Tanya Sharma
Research Subjects
Tanya Sharma has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Pooja Chandravanshi
Quantum Science and Technology Laboratory Physical Research Laboratory Ahmedabad 380009 India
5 shared publications- Ravindra Pratap Singh
Quantum Science and Technology Laboratory, Physical Research Laboratory, Ahmedabad, India
4 shared publications Ayan Biswas
School of Physics, Engineering & Technology and York Centre for Quantum Technologies University of York York YO10 5FT UK
3 shared publications- Ayan Biswas
School of Physics, Engineering and Technology and the York Centre for Quantum Technologies, Institute for Safe Autonomy, University of York, York, U.K.
3 shared publications - Jayanth Ramakrishnan
Quantum Science and Technology Laboratory Physical Research Laboratory Ahmedabad 380009 India
3 shared publications R. P. Singh
Quantum Science and Technology Laboratory Physical Research Laboratory Ahmedabad India
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 30 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in Advanced Quantum Technologies
- Vol. 9 (4)
Impact of Atmospheric Turbulence on Spatial Mode Mismatch Attacks in Free‐Space QKD Implementation
In free‐space quantum key distribution (QKD), atmospheric turbulence affects quantum signals by causing intensity fluctuations, phase distortions, and beam wander, which may be exploited by an eavesdropper. Accurate characterization of the quantum channel and receiver is, therefore, essential. Detector efficiency mismatch has previously been identified as a possible side‐channel vulnerability. This study examines the impact of atmospheric turbulence on the security of a BB84 QKD receiver under a spatial‐mode mismatch attack. Turbulence is emulated in the laboratory using phase screens implemented on a spatial light modulator. Results show that turbulence exacerbates inherent detection probability mismatches, increasing the receiver's vulnerability. Information leakage to an eavesdropper is characterized and quantified based on both detection mismatches and turbulence strengths. A comparative analysis between Gaussian and Laguerre‐Gaussian (LG) modes shows that LG modes, particularly those of higher order, exhibit enhanced resilience against turbulence‐induced information leakage. These findings highlight the importance of receiver characterization and spatial mode selection for the secure implementation of QKD in long‐distance and satellite‐based systems under realistic atmospheric conditions.
- 30 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in Advanced Quantum Technologies
- Vol. 9 (4)
Impact of Atmospheric Turbulence on Spatial Mode Mismatch Attacks in Free‐Space QKD Implementation
In free‐space quantum key distribution (QKD), atmospheric turbulence affects quantum signals by causing intensity fluctuations, phase distortions, and beam wander, which may be exploited by an eavesdropper. Accurate characterization of the quantum channel and receiver is, therefore, essential. Detector efficiency mismatch has previously been identified as a possible side‐channel vulnerability. This study examines the impact of atmospheric turbulence on the security of a BB84 QKD receiver under a spatial‐mode mismatch attack. Turbulence is emulated in the laboratory using phase screens implemented on a spatial light modulator. Results show that turbulence exacerbates inherent detection probability mismatches, increasing the receiver's vulnerability. Information leakage to an eavesdropper is characterized and quantified based on both detection mismatches and turbulence strengths. A comparative analysis between Gaussian and Laguerre‐Gaussian (LG) modes shows that LG modes, particularly those of higher order, exhibit enhanced resilience against turbulence‐induced information leakage. These findings highlight the importance of receiver characterization and spatial mode selection for the secure implementation of QKD in long‐distance and satellite‐based systems under realistic atmospheric conditions.
- 17 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Advanced Quantum Technologies
- Vol. 8 (10)
Enhancing Key Rates of QKD Protocol by Coincidence Detection
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) provides unconditional security; however, its practical implementations are susceptible to exploitable vulnerabilities. This investigation tackles the constraints in practical QKD implementations using weak coherent pulses. The conventional approach of using decoy pulses is improved by integrating it with the coincidence detection (CD) protocol. Additionally, an easy‐to‐implement technique is employed to compute asymptotic key rates for the protocol secure under specific photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. Furthermore, an experimental implementation of the protocol, where it is demonstrated that monitoring coincidences in the decoy state protocol leads to enhanced key rates under realistic experimental conditions, is carried out.
