Guillaume Köstner
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Guillaume Köstner has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cesare Carissimo
Computational Social Science, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
1 shared publication - Emanuele Martinelli
University of Zurich Ethikzentrum, Zurich, Switzerland
1 shared publication - Marcin Korecki
Computational Social Science, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
1 shared publication - Michael Esfeld
University of Lausanne
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Minds and Machines
- Vol. 34 (1) , 1-30
The Man Behind the Curtain: Appropriating Fairness in AI
Our goal in this paper is to establish a set of criteria for understanding the meaning and sources of attributing (un)fairness to AI algorithms. To do so, we first establish that (un)fairness, like other normative notions, can be understood in a proper primary sense and in secondary senses derived by analogy. We argue that AI algorithms cannot be said to be (un)fair in the proper sense due to a set of criteria related to normativity and agency. However, we demonstrate how and why AI algorithms can be qualified as (un)fair by analogy and explore the sources of this (un)fairness and the associated problems of responsibility assignment. We conclude that more user-driven AI approaches could alleviate some of these difficulties.
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Minds and Machines
- Vol. 34 (1) , 1-30
Open AccessThe Man Behind the Curtain: Appropriating Fairness in AI
Our goal in this paper is to establish a set of criteria for understanding the meaning and sources of attributing (un)fairness to AI algorithms. To do so, we first establish that (un)fairness, like other normative notions, can be understood in a proper primary sense and in secondary senses derived by analogy. We argue that AI algorithms cannot be said to be (un)fair in the proper sense due to a set of criteria related to normativity and agency. However, we demonstrate how and why AI algorithms can be qualified as (un)fair by analogy and explore the sources of this (un)fairness and the associated problems of responsibility assignment. We conclude that more user-driven AI approaches could alleviate some of these difficulties.
- Open Access
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (6) , 1-15
Normative relations, mind points and social ontology
The paper spells out an argument to the effect that rejecting what Sellars denounces as the “myth of the given” has a bearing not only on epistemology, but also on ontology: we get to recognizing persons as ontologically primitive. We spell that argument out by drawing on what is known as left-wing Sellarsianism, although our aim is not the exegesis of Sellars’s texts. Our aim is to show how one can get from this argument to a social ontology in the guise of a synoptic view that recognizes both persons and matter in motion as ontologically primitive and that employs the conceptual tools of ontic structural realism.
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (6) , 1-15
Open AccessNormative relations, mind points and social ontology
The paper spells out an argument to the effect that rejecting what Sellars denounces as the “myth of the given” has a bearing not only on epistemology, but also on ontology: we get to recognizing persons as ontologically primitive. We spell that argument out by drawing on what is known as left-wing Sellarsianism, although our aim is not the exegesis of Sellars’s texts. Our aim is to show how one can get from this argument to a social ontology in the guise of a synoptic view that recognizes both persons and matter in motion as ontologically primitive and that employs the conceptual tools of ontic structural realism.