Varun Gupta
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Varun Gupta has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aaron Roth
University of Pennsylvania
3 shared publications - Natalie Collina
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
2 shared publications - Christopher Jung
Stanford University, USA
1 shared publication - Ira Globus-Harris
Computer and Information Sciences, University of Pennsylvania, USA and Amazon Web Services Artificial Intelligence (AWS AI), USA
1 shared publication - Jamie Morgenstern
University of Washington
1 shared publication - Michael Kearns
Computer and Information Sciences, University of Pennsylvania, USA and Amazon Web Services Artificial Intelligence (AWS AI), USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1532-1543
Tractable Agreement Protocols
- 15 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1532-1543
Open AccessTractable Agreement Protocols
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 640-668
Repeated Contracting with Multiple Non-Myopic Agents: Policy Regret and Limited Liability
We study a repeated contracting setting in which a Principal adaptively chooses amongst k Agents at each of T rounds. The Agents are non-myopic, and so a mechanism for the Principal induces a T-round extensive form game amongst the Agents. We give several results aimed at understanding an under-explored aspect of contract theory --- the game induced when choosing an Agent to contract with. First, we show that this game admits a pure-strategy non-responsive equilibrium amongst the Agents --- informally an equilibrium in which the Agent's actions depend on the history of realized states of nature, but not on the history of each other's actions, and so avoids the complexities of collusion and threats. Next, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a monotone bandit algorithm, then for any concave contract, in any such equilibrium, the Principal obtains no regret to contracting with the best Agent in hindsight --- not just given their realized actions, but also to the counterfactual world in which they had offered a guaranteed T-round contract to the best Agent in hindsight, which would have induced a different sequence of actions. Finally, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a monotone bandit algorithm which guarantees no swap-regret, then the Principal can additionally offer only limited liability contracts (in which the Agent never needs to pay the Principal) while getting no-regret to the counterfactual world in which she offered a linear contract to the best Agent in hindsight --- despite the fact that linear contracts are not limited liability. We instantiate this theorem by demonstrating the existence of a monotone no swap-regret bandit algorithm, which to our knowledge has not previously appeared in the literature.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 640-668
Open AccessRepeated Contracting with Multiple Non-Myopic Agents: Policy Regret and Limited Liability
We study a repeated contracting setting in which a Principal adaptively chooses amongst k Agents at each of T rounds. The Agents are non-myopic, and so a mechanism for the Principal induces a T-round extensive form game amongst the Agents. We give several results aimed at understanding an under-explored aspect of contract theory --- the game induced when choosing an Agent to contract with. First, we show that this game admits a pure-strategy non-responsive equilibrium amongst the Agents --- informally an equilibrium in which the Agent's actions depend on the history of realized states of nature, but not on the history of each other's actions, and so avoids the complexities of collusion and threats. Next, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a monotone bandit algorithm, then for any concave contract, in any such equilibrium, the Principal obtains no regret to contracting with the best Agent in hindsight --- not just given their realized actions, but also to the counterfactual world in which they had offered a guaranteed T-round contract to the best Agent in hindsight, which would have induced a different sequence of actions. Finally, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a monotone bandit algorithm which guarantees no swap-regret, then the Principal can additionally offer only limited liability contracts (in which the Agent never needs to pay the Principal) while getting no-regret to the counterfactual world in which she offered a linear contract to the best Agent in hindsight --- despite the fact that linear contracts are not limited liability. We instantiate this theorem by demonstrating the existence of a monotone no swap-regret bandit algorithm, which to our knowledge has not previously appeared in the literature.
- Open Access
- 8 August 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 259-286
Multicalibrated Regression for Downstream Fairness
We show how to take a regression function that is appropriately multicalibrated and efficiently post-process it into an approximately error minimizing classifier satisfying a large variety of fairness constraints. The post-processing requires no labeled data, and only a modest amount of unlabeled data and computation. The computational and sample complexity requirements of computing are comparable to the requirements for solving a single fair learning task optimally, but it can in fact be used to solve many different downstream fairness-constrained learning problems efficiently. Our post-processing method easily handles intersecting groups, generalizing prior work on post-processing regression functions to satisfy fairness constraints that only applied to disjoint groups. Our work extends recent work showing that multicalibrated regression functions are omnipredictors (i.e. can be post-processed to optimally solve unconstrained ERM problems) to constrained optimization problems.
- 8 August 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 259-286
Open AccessMulticalibrated Regression for Downstream Fairness
We show how to take a regression function that is appropriately multicalibrated and efficiently post-process it into an approximately error minimizing classifier satisfying a large variety of fairness constraints. The post-processing requires no labeled data, and only a modest amount of unlabeled data and computation. The computational and sample complexity requirements of computing are comparable to the requirements for solving a single fair learning task optimally, but it can in fact be used to solve many different downstream fairness-constrained learning problems efficiently. Our post-processing method easily handles intersecting groups, generalizing prior work on post-processing regression functions to satisfy fairness constraints that only applied to disjoint groups. Our work extends recent work showing that multicalibrated regression functions are omnipredictors (i.e. can be post-processed to optimally solve unconstrained ERM problems) to constrained optimization problems.