Élise Flore Tchouante
Current Organizations / Institutes
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Previous Organizations / Institutes
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Research Subjects
Élise Flore Tchouante has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marcus Pivato
CY Cergy Paris Université, CNRS, THEMA, Cergy, France
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 19 (3) , 1351-1398
Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty
We consider collective decisions under uncertainty, when agents have generalized Hurwicz preferences, a broad class allowing many different ambiguity attitudes, including subjective expected utility preferences. We consider sequences of acts that are “almost‐objectively uncertain” in the sense that asymptotically, all agents almost agree about the probabilities of the underlying events. We introduce a Pareto axiom, which applies only to asymptotic preferences along such almost‐objective sequences. This axiom implies that the social welfare function is utilitarian, but it does not impose any constraint on collective beliefs. Next, we show that a Pareto axiom restricted to two‐valued acts implies that collective beliefs are contained in the closed, convex hull of individual beliefs, but imposes no constraints on the social welfare function. Neither axiom entails any link between individual and collective ambiguity attitudes.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 19 (3) , 1351-1398
Open AccessBayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty
We consider collective decisions under uncertainty, when agents have generalized Hurwicz preferences, a broad class allowing many different ambiguity attitudes, including subjective expected utility preferences. We consider sequences of acts that are “almost‐objectively uncertain” in the sense that asymptotically, all agents almost agree about the probabilities of the underlying events. We introduce a Pareto axiom, which applies only to asymptotic preferences along such almost‐objective sequences. This axiom implies that the social welfare function is utilitarian, but it does not impose any constraint on collective beliefs. Next, we show that a Pareto axiom restricted to two‐valued acts implies that collective beliefs are contained in the closed, convex hull of individual beliefs, but imposes no constraints on the social welfare function. Neither axiom entails any link between individual and collective ambiguity attitudes.
- 5 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 77 (3) , 561-595
Bayesian social aggregation with non-Archimedean utilities and probabilities
- 5 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 77 (3) , 561-595
Bayesian social aggregation with non-Archimedean utilities and probabilities