RRRebecca J. Rennert

Rebecca J. Rennert

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Rebecca J. Rennert has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Differential Development of Object and Location Processing is a Critical Factor to a Child's Passing or Failing Explicit False‐Belief Tasks

    by Rebecca J. Rennert, Annie Cheng, Virginia Chambers, Sabrina Flores, Güldehan Durman, Daniel D. Dilks

    It is well‐documented that 5‐year‐olds consistently pass explicit false‐belief tasks—one of the most common tests for assessing “Theory of Mind” (ToM). But what about younger children? While some studies find that 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds fail explicit false‐belief tasks, other studies find that these same age children pass such tasks, leading to confusion about exactly when, and why, children pass false‐belief tasks. Traditionally, explicit false‐belief tasks include scenarios with object changes (e.g., Smarties task) or location changes (e.g., Sally‐Anne task). However, object and location information are prioritized differentially throughout development, with preschoolers weighting cues about objects over locations. Thus, here we ask whether a child younger than 5 years old could pass an explicit false‐belief task about objects yet fail one about locations, hypothesizing that the development of information processing is a critical factor that contributes to false‐belief performance. To directly test this hypothesis, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds participated in a novel explicit false‐belief task with independent object‐ and location‐change trials. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found i) that all participants performed significantly better on object than location trials, and ii) a significant number of 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds who passed the object trials yet failed the location trials. These findings demonstrate that when testing the development of false belief (or potentially any other cognitive abilities using object and location information), one must consider developmental differences in information processing, since such differences can yield opposite answers and, crucially, opposite conclusions.

  • Two cortical navigation systems and their differential development

    by Rebecca J Rennert, Daniel D Dilks

    A couple of recent neuroimaging studies together led us to hypothesize—perhaps counterintuitively—that the occipital place area (OPA), which supports “visually-guided navigation” (ie making our way through the immediately visible environment, avoiding boundaries and obstacles), develops later than the retrosplenial complex (RSC), which supports “map-based navigation” (ie finding our way from a specific place to some distant, out-of-sight place). But is this true? We directly test this hypothesis using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) adaptation in 5- and 8-year-old children and ask when OPA and RSC represent left and right information—information that both regions represent in adulthood, albeit for different kinds of navigation. Our results revealed that in 5-year-olds, OPA does not represent left/right information and only does so in 8-year-olds. By contrast, RSC in 5-year-olds represents left/right information, like in 8-year-olds. These findings strongly support our hypothesis: the OPA, which is involved in visually-guided navigation, develops later than the RSC, which supports map-based navigation. This developmental timeline not only demonstrates that OPA and RSC develop at different rates but also strengthens the case that these regions serve distinct roles in adult human navigation—since a single system cannot follow two separate developmental trajectories.


  • Open Access

    Dissociable Cognitive Systems for Recognizing Places and Navigating through Them: Developmental and Neuropsychological Evidence

    by Frederik S. Kamps, Rebecca J. Rennert, Samaher F. Radwan, Stephanie Wahab, Jordan E. Pincus, Daniel D. Dilks

    Recent neural evidence suggests that the human brain contains dissociable systems for “scene categorization” (i.e., recognizing a place as a particular kind of place, for example, a kitchen), including the parahippocampal place area, and “visually guided navigation” (e.g., finding our way through a kitchen, not running into the kitchen walls or banging into the kitchen table), including the occipital place area. However, converging behavioral data — for instance, whether scene categorization and visually guided navigation abilities develop along different timelines and whether there is differential breakdown under neurologic deficit — would provide even stronger support for this two-scene-systems hypothesis. Thus, here we tested scene categorization and visually guided navigation abilities in 131 typically developing children between 4 and 9 years of age, as well as 46 adults with Williams syndrome, a developmental disorder with known impairment on “action” tasks, yet relative sparing on “perception” tasks, in object processing. We found that (1) visually guided navigation is later to develop than scene categorization, and (2) Williams syndrome adults are impaired in visually guided navigation, but not scene categorization, relative to mental age-matched children. Together, these findings provide the first developmental and neuropsychological evidence for dissociable cognitive systems for recognizing places and navigating through them.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTTwo decades ago, Milner and Goodale showed us that identifying objects and manipulating them involve distinct cognitive and neural systems. Recent neural evidence suggests that the same may be true of our interactions with our environment: identifying places and navigating through them are dissociable systems. Here we provide converging behavioral evidence supporting this two-scene-systems hypothesis — finding both differential development and breakdown of “scene categorization” and “visually guided navigation.” This finding suggests that the division of labor between perception and action systems is a general organizing principle for the visual system, not just a principle of the object processing system in particular.