Harold Linh Cole
Research Subjects
Harold Linh Cole has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrew Postlewaite
Dept. of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, U.S.A.
1 shared publication - George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania
1 shared publication - Hanno Lustig1 shared publication
Thomas F. Cooley
1 shared publication- YiLi Chien
Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, United States of America
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 3 August 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Review of Economic Dynamics
- Vol. 50, 28-42
Information acquisition and rating agencies
- 3 August 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Review of Economic Dynamics
- Vol. 50, 28-42
Information acquisition and rating agencies
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- No. No. 2014-0
Implications Of Heterogeneity in Preferences, Beliefs and Asset Trading Technologies in An Endowment Economy
This paper analyzes and computes the equilibria of economies with large numbers of heterogeneous agents who have different asset trading technologies, preferences and beliefs. We illustrate the value of our method by using it to evaluate the implications of these heterogeneities through several quantitative exercises.
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- No. No. 2014-0
Open AccessImplications Of Heterogeneity in Preferences, Beliefs and Asset Trading Technologies in An Endowment Economy
This paper analyzes and computes the equilibria of economies with large numbers of heterogeneous agents who have different asset trading technologies, preferences and beliefs. We illustrate the value of our method by using it to evaluate the implications of these heterogeneities through several quantitative exercises.
- 9 March 2001
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 1 (1)
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies
Individuals making investments typically do not have incentives to invest efficiently when they cannot contract prior to their decisions. When they bargain over the surplus generated by their investments, they will usually not obtain the full fruits of the investment. Intuitively, this hold-up problem should be ameliorated if, in the bargaining stage, each agent has alternatives to the partner he is bargaining with. We characterize the matching and division of surplus in finite economies for any initial investment decisions. We provide conditions on those decisions that guarantee that each agent will capture the change in the aggregate social surplus that results from any investment change he makes. We further show that for any given problem, there exists a bargaining rule by which pairs split their surplus that will support efficient investment choices in equilibrium. We also show, however, that overinvestment or underinvestment can occur for natural bargaining rules.
- 9 March 2001
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 1 (1)
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies
Individuals making investments typically do not have incentives to invest efficiently when they cannot contract prior to their decisions. When they bargain over the surplus generated by their investments, they will usually not obtain the full fruits of the investment. Intuitively, this hold-up problem should be ameliorated if, in the bargaining stage, each agent has alternatives to the partner he is bargaining with. We characterize the matching and division of surplus in finite economies for any initial investment decisions. We provide conditions on those decisions that guarantee that each agent will capture the change in the aggregate social surplus that results from any investment change he makes. We further show that for any given problem, there exists a bargaining rule by which pairs split their surplus that will support efficient investment choices in equilibrium. We also show, however, that overinvestment or underinvestment can occur for natural bargaining rules.