BDBen Du

Ben Du

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Ben Du has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Rooting Out Incorrect RIPE Atlas Probe Geolocations

    by Katherine Izhikevich, Ben Du, Sumanth Rao, Manda Tran, Alisha Ukani, Ray Bellis, Liz Izhikevich

    Geolocation plays a critical role in understanding the Internet. In this work, we analyze and fix operator-misreported geolocation. Using DNS root servers to detect speed of Internet violations, we conservatively infer that at least 2% of vantage points in the largest community-vantage point collection, RIPE Atlas, were not located at their operator-reported geolocation between January 2019 and April 2026. To increase the accuracy of future studies that use operator-reported geolocation, we open source our simple methodology, implement a reporting campaign of violating probes within RIPE, work with operators to fix the misreported geolocations, and release a continually updated dataset of RIPE vantage points that likely misreport geolocation.

  • Open Access

    Proximity Risks and Policy Gaps in the LEO Constellation Era

    by Ben Du, Yuan Tian, Liz Izhikevich

    Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is becoming increasingly congested as satellite constellations expand, debris accumulates, and more spacecraft gain maneuvering capability. Using publicly available orbital data from 2020-2025, we find that debris from individual launch and fragmentation events exposes satellites to recurring close approaches for many years. Close approaches (conjunctions) between satellites have increased by over two fold. We also identify a small number of unexplained cases in which satellites operated by different countries repeatedly approach and maneuver near one another, