Wangsheng Zhu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Wangsheng Zhu has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Vijay Mookerjee
Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080
2 shared publications Shaojie Tang
Center for AI Business Innovation, Department of Management Science and Systems, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York 14260
1 shared publication- Subodha Kumar
Temple University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 36 (3) , 1502-1521
Should Ad Exchanges Subsidize Advertisers to Acquire Targeting Data?
Large volumes of online impressions are sold daily via real-time auctions to deliver targeted advertisements to consumers. Advertisers use data to learn about user preferences and select the most appropriate ad for each user, which also help them optimize their bids in an ad auction. Although ad exchanges may provide some user data to advertisers, they are usually limited, and advertisers often acquire data from various sources to improve targeting performance. The acquisition of such data can significantly influence the revenue of the ad exchange, which motivates ad exchanges to take actions that reduce advertisers’ data acquisition costs and encourage them to buy data. In this study, we propose three subsidy frameworks to increase ad exchange revenue by inducing more advertisers to acquire data: all subsidized, winner subsidized, and loser subsidized. Using a stylized model, we analyze the impact of subsidy provisions on the platform’s net revenue. Our results show that winner subsidized can be better or worse than all subsidized depending on the cost of data acquisition, its beneficial impact on ad selection, and the distribution of impression values.
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 36 (3) , 1502-1521
Should Ad Exchanges Subsidize Advertisers to Acquire Targeting Data?
Large volumes of online impressions are sold daily via real-time auctions to deliver targeted advertisements to consumers. Advertisers use data to learn about user preferences and select the most appropriate ad for each user, which also help them optimize their bids in an ad auction. Although ad exchanges may provide some user data to advertisers, they are usually limited, and advertisers often acquire data from various sources to improve targeting performance. The acquisition of such data can significantly influence the revenue of the ad exchange, which motivates ad exchanges to take actions that reduce advertisers’ data acquisition costs and encourage them to buy data. In this study, we propose three subsidy frameworks to increase ad exchange revenue by inducing more advertisers to acquire data: all subsidized, winner subsidized, and loser subsidized. Using a stylized model, we analyze the impact of subsidy provisions on the platform’s net revenue. Our results show that winner subsidized can be better or worse than all subsidized depending on the cost of data acquisition, its beneficial impact on ad selection, and the distribution of impression values.
- 1 September 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 35 (3) , 1011-1033
Coordination in Multibrand, Multimedia Advertising: Is It Always a Good Thing?
The growing online retail market has led to the prevalence of multichannel retailing. Meanwhile, retailers are increasingly combining multichannel retailing with a multibranding strategy. Although this can further increase the retailer’s sales, it brings new advertising challenges. Multibrand, multichannel retailers usually launch advertising campaigns for different brands on multiple media. Thus, their advertising efforts fall into a set of brand-media units. Each unit’s advertising can affect the sales of all brands on all channels. To maximize the advertising returns, a retailer needs to coordinate the advertising expenditures on different units. We develop a stochastic differential equation model that helps the retailer estimate the impact of multimedia advertising on the sales of different brands on different channels. Afterward, we formulate the advertising optimization problems under four coordination strategies: noncoordination, brand coordination, media coordination, and global coordination. By solving the problem for each strategy, the retailers can obtain the optimal expenditure for each unit under that strategy. Finally, we compare the retailer’s profits under four strategies. Interestingly, we find that brand or media coordination may result in a profit lower than noncoordination. Our findings provide insights regarding the selection of coordination strategies for multibrand, multichannel retailers with multimedia advertising campaigns.
- 1 September 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 35 (3) , 1011-1033
Coordination in Multibrand, Multimedia Advertising: Is It Always a Good Thing?
The growing online retail market has led to the prevalence of multichannel retailing. Meanwhile, retailers are increasingly combining multichannel retailing with a multibranding strategy. Although this can further increase the retailer’s sales, it brings new advertising challenges. Multibrand, multichannel retailers usually launch advertising campaigns for different brands on multiple media. Thus, their advertising efforts fall into a set of brand-media units. Each unit’s advertising can affect the sales of all brands on all channels. To maximize the advertising returns, a retailer needs to coordinate the advertising expenditures on different units. We develop a stochastic differential equation model that helps the retailer estimate the impact of multimedia advertising on the sales of different brands on different channels. Afterward, we formulate the advertising optimization problems under four coordination strategies: noncoordination, brand coordination, media coordination, and global coordination. By solving the problem for each strategy, the retailers can obtain the optimal expenditure for each unit under that strategy. Finally, we compare the retailer’s profits under four strategies. Interestingly, we find that brand or media coordination may result in a profit lower than noncoordination. Our findings provide insights regarding the selection of coordination strategies for multibrand, multichannel retailers with multimedia advertising campaigns.