Simon-Philipp Merz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Simon-Philipp Merz has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kenneth G. Paterson
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Akin Ünal
ISTA
1 shared publication - Felix Günther
IBM Research Europe - Zurich, Rüschlikon, Switzerland
1 shared publication - Frederik Vercauteren
Imec-COSIC, KU Leuven
1 shared publication - Kien Tuong Truong
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
1 shared publication - Marc Houben
KU Leuven
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2294-2308
Breaking and Fixing Content-Defined Chunking
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2294-2308
Open AccessBreaking and Fixing Content-Defined Chunking
- 28 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 385-415
On the Soundness of Algebraic Attacks Against Code-Based Assumptions
- 28 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 385-415
On the Soundness of Algebraic Attacks Against Code-Based Assumptions
- Open Access
- 8 April 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (1)
Breaking BASS
We provide several attacks on the BASS signature scheme introduced by Grigoriev, Ilmer, Ovchinnikov and Shpilrain in 2023. We lay out a trivial forgery attack which generates signatures passing the scheme's probabilistic signature verification with high probability. Generating these forgeries is faster than generating signatures honestly. Moreover, we describe a key-only attack which allows us to recover an equivalent private key from a signer's public key. The time complexity of this recovery is asymptotically the same as that of signing messages.
- 8 April 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (1)
Open AccessBreaking BASS
We provide several attacks on the BASS signature scheme introduced by Grigoriev, Ilmer, Ovchinnikov and Shpilrain in 2023. We lay out a trivial forgery attack which generates signatures passing the scheme's probabilistic signature verification with high probability. Generating these forgeries is faster than generating signatures honestly. Moreover, we describe a key-only attack which allows us to recover an equivalent private key from a signer's public key. The time complexity of this recovery is asymptotically the same as that of signing messages.
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 762-792
Weak Instances of Class Group Action Based Cryptography via Self-pairings
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 762-792
Weak Instances of Class Group Action Based Cryptography via Self-pairings