Miodrag Lovric
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Miodrag Lovric has a total of 110 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Andreas N. Philippou
University of Patras
2 shared publicationsChen Zhang
Tsinghua University
2 shared publicationsDamir Kalpić
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, University of Zagreb
2 shared publicationsFrank M. Guess
University of Tennessee
2 shared publicationsFugee Tsung
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST)
2 shared publicationsKimiko O. Bowman
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
What the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox Really Is: Correcting a Persistent Misconception
The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox stands as the most profound divergence between frequentist and Bayesian approaches to hypothesis testing. Yet despite more than six decades of discussion, this paradox remains frequently misunderstood--even in the pages of leading statistical journals. In a 1993 paper published in Statistica Sinica, Robert characterized the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox as "the fact that a point null hypothesis will always be accepted when the variance of a conjugate prior goes to infinity." This characterization, however, describes a different phenomenon entirely-what we term Bartlett's Anomaly-rather than the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox as originally formulated. The paradox, as presented by Lindley (1957), concerns what happens as sample size increases without bound while holding the significance level fixed, not what happens as prior variance diverges. This distinction is not merely terminological: the two phenomena have different mathematical structures, different implications, and require different solutions. The present paper aims to clarify this confusion, demonstrating through Lindley's own equations that he was concerned exclusively with sample size asymptotics. We show that even Jeffreys himself underestimated the practical frequency of the paradox. Finally, we argue that the only genuine resolution lies in abandoning point null hypotheses in favor of interval nulls, a paradigm shift that eliminates the paradox and restores harmony between Bayesian and frequentist inference. Submitted to Statistica Sinica.
Open AccessWhat the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox Really Is: Correcting a Persistent Misconception
The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox stands as the most profound divergence between frequentist and Bayesian approaches to hypothesis testing. Yet despite more than six decades of discussion, this paradox remains frequently misunderstood--even in the pages of leading statistical journals. In a 1993 paper published in Statistica Sinica, Robert characterized the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox as "the fact that a point null hypothesis will always be accepted when the variance of a conjugate prior goes to infinity." This characterization, however, describes a different phenomenon entirely-what we term Bartlett's Anomaly-rather than the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox as originally formulated. The paradox, as presented by Lindley (1957), concerns what happens as sample size increases without bound while holding the significance level fixed, not what happens as prior variance diverges. This distinction is not merely terminological: the two phenomena have different mathematical structures, different implications, and require different solutions. The present paper aims to clarify this confusion, demonstrating through Lindley's own equations that he was concerned exclusively with sample size asymptotics. We show that even Jeffreys himself underestimated the practical frequency of the paradox. Finally, we argue that the only genuine resolution lies in abandoning point null hypotheses in favor of interval nulls, a paradigm shift that eliminates the paradox and restores harmony between Bayesian and frequentist inference. Submitted to Statistica Sinica.
- Open Access
The Bayes Factor Reversal Paradox
In 1957, Lindley published "A statistical paradox" in Biometrika, revealing a fundamental conflict between frequentist and Bayesian inference as sample size approaches infinity. We present a new paradox of a different kind: a conflict within Bayesian inference itself. In the normal model with known variance, we prove that for any two-sided statistically significant result at the 0.05 level there exist prior variances such that the Bayes factor indicates evidence for the alternative with one choice while indicating evidence for the null with another. Thus, the same data, testing the same hypothesis, can yield opposite conclusions depending solely on prior choice. This answers Robert's 2016 call to investigate the impact of the prior scale on Bayes factors and formalises his concern that this choice involves arbitrariness to a high degree. Unlike the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox, which requires sample size approaching infinity, the paradox we identify occurs with realistic sample sizes.
Open AccessThe Bayes Factor Reversal Paradox
In 1957, Lindley published "A statistical paradox" in Biometrika, revealing a fundamental conflict between frequentist and Bayesian inference as sample size approaches infinity. We present a new paradox of a different kind: a conflict within Bayesian inference itself. In the normal model with known variance, we prove that for any two-sided statistically significant result at the 0.05 level there exist prior variances such that the Bayes factor indicates evidence for the alternative with one choice while indicating evidence for the null with another. Thus, the same data, testing the same hypothesis, can yield opposite conclusions depending solely on prior choice. This answers Robert's 2016 call to investigate the impact of the prior scale on Bayes factors and formalises his concern that this choice involves arbitrariness to a high degree. Unlike the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox, which requires sample size approaching infinity, the paradox we identify occurs with realistic sample sizes.
- 20 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 2000-2002
Proportions, Inferences, and Comparisons
- 20 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 566-567
Cp Statistic
- 20 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1421-1428
Maximum Likelihood: Theoretical Foundations and Practical Applications
- 20 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1421-1428
Maximum Likelihood: Theoretical Foundations and Practical Applications
- 20 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 134-136
Axioms of Probability
- 20 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 2090-2093
Random Walk
- 20 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 306-309
Binomial Distribution