- 17 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Advanced Quantum Technologies
- Vol. 8 (10)
Enhancing Key Rates of QKD Protocol by Coincidence Detection
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) provides unconditional security; however, its practical implementations are susceptible to exploitable vulnerabilities. This investigation tackles the constraints in practical QKD implementations using weak coherent pulses. The conventional approach of using decoy pulses is improved by integrating it with the coincidence detection (CD) protocol. Additionally, an easy‐to‐implement technique is employed to compute asymptotic key rates for the protocol secure under specific photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. Furthermore, an experimental implementation of the protocol, where it is demonstrated that monitoring coincidences in the decoy state protocol leads to enhanced key rates under realistic experimental conditions, is carried out.
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in Journal of Lightwave Technology
- Vol. 42 (9) , 3221-3227
Mitigating the Source-Side Channel Vulnerability by Characterisation of Photon Statistics
Quantum key distribution (QKD) theoretically offers unconditional security. Unfortunately, the gap between theory and practice threatens side-channel attacks on practical QKD systems. Many well-known QKD protocols use weak coherent laser pulses to encode the quantum information. These sources differ from ideal single photon sources and follow Poisson statistics. Many protocols, such as decoy state and coincidence detection protocols, rely on monitoring the photon statistics to detect any information leakage. The accurate measurement and characterization of photon statistics enable the detection of adversarial attacks and the estimation of secure key rates, strengthening the overall security of the QKD system. We have rigorously characterized our source to estimate the mean photon number employing multiple detectors for comparison against measurements made with a single detector. Furthermore, we have also studied intensity fluctuations to help identify and mitigate any potential information leakage due to state preparation flaws. We aim to bridge the gap between theory and practice to achieve information-theoretic security.
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in Journal of Lightwave Technology
- Vol. 42 (9) , 3221-3227
Mitigating the Source-Side Channel Vulnerability by Characterisation of Photon Statistics
Quantum key distribution (QKD) theoretically offers unconditional security. Unfortunately, the gap between theory and practice threatens side-channel attacks on practical QKD systems. Many well-known QKD protocols use weak coherent laser pulses to encode the quantum information. These sources differ from ideal single photon sources and follow Poisson statistics. Many protocols, such as decoy state and coincidence detection protocols, rely on monitoring the photon statistics to detect any information leakage. The accurate measurement and characterization of photon statistics enable the detection of adversarial attacks and the estimation of secure key rates, strengthening the overall security of the QKD system. We have rigorously characterized our source to estimate the mean photon number employing multiple detectors for comparison against measurements made with a single detector. Furthermore, we have also studied intensity fluctuations to help identify and mitigate any potential information leakage due to state preparation flaws. We aim to bridge the gap between theory and practice to achieve information-theoretic security.
- 25 September 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal of Quantum Electronics
- Vol. 59 (6) , 1-7
Vulnerability in Free Space QKD Due to Detection Coupling Mismatch
Practical implementations of QKD protocols involve devices which are not perfect, and an eavesdropper may exploit this to gain information leading to attacks. Here we have considered the effects of coupling mismatch between the detectors. We find possible information leakage to Eve due to coupling mismatch at the receiver’s detectors in terms of mutual information between the eavesdropper and receiver. The experiment has been performed for the Gaussian and Laguerre-Gaussian modes of the signal. This aspect becomes essential while implementing free space QKD using a satellite. The results suggest that accounting for detection coupling mismatch is crucial to avoid side-channel attacks.
- 25 September 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal of Quantum Electronics
- Vol. 59 (6) , 1-7
Vulnerability in Free Space QKD Due to Detection Coupling Mismatch
Practical implementations of QKD protocols involve devices which are not perfect, and an eavesdropper may exploit this to gain information leading to attacks. Here we have considered the effects of coupling mismatch between the detectors. We find possible information leakage to Eve due to coupling mismatch at the receiver’s detectors in terms of mutual information between the eavesdropper and receiver. The experiment has been performed for the Gaussian and Laguerre-Gaussian modes of the signal. This aspect becomes essential while implementing free space QKD using a satellite. The results suggest that accounting for detection coupling mismatch is crucial to avoid side-channel attacks.
