Kang Du
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Kang Du has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ruguo Fan
School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
2 shared publications - Hu Xue
College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing, China
1 shared publication Xuguang Bao
Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China
1 shared publication- Yitong Wang
University of California Irvine, The Paul Merage School of Business, Irvine, California
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 4 October 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems: Applications in Engineering and Technology
- Vol. 45 (4) , 6453-6467
Evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game based on heterogenous social preferences and dynamic punishment
The mechanism of promoting cooperation in the public goods game has always been concerned by scholars. However, most of the existing studies are based on the premise that participants are self-interested. In order to explore why some sellers on e-commerce platforms voluntarily maintain the platform’s reputation, we incorporate heterogeneous social preferences of sellers into the spatial public goods game. We find that heterogeneous social preferences can enhance cooperation by improving collective rationality. Specifically, the altruistic preference of sellers can greatly reduce free-riding behavior, while the inequality aversion preference has a little inhibitory effect. Interestingly, when the benefit of maintaining the platform’s reputation is relatively high, the reciprocal preference can inhibit cooperation, but it can promote cooperation when the benefit is relatively small. This is due to the existence of some loosely connected but stable cooperative or defective clusters of sellers in e-commerce platforms. Furthermore, we propose a dynamic punishment mechanism to punish free riders. We observe that the dynamic punishment mechanism is more effective than the static punishment mechanism in solving the second-order free-riding problem faced by punishers. Increasing the enhancement factor of public goods is identified as a fundamental approach to mitigating this problem.
- 4 October 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems: Applications in Engineering and Technology
- Vol. 45 (4) , 6453-6467
Evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game based on heterogenous social preferences and dynamic punishment
The mechanism of promoting cooperation in the public goods game has always been concerned by scholars. However, most of the existing studies are based on the premise that participants are self-interested. In order to explore why some sellers on e-commerce platforms voluntarily maintain the platform’s reputation, we incorporate heterogeneous social preferences of sellers into the spatial public goods game. We find that heterogeneous social preferences can enhance cooperation by improving collective rationality. Specifically, the altruistic preference of sellers can greatly reduce free-riding behavior, while the inequality aversion preference has a little inhibitory effect. Interestingly, when the benefit of maintaining the platform’s reputation is relatively high, the reciprocal preference can inhibit cooperation, but it can promote cooperation when the benefit is relatively small. This is due to the existence of some loosely connected but stable cooperative or defective clusters of sellers in e-commerce platforms. Furthermore, we propose a dynamic punishment mechanism to punish free riders. We observe that the dynamic punishment mechanism is more effective than the static punishment mechanism in solving the second-order free-riding problem faced by punishers. Increasing the enhancement factor of public goods is identified as a fundamental approach to mitigating this problem.
- 16 August 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Expert Systems with Applications
- Vol. 235
SHI1I2R competitive information spreading model in online and offline two-layer networks in emergencies
- 16 August 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Expert Systems with Applications
- Vol. 235
SHI1I2R competitive information spreading model in online and offline two-layer networks in emergencies