86t{_{-}\!}elt}\) on an Intel x86 system running Linux. Our results show TEMpesT’s techniques are able to induce high outcome variety, resulting in 94% of all possible outcomes being observed with just 10,000 iterations of each ELT synthesized for \({\tt x86t{_{-}\!}elt}\) , outperforming prior methodology by 5.8×. This article also introduces MTM mutation tests that we used to evaluate TEMpesT’s fuzzing techniques and demonstrate effective MTM bug detection. - Open Access
- 13 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1-26
SoCurity: Enhancing SoC Security with Anomalous Activity Detection and Localization
As systems-on-a-chip (SoCs) that power our devices become increasingly heterogeneous to meet low-power, high-performance computational requirements, they also become more vulnerable to the possible impacts of an on-chip resource availability attack. In this article, we present SoCurity, the first network-on-chip (NoC) counter-based hardware monitoring approach for enhancing heterogeneous SoC security. With this monitoring approach, we develop a fast, lightweight anomalous activity detection and localization system at the hardware level. The presented detection system uses semi-supervised machine learning models, and requires no prior attack knowledge for detecting anomalous activity. This design choice provides protection against existing and novel future attacks impacting on-chip resource availability. Our localization engine leverages the inherent interpretability of SoCurity’s NoC counters to locate detected anomalous activity in the SoC for focused recovery. We demonstrate our techniques with a case study on a real SoC implementation for a connected autonomous vehicle system and find up to 96% detection accuracy and fast detection (∼30µs for prediction on an ASIC) in online experiments. Furthermore, we show that the flagged anomalous activity can be reliably localized for up to 99% of detected anomalous activity in our experiments.
- 13 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1-26
Open AccessSoCurity: Enhancing SoC Security with Anomalous Activity Detection and Localization
As systems-on-a-chip (SoCs) that power our devices become increasingly heterogeneous to meet low-power, high-performance computational requirements, they also become more vulnerable to the possible impacts of an on-chip resource availability attack. In this article, we present SoCurity, the first network-on-chip (NoC) counter-based hardware monitoring approach for enhancing heterogeneous SoC security. With this monitoring approach, we develop a fast, lightweight anomalous activity detection and localization system at the hardware level. The presented detection system uses semi-supervised machine learning models, and requires no prior attack knowledge for detecting anomalous activity. This design choice provides protection against existing and novel future attacks impacting on-chip resource availability. Our localization engine leverages the inherent interpretability of SoCurity’s NoC counters to locate detected anomalous activity in the SoC for focused recovery. We demonstrate our techniques with a case study on a real SoC implementation for a connected autonomous vehicle system and find up to 96% detection accuracy and fast detection (∼30µs for prediction on an ASIC) in online experiments. Furthermore, we show that the flagged anomalous activity can be reliably localized for up to 99% of detected anomalous activity in our experiments.
- 3 August 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 22 (2) , 105-108
SoCurity: A Design Approach for Enhancing SoC Security
Heterogeneous systems-on-a-chip (SoCs) are increasingly used to meet low-power, high-performance computational requirements but are vulnerable to on-chip resource availability attacks. We propose SoCurity, the first NoC counter-based hardware monitoring approach for enhancing heterogeneous SoC security. With SoCurity, we develop a fast, lightweight anomalous activity detection system leveraging semi-supervised machine learning models that require no prior attack knowledge for detecting anomalies. This design choice provides protection against existing and novel future attacks on SoC resource availability. We demonstrate our techniques with a case study on a real SoC for a connected autonomous vehicle system and find up to 96% detection accuracy.
- 3 August 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
- Vol. 22 (2) , 105-108
SoCurity: A Design Approach for Enhancing SoC Security
Heterogeneous systems-on-a-chip (SoCs) are increasingly used to meet low-power, high-performance computational requirements but are vulnerable to on-chip resource availability attacks. We propose SoCurity, the first NoC counter-based hardware monitoring approach for enhancing heterogeneous SoC security. With SoCurity, we develop a fast, lightweight anomalous activity detection system leveraging semi-supervised machine learning models that require no prior attack knowledge for detecting anomalies. This design choice provides protection against existing and novel future attacks on SoC resource availability. We demonstrate our techniques with a case study on a real SoC for a connected autonomous vehicle system and find up to 96% detection accuracy.