Rosalind Dixon
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Rosalind Dixon has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Landau
Florida State University
7 shared publications - Tom Ginsburg
University of Chicago
2 shared publications - Adam Chilton
University of Chicago Law School
1 shared publication Amelia Loughland
Solicitor and Fellow, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
1 shared publication- Ashley Moran
Comparative Constitutions Project, University of Texas at Austin and the University of Chicago, Austin, TX, USA
1 shared publication - Daniel Bogéa
Department of Political Science, University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 October 2026
- Published by Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Vniversitas
- Vol. 75
Control Judicial Responsivo en Colombia
Theories of responsive judicial review and constitutionalism have clear relevance to Colombia. They build on important existing work by Manuel Cepeda on responsive constitutionalism in Colombia and draw on Colombian constitutional experience as inspiration. This paper critically examines the further potential to draw on these ideas in the design and interpretation of the 1991 Colombian Constitution, and lessons from Colombia for global debates on these questions.
- 16 October 2026
- Published by Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Vniversitas
- Vol. 75
Open AccessControl Judicial Responsivo en Colombia
Theories of responsive judicial review and constitutionalism have clear relevance to Colombia. They build on important existing work by Manuel Cepeda on responsive constitutionalism in Colombia and draw on Colombian constitutional experience as inspiration. This paper critically examines the further potential to draw on these ideas in the design and interpretation of the 1991 Colombian Constitution, and lessons from Colombia for global debates on these questions.
- Open Access
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht
Comparative Representation-Reinforcement in Japan
I. Introduction | II. Ely in Japan | III. From Ely to CRRT | 1. CRRT Globally | 2. CRRT in Japan | IV. Conclusion
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht
Open AccessComparative Representation-Reinforcement in Japan
I. Introduction | II. Ely in Japan | III. From Ely to CRRT | 1. CRRT Globally | 2. CRRT in Japan | IV. Conclusion
- Open Access
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht
Comparative Political Process Theory in Japan
In Japan and elsewhere the political process theory John Hart Ely expounded in his 1980 classic, Democracy and Distrust (D&D), remains an influential theory of judicial review. Its main prescription is that of U.S. vs. Carolene Products’ famous footnote four: courts should strictly scrutinize a statute only when it (1) infringes a right that the written constitution either explicitly or intentionally guarantees; (2) closes off channels of political change to outsiders (e.g., by denying them a voice or the vote), or (3) is the product of such severe hostility or prejudice against some outsiders— viz., discrete and insular minorities—that insiders refuse to deal with them no matter what (e.g., racial segregation in schools). Save largely for these three exceptions the courts should give elected lawmakers a large leeway in deciding all public issues. [Excerpt from the Preface]
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht
Open AccessComparative Political Process Theory in Japan
In Japan and elsewhere the political process theory John Hart Ely expounded in his 1980 classic, Democracy and Distrust (D&D), remains an influential theory of judicial review. Its main prescription is that of U.S. vs. Carolene Products’ famous footnote four: courts should strictly scrutinize a statute only when it (1) infringes a right that the written constitution either explicitly or intentionally guarantees; (2) closes off channels of political change to outsiders (e.g., by denying them a voice or the vote), or (3) is the product of such severe hostility or prejudice against some outsiders— viz., discrete and insular minorities—that insiders refuse to deal with them no matter what (e.g., racial segregation in schools). Save largely for these three exceptions the courts should give elected lawmakers a large leeway in deciding all public issues. [Excerpt from the Preface]
- 22 April 2025
- Published by The University of Sydney Library in Sydney Law Review
- Vol. 46 (4) , 455-481
A New Australian Constitutionalism? Constitutional Purposes, Proportionality and Process Theory
Australian constitutional law rests on a foundation of settled principle, including the idea that Australian constitutionalism comprises a mix of legal and political, negative and positive, and fixed and dynamic, constitutional commitments. It also depends on a series of settled substantive principles. Beyond this, there is greater contest between three rival visions of constitutional reasoning: legalism versus purposive or ‘functionalist’ approaches to interpretation; autochthonous versus proportionality-based tests of constitutional validity; and context-invariant versus process-sensitive or ‘representation-reinforcing’ approaches to construction. This essay explores these three dimensions of contest, and argues for the benefits of the newer approach within each of these dyads. Each of these approaches is conceptually and empirically distinct. But each offers important benefits from a democratic and rule of law perspective, and has affinities from a conceptual and comparative viewpoint. The essay therefore argues for a new purposive, proportionality-based and process-sensitive approach to constitutional construction, as a unified approach to constitutional construction in Australia. It also notes the incipient support for each element of this approach within the judgment of members of the High Court of Australia in recent Ch III cases.
