Timo Hönig
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Timo Hönig has a total of 46 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Henriette Herzog
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum (RUB)
5 shared publications - Wolfgang Schröder-Preikschat
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany
5 shared publications - Benedict Herzog
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum (RUB)
4 shared publications - Rüdiger Kapitza
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany
4 shared publications - Luis Gerhorst
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany
3 shared publications - Manuel Vögele
Ruhr University Bochum
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 29 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 192-220
Firefly: High-Performance Transient Execution Attack Defenses for In-Kernel Sandboxes
- 29 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 192-220
Firefly: High-Performance Transient Execution Attack Defenses for In-Kernel Sandboxes
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 63-78
CHaOS: A Persistent Lightweight Cache Hybridization-Aware OS
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 63-78
CHaOS: A Persistent Lightweight Cache Hybridization-Aware OS
- Open Access
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 174-188
Practical Whole-System Persistence
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 174-188
Open AccessPractical Whole-System Persistence
- Open Access
- 24 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1676-1689
Systematic Analysis of Kernel Security Performance and Energy Costs
- 24 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1676-1689
Open AccessSystematic Analysis of Kernel Security Performance and Energy Costs
- Open Access
- 14 May 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 96-102
Spork: A posix_spawn you can use as a fork
- 14 May 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 96-102
Open AccessSpork: A posix_spawn you can use as a fork
- Open Access
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 60-66
Where are the Joules? Energy Demand Analysis of Heterogeneous Memory Technologies
- 30 March 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 60-66
Open AccessWhere are the Joules? Energy Demand Analysis of Heterogeneous Memory Technologies
- Open Access
- 3 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 25-32
Moses: Heap Partitioning for Semantic Data Tiering
The adoption of emerging memory technologies has long been impeded by the lack of interfaces communicating memory placement semantics not only between applications, system software, and diagnostics tools but also between multiple tenants in a system. With the support of NUMA and memory tiering in Linux, applications can explicitly place pages based on domain knowledge. Yet, the internal reasoning behind placing a specific allocation into a specific memory resource remain largely hidden from the outside world. At the application level, different allocations exhibit different longevity, which is very prominent in the domain of In-Memory Database Systems (IMDBS), where short-lived temporary allocations required by database operators are distinct from long-lived table data. Consequently, access patterns or non-functional requirements on memory resources like bandwidth and latency vary considerably. To allow for more fine-grained control over the allocation behavior of an application, we propose to partition the heap into memory regions with associated semantics, that are exposed in a hierarchical file system. Our prototype Moses enables domain experts (i.e., programmers) to express and refine memory placement requirements. We demonstrate how this can be applied to the in-memory database system Hyrise. Using Moses, we can achieve semantic data tiering, transparent to extrinsic operating system tools. We subsequently reduce the resident set size of the table data of the TPC-H benchmark by nearly 65 % at a moderate execution time overhead of less than 5 %.
- 3 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 25-32
Open AccessMoses: Heap Partitioning for Semantic Data Tiering
The adoption of emerging memory technologies has long been impeded by the lack of interfaces communicating memory placement semantics not only between applications, system software, and diagnostics tools but also between multiple tenants in a system. With the support of NUMA and memory tiering in Linux, applications can explicitly place pages based on domain knowledge. Yet, the internal reasoning behind placing a specific allocation into a specific memory resource remain largely hidden from the outside world. At the application level, different allocations exhibit different longevity, which is very prominent in the domain of In-Memory Database Systems (IMDBS), where short-lived temporary allocations required by database operators are distinct from long-lived table data. Consequently, access patterns or non-functional requirements on memory resources like bandwidth and latency vary considerably. To allow for more fine-grained control over the allocation behavior of an application, we propose to partition the heap into memory regions with associated semantics, that are exposed in a hierarchical file system. Our prototype Moses enables domain experts (i.e., programmers) to express and refine memory placement requirements. We demonstrate how this can be applied to the in-memory database system Hyrise. Using Moses, we can achieve semantic data tiering, transparent to extrinsic operating system tools. We subsequently reduce the resident set size of the table data of the TPC-H benchmark by nearly 65 % at a moderate execution time overhead of less than 5 %.
