Mona Groß
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mona Groß has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel Wiesen
Department of Business Administration and Health Care Management, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
2 shared publications - Heike Hennig-Schmidt
Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
2 shared publications - Arthur E. Attema
EScHER, Erasmus School of Health Policy & Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
1 shared publication - Jeannette Brosig-Koch
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg and Health Economics Research Center (CINCH), Essen, Germany
1 shared publication - Matteo Maria Galizzi
London School of Economics and Political Science
1 shared publication - Nadja Kairies-Schwarz
Institute for Health Services Research and Health Economics, Centre for Health and Society, Medical Faculty, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Health Economics and Management
- Vol. 25 (2) , 217-243
Physicians’ incentives, patients’ characteristics, and quality of care: a systematic experimental comparison of performance-pay systems
How performance pay affects physicians’ medical service provision and the quality of care is relevant for researchers and policy-makers alike. This paper systematically studies how performance pay, complementing either fee-for-service or capitation, affects physicians’ medical service provision and the quality of care for heterogeneous patients. Using a series of controlled behavioral experiments with physicians and students, we test the incentive effect of performance pay at a within-subject level. We consider a performance pay scheme which grants a discrete bonus if a quality threshold is reached, which varies with the patients’ severity of illness. We find that performance pay significantly reduces non-optimal service provision and enhances the quality of care. Effect sizes depend on the patients’ severity of illness and whether performance pay is blended with fee-for-service or capitation. Health policy implications, including a cost benefit analysis of introducing performance pay, are discussed.
- 19 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Health Economics and Management
- Vol. 25 (2) , 217-243
Open AccessPhysicians’ incentives, patients’ characteristics, and quality of care: a systematic experimental comparison of performance-pay systems
How performance pay affects physicians’ medical service provision and the quality of care is relevant for researchers and policy-makers alike. This paper systematically studies how performance pay, complementing either fee-for-service or capitation, affects physicians’ medical service provision and the quality of care for heterogeneous patients. Using a series of controlled behavioral experiments with physicians and students, we test the incentive effect of performance pay at a within-subject level. We consider a performance pay scheme which grants a discrete bonus if a quality threshold is reached, which varies with the patients’ severity of illness. We find that performance pay significantly reduces non-optimal service provision and enhances the quality of care. Effect sizes depend on the patients’ severity of illness and whether performance pay is blended with fee-for-service or capitation. Health policy implications, including a cost benefit analysis of introducing performance pay, are discussed.
- Open Access
- 20 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 87, 102716
The formation of physician altruism
- 20 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 87, 102716
Open AccessThe formation of physician altruism