- 22 April 2025
- Published by The University of Sydney Library in Sydney Law Review
- Vol. 46 (4) , 455-481
A New Australian Constitutionalism? Constitutional Purposes, Proportionality and Process Theory
Australian constitutional law rests on a foundation of settled principle, including the idea that Australian constitutionalism comprises a mix of legal and political, negative and positive, and fixed and dynamic, constitutional commitments. It also depends on a series of settled substantive principles. Beyond this, there is greater contest between three rival visions of constitutional reasoning: legalism versus purposive or ‘functionalist’ approaches to interpretation; autochthonous versus proportionality-based tests of constitutional validity; and context-invariant versus process-sensitive or ‘representation-reinforcing’ approaches to construction. This essay explores these three dimensions of contest, and argues for the benefits of the newer approach within each of these dyads. Each of these approaches is conceptually and empirically distinct. But each offers important benefits from a democratic and rule of law perspective, and has affinities from a conceptual and comparative viewpoint. The essay therefore argues for a new purposive, proportionality-based and process-sensitive approach to constitutional construction, as a unified approach to constitutional construction in Australia. It also notes the incipient support for each element of this approach within the judgment of members of the High Court of Australia in recent Ch III cases.
- Open Access
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Supremo Tribunal Federal in Suprema: Revista de Estudos Constitucionais
- Vol. 5 (Especial) , 85-100
Constitucionalismo paritário
Em 2021, a Convenção Chilena tornou-se o primeiro órgão constituinte com paridade de gênero. Contudo, a proposta de texto constitucional – que refletiu diversas normas relacionadas a gênero – foi rejeitada por 61,89% dos votantes no plebiscito de saída de 2022. Neste artigo, argumentamos que, embora o constitucionalismo paritário seja promissor e, no caso chileno, tenha se associadoa resultados relacionados a gênero no texto constitucional, a promessa da paridade pode não se concretizar. Assim, advertimos contra uma visão ingênua do constitucionalismo paritário como um dos principais legados do processo de elaboração da Constituição chilena que ocorreu entre 2020 e 2022.
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Supremo Tribunal Federal in Suprema: Revista de Estudos Constitucionais
- Vol. 5 (Especial) , 85-100
Open AccessConstitucionalismo paritário
Em 2021, a Convenção Chilena tornou-se o primeiro órgão constituinte com paridade de gênero. Contudo, a proposta de texto constitucional – que refletiu diversas normas relacionadas a gênero – foi rejeitada por 61,89% dos votantes no plebiscito de saída de 2022. Neste artigo, argumentamos que, embora o constitucionalismo paritário seja promissor e, no caso chileno, tenha se associadoa resultados relacionados a gênero no texto constitucional, a promessa da paridade pode não se concretizar. Assim, advertimos contra uma visão ingênua do constitucionalismo paritário como um dos principais legados do processo de elaboração da Constituição chilena que ocorreu entre 2020 e 2022.
- Open Access
- 2 April 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Global Constitutionalism
- Vol. 14 (2) , 206-218
Courts and comparative representation-reinforcing theory
In the same vein as John Hart Ely, but with a modern, global focus, a new wave of comparative constitutional scholarship focuses on the role of courts in protecting and promoting democracy. This article introduces this new wave of ‘comparative political process’ theory (CPPT), and explains its origins and utility, but also suggests it is best conceptualized as a form of ‘comparative representation-reinforcing’ theory (CRRT). Labels are not everything, but they do matter. And CRRT better captures the varieties of different forms of judicial democracy protection and promotion, and avoids any false claim of neutrality for such an approach.
- 2 April 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Global Constitutionalism
- Vol. 14 (2) , 206-218
Open AccessCourts and comparative representation-reinforcing theory
In the same vein as John Hart Ely, but with a modern, global focus, a new wave of comparative constitutional scholarship focuses on the role of courts in protecting and promoting democracy. This article introduces this new wave of ‘comparative political process’ theory (CPPT), and explains its origins and utility, but also suggests it is best conceptualized as a form of ‘comparative representation-reinforcing’ theory (CRRT). Labels are not everything, but they do matter. And CRRT better captures the varieties of different forms of judicial democracy protection and promotion, and avoids any false claim of neutrality for such an approach.