- Open Access
- 30 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 644-659
VeriFence: Lightweight and Precise Spectre Defenses for Untrusted Linux Kernel Extensions
High-performance IO demands low-overhead communication between user- and kernel space. This demand can no longer be fulfilled by traditional system calls. Linux’s extended Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) avoids user-/kernel transitions by just-in-time compiling user-provided bytecode and executing it in kernel mode with near-native speed. To still isolate BPF programs from the kernel, they are statically analyzed for memory- and type-safety, which imposes some restrictions but allows for good expressiveness and high performance. However, to mitigate the Spectre vulnerabilities disclosed in 2018, defenses which reject potentially-dangerous programs had to be deployed. We find that this affects Math 1 to Math 2 of programs in a dataset with 844 real-world BPF programs from popular open-source projects. To solve this, users are forced to disable the defenses to continue using the programs, which puts the entire system at risk. To enable secure and expressive untrusted Linux kernel extensions, we propose VeriFence, an enhancement to the kernel’s Spectre defenses that reduces the number of BPF application programs rejected from Math 3 to zero. We measure VeriFence’s overhead for all mainstream performance-sensitive applications of BPF (i.e., event tracing, profiling, and packet processing) and find that it improves significantly upon the status-quo where affected BPF programs are either unusable or enable transient execution attacks on the kernel.
- 30 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 644-659
Open AccessVeriFence: Lightweight and Precise Spectre Defenses for Untrusted Linux Kernel Extensions
High-performance IO demands low-overhead communication between user- and kernel space. This demand can no longer be fulfilled by traditional system calls. Linux’s extended Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) avoids user-/kernel transitions by just-in-time compiling user-provided bytecode and executing it in kernel mode with near-native speed. To still isolate BPF programs from the kernel, they are statically analyzed for memory- and type-safety, which imposes some restrictions but allows for good expressiveness and high performance. However, to mitigate the Spectre vulnerabilities disclosed in 2018, defenses which reject potentially-dangerous programs had to be deployed. We find that this affects Math 1 to Math 2 of programs in a dataset with 844 real-world BPF programs from popular open-source projects. To solve this, users are forced to disable the defenses to continue using the programs, which puts the entire system at risk. To enable secure and expressive untrusted Linux kernel extensions, we propose VeriFence, an enhancement to the kernel’s Spectre defenses that reduces the number of BPF application programs rejected from Math 3 to zero. We measure VeriFence’s overhead for all mainstream performance-sensitive applications of BPF (i.e., event tracing, profiling, and packet processing) and find that it improves significantly upon the status-quo where affected BPF programs are either unusable or enable transient execution attacks on the kernel.
- Open Access
- 16 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Design Automation for Embedded Systems
- Vol. 28 (1) , 23-44
Profiling with trust: system monitoring from trusted execution environments
Large-scale attacks on IoT and edge computing devices pose a significant threat. As a prominent example, Mirai is an IoT botnet with 600,000 infected devices around the globe, capable of conducting effective and targeted DDoS attacks on (critical) infrastructure. Driven by the substantial impacts of attacks, manufacturers and system integrators propose Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) that have gained significant importance recently. TEEs offer an execution environment to run small portions of code isolated from the rest of the system, even if the operating system is compromised. In this publication, we examine TEEs in the context of system monitoring and introduce the Trusted Monitor (TM), a novel anomaly detection system that runs within a TEE. The TM continuously profiles the system using hardware performance counters and utilizes an application-specific machine-learning model for anomaly detection. In our evaluation, we demonstrate that the TM accurately classifies 86% of 183 tested workloads, with an overhead of less than 2%. Notably, we show that a real-world kernel-level rootkit has observable effects on performance counters, allowing the TM to detect it. Major parts of the TM are implemented in the Rust programming language, eliminating common security-critical programming errors.
- 16 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Design Automation for Embedded Systems
- Vol. 28 (1) , 23-44
Open AccessProfiling with trust: system monitoring from trusted execution environments
Large-scale attacks on IoT and edge computing devices pose a significant threat. As a prominent example, Mirai is an IoT botnet with 600,000 infected devices around the globe, capable of conducting effective and targeted DDoS attacks on (critical) infrastructure. Driven by the substantial impacts of attacks, manufacturers and system integrators propose Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) that have gained significant importance recently. TEEs offer an execution environment to run small portions of code isolated from the rest of the system, even if the operating system is compromised. In this publication, we examine TEEs in the context of system monitoring and introduce the Trusted Monitor (TM), a novel anomaly detection system that runs within a TEE. The TM continuously profiles the system using hardware performance counters and utilizes an application-specific machine-learning model for anomaly detection. In our evaluation, we demonstrate that the TM accurately classifies 86% of 183 tested workloads, with an overhead of less than 2%. Notably, we show that a real-world kernel-level rootkit has observable effects on performance counters, allowing the TM to detect it. Major parts of the TM are implemented in the Rust programming language, eliminating common security-critical programming errors.
- 26 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 153-167
Back to the Core-Memory Age: Running Operating Systems in NVRAM only
- 26 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 153-167
Back to the Core-Memory Age: Running Operating Systems in NVRAM only