- Open Access
Mitigating the source-side channel vulnerability by characterization of photon statistics
Quantum key distribution (QKD) theoretically offers unconditional security. Unfortunately, the gap between theory and practice threatens side-channel attacks on practical QKD systems. Many well-known QKD protocols use weak coherent laser pulses to encode the quantum information. These sources differ from ideal single photon sources and follow Poisson statistics. Many protocols, such as decoy state and coincidence detection protocols, rely on monitoring the photon statistics to detect any information leakage. The accurate measurement and characterization of photon statistics enable the detection of adversarial attacks and the estimation of secure key rates, strengthening the overall security of the QKD system. We have rigorously characterized our source to estimate the mean photon number employing multiple detectors for comparison against measurements made with a single detector. Furthermore, we have also studied intensity fluctuations to help identify and mitigate any potential information leakage due to state preparation flaws. We aim to bridge the gap between theory and practice to achieve information-theoretic security.
Open AccessMitigating the source-side channel vulnerability by characterization of photon statistics
Quantum key distribution (QKD) theoretically offers unconditional security. Unfortunately, the gap between theory and practice threatens side-channel attacks on practical QKD systems. Many well-known QKD protocols use weak coherent laser pulses to encode the quantum information. These sources differ from ideal single photon sources and follow Poisson statistics. Many protocols, such as decoy state and coincidence detection protocols, rely on monitoring the photon statistics to detect any information leakage. The accurate measurement and characterization of photon statistics enable the detection of adversarial attacks and the estimation of secure key rates, strengthening the overall security of the QKD system. We have rigorously characterized our source to estimate the mean photon number employing multiple detectors for comparison against measurements made with a single detector. Furthermore, we have also studied intensity fluctuations to help identify and mitigate any potential information leakage due to state preparation flaws. We aim to bridge the gap between theory and practice to achieve information-theoretic security.
- 24 August 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal of Quantum Electronics
- Vol. 59 (5) , 1-8
Experimental Shot Noise Measurement Using the Imperfect Detection—A Special Case for Pulsed Laser
Measuring the quantum fluctuations of a laser source is the first task in performing continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols. The quantum fluctuations of the source are measured using balanced homodyne detection. In this paper, we have measured the shot noise of a pulsed laser using imperfect homodyne detection. The imperfections accounted for in the detection process are a delay between the homodyne output arms and also due to the selection of the pulse integration window larger as well as smaller than the photo-current pulse width during the analysis. We have analyzed the imperfect detection results for two different experimental layouts, and a comparative study has been performed. From our analysis, it is evident that these imperfections play a significant role in balanced homodyne detection and must be optimized properly. Our results indicate that balanced homodyne detection can be performed using limited resources, which paves the way for easy experimental realization of optical homodyne tomography and continuous variable quantum key distribution in a laboratory setting.
- 24 August 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal of Quantum Electronics
- Vol. 59 (5) , 1-8
Experimental Shot Noise Measurement Using the Imperfect Detection—A Special Case for Pulsed Laser
Measuring the quantum fluctuations of a laser source is the first task in performing continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols. The quantum fluctuations of the source are measured using balanced homodyne detection. In this paper, we have measured the shot noise of a pulsed laser using imperfect homodyne detection. The imperfections accounted for in the detection process are a delay between the homodyne output arms and also due to the selection of the pulse integration window larger as well as smaller than the photo-current pulse width during the analysis. We have analyzed the imperfect detection results for two different experimental layouts, and a comparative study has been performed. From our analysis, it is evident that these imperfections play a significant role in balanced homodyne detection and must be optimized properly. Our results indicate that balanced homodyne detection can be performed using limited resources, which paves the way for easy experimental realization of optical homodyne tomography and continuous variable quantum key distribution in a laboratory setting.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Optica Publishing Group
- p. QW2A.2
Information Leakage due to Detection Coupling Mismatch
An eavesdropper may gain information by exploiting device imperfections while implementing quantum key distribution protocols. We find information leakage due to coupling mismatch at receiver’s detectors in terms of mutual information between eaves-dropper and receiver.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Optica Publishing Group
- p. QW2A.2
Information Leakage due to Detection Coupling Mismatch
An eavesdropper may gain information by exploiting device imperfections while implementing quantum key distribution protocols. We find information leakage due to coupling mismatch at receiver’s detectors in terms of mutual information between eaves-dropper and receiver.