- Open Access
- 27 February 2025
- Published by Boston College Law School in Boston College Law Review
- Vol. 66 (2) , 477-537
Abusive Feminism
The language of gender equality is increasingly popular worldwide. Yet, it is used both to advance women’s rights and justify the rollback of commitments to equality and democracy. This kind of “abusive feminism” is also arguably on the rise: would-be authoritarian actors today often attempt simultaneously to appeal both to conservative anti-feminist and feminist voters. In one breath, authoritarian actors condemn feminist ideas, and in the other, they selectively and opportunistically advance the language, if not substance, of women’s rights and ideas about women’s descriptive representation. This Article explores this phenomenon, and its prevalence in democracies under strain today—including in the United States, Europe, and Africa—as well as its logic and preconditions. In addition, it explores potential responses on the part of feminists and those committed to electoral democracy. Ultimately, the Article suggests, the safest defense against abusive feminism lies in a general shift toward greater human rights realism over formalism, together with a more careful, anti-essentialist approach on the part of feminist scholars and practitioners. But achieving this shift is likely to involve a range of real-world challenges.
- 27 February 2025
- Published by Boston College Law School in Boston College Law Review
- Vol. 66 (2) , 477-537
Open AccessAbusive Feminism
The language of gender equality is increasingly popular worldwide. Yet, it is used both to advance women’s rights and justify the rollback of commitments to equality and democracy. This kind of “abusive feminism” is also arguably on the rise: would-be authoritarian actors today often attempt simultaneously to appeal both to conservative anti-feminist and feminist voters. In one breath, authoritarian actors condemn feminist ideas, and in the other, they selectively and opportunistically advance the language, if not substance, of women’s rights and ideas about women’s descriptive representation. This Article explores this phenomenon, and its prevalence in democracies under strain today—including in the United States, Europe, and Africa—as well as its logic and preconditions. In addition, it explores potential responses on the part of feminists and those committed to electoral democracy. Ultimately, the Article suggests, the safest defense against abusive feminism lies in a general shift toward greater human rights realism over formalism, together with a more careful, anti-essentialist approach on the part of feminist scholars and practitioners. But achieving this shift is likely to involve a range of real-world challenges.
- 12 February 2025
- Published by The University of Sydney Library in Sydney Law Review
- Vol. 46 (3) , 363-372
Rethinking “On Just Terms”: Commonwealth v Yunupingu
Commonwealth v Yunupingu raises a number of constitutionally significant issues concerning the scope of the Commonwealth Parliament’s power under s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution and its relationship to the territories power in s 122. One issue that is not directly raised by the questions before the High Court of Australia, but that will nevertheless inform the Court’s answers, concerns the meaning of ‘on just terms’. Is ‘on just terms’ a narrow and inflexible requirement to provide full market-based compensation? Or does it permit a broader and more flexible approach to determining the obligations of the Commonwealth and territory governments, which would allow for structural reparations and non-pecuniary remedies? We suggest that a broader and more flexible approach is generally to be preferred as a matter of both principle and prudence and that such an approach is especially relevant for the Court as it considers the consequences of its answers to the questions before it.
- 12 February 2025
- Published by The University of Sydney Library in Sydney Law Review
- Vol. 46 (3) , 363-372
Rethinking “On Just Terms”: Commonwealth v Yunupingu
Commonwealth v Yunupingu raises a number of constitutionally significant issues concerning the scope of the Commonwealth Parliament’s power under s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution and its relationship to the territories power in s 122. One issue that is not directly raised by the questions before the High Court of Australia, but that will nevertheless inform the Court’s answers, concerns the meaning of ‘on just terms’. Is ‘on just terms’ a narrow and inflexible requirement to provide full market-based compensation? Or does it permit a broader and more flexible approach to determining the obligations of the Commonwealth and territory governments, which would allow for structural reparations and non-pecuniary remedies? We suggest that a broader and more flexible approach is generally to be preferred as a matter of both principle and prudence and that such an approach is especially relevant for the Court as it considers the consequences of its answers to the questions before it.
- Open Access
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Global Constitutionalism
- Vol. 14 (2) , 323-348
Responsive judicial remedies
Judicial remedies are the critical means by which courts worldwide enforce and implement constitutional rights. Yet constitutional remedies were largely overlooked by early political process theorists, such as John Hart Ely. Contemporary comparative political process theory (CPPT) or comparative representation-reinforcing theory (CRRT) pays much greater attention to remedial questions, including the use of a range of ‘weak’ judicial remedies. These CPPT/CRRT scholars have highlighted the risks as well as advantages associated with the use of such remedies, but they have not reached any consensus on how to strike this balance and optimise their use. The article therefore draws on one specific recent version of CPPT/CRRT, namely the theory of ‘responsive judicial review’, to propose one way to strike this balance, namely: In cases impacting the ‘democratic minimum core’, courts should generally prefer strong remedies, with delayed relief only applied for prudential reasons; for other cases, courts should deploy more dialogic remedies, but generally these delayed or suspended remedies should be accompanied by a judicial statement of pre-defined strong remedies that take effect automatically in the event of legislative inaction. In this way, this article suggests that courts can give weak remedies ‘bite’, and hence promote actual legislative debate and dialogue, rather than incentivise legislative inaction after their rulings.
