Xinrui Ma
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Xinrui Ma has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Weidong Zhang
Beihang University
1 shared publication - Xingshuo Hai
Beihang University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 March 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 589-594
The Influence of the Uncertainty on Drones’ Cognition in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Communication Network
This paper analyzes the one-leader-multi-followers unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) security game with misperception. In the leader-follower UAV security game, the solution concept under misperceptions can be defined as Misperception Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (MSSE). However, by observing other strategies, players may realize the misperception, which makes players not trust their current cognition any longer. Therefore, this paper proposes a model that the leader drone is aware of the observed differences but all follower drones do not realize, and give the concrete definition of Hyper Best Response Equilibrium (HBRE). Besides, this paper analyzes the relation between the two equilibria in the one-leader-multi-followers UAV security game with misperception to reveal a sufficient condition for cognitive stability and strategy stability. Moreover, this paper verifies our conclusion by constructing several experiments.
- 17 March 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 589-594
Open AccessThe Influence of the Uncertainty on Drones’ Cognition in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Communication Network
This paper analyzes the one-leader-multi-followers unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) security game with misperception. In the leader-follower UAV security game, the solution concept under misperceptions can be defined as Misperception Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (MSSE). However, by observing other strategies, players may realize the misperception, which makes players not trust their current cognition any longer. Therefore, this paper proposes a model that the leader drone is aware of the observed differences but all follower drones do not realize, and give the concrete definition of Hyper Best Response Equilibrium (HBRE). Besides, this paper analyzes the relation between the two equilibria in the one-leader-multi-followers UAV security game with misperception to reveal a sufficient condition for cognitive stability and strategy stability. Moreover, this paper verifies our conclusion by constructing several experiments.