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Global Constitutionalism
- Vol. 14 (2) , 323-348
Open AccessResponsive judicial remedies
Judicial remedies are the critical means by which courts worldwide enforce and implement constitutional rights. Yet constitutional remedies were largely overlooked by early political process theorists, such as John Hart Ely. Contemporary comparative political process theory (CPPT) or comparative representation-reinforcing theory (CRRT) pays much greater attention to remedial questions, including the use of a range of ‘weak’ judicial remedies. These CPPT/CRRT scholars have highlighted the risks as well as advantages associated with the use of such remedies, but they have not reached any consensus on how to strike this balance and optimise their use. The article therefore draws on one specific recent version of CPPT/CRRT, namely the theory of ‘responsive judicial review’, to propose one way to strike this balance, namely: In cases impacting the ‘democratic minimum core’, courts should generally prefer strong remedies, with delayed relief only applied for prudential reasons; for other cases, courts should deploy more dialogic remedies, but generally these delayed or suspended remedies should be accompanied by a judicial statement of pre-defined strong remedies that take effect automatically in the event of legislative inaction. In this way, this article suggests that courts can give weak remedies ‘bite’, and hence promote actual legislative debate and dialogue, rather than incentivise legislative inaction after their rulings.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Nomos Verlag in Verfassung in Recht und Übersee
- Vol. 58 (1) , 70-96
Theorising Constitutions Comparatively
The relationship between constitutional theory and constitutional comparison is an area of evolving scholarly interest and concern. Constitutional theory has long engaged in dialogue with constitutional practice, but often that dialogue is more implicit than explicit. In part because of that, it can focus on a relatively narrow range of countries, or ‘the usual suspects’ in constitutional law, and where that happens, the theories developed will not be able to account for the global variety of constitutional experiences and practices. This essay thus starts from the proposition that comparative engagement by constitutional theorists with constitutional practice in a wide range of jurisdictions is desirable, and should be actively encouraged. But it also cautions that scholars must be attentive to taking constitutional comparison seriously, and to engaging in it in a methodologically rigorous way. In order to assist with this task, the essay set out three archetypical modes in which constitutional theory can be informed by constitutional practice—inductive, illustrative and reflexive—and illustrates those modes in practice (including in their hybrid forms and the way they can interact with each other) by reference to a range of recent works of constitutional theory. It then turns to the question of how to ensure that such comparative engagement is methodically rigorous. We suggest that rigorous forms of comparative constitutional theorising involve three key commitments: transparency in the jurisdictions relied on, symmetry between the countries chosen and the scope of theoretical claims made, and self-awareness or reflexivity on the part of scholars as part of this process. Work that adheres to these commitments is more likely to constructively contribute to what is ultimately a collaborative quest by scholars to advancing our collective understanding of constitutions.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Nomos Verlag in Verfassung in Recht und Übersee
- Vol. 58 (1) , 70-96
Open AccessTheorising Constitutions Comparatively
The relationship between constitutional theory and constitutional comparison is an area of evolving scholarly interest and concern. Constitutional theory has long engaged in dialogue with constitutional practice, but often that dialogue is more implicit than explicit. In part because of that, it can focus on a relatively narrow range of countries, or ‘the usual suspects’ in constitutional law, and where that happens, the theories developed will not be able to account for the global variety of constitutional experiences and practices. This essay thus starts from the proposition that comparative engagement by constitutional theorists with constitutional practice in a wide range of jurisdictions is desirable, and should be actively encouraged. But it also cautions that scholars must be attentive to taking constitutional comparison seriously, and to engaging in it in a methodologically rigorous way. In order to assist with this task, the essay set out three archetypical modes in which constitutional theory can be informed by constitutional practice—inductive, illustrative and reflexive—and illustrates those modes in practice (including in their hybrid forms and the way they can interact with each other) by reference to a range of recent works of constitutional theory. It then turns to the question of how to ensure that such comparative engagement is methodically rigorous. We suggest that rigorous forms of comparative constitutional theorising involve three key commitments: transparency in the jurisdictions relied on, symmetry between the countries chosen and the scope of theoretical claims made, and self-awareness or reflexivity on the part of scholars as part of this process. Work that adheres to these commitments is more likely to constructively contribute to what is ultimately a collaborative quest by scholars to advancing our collective understanding of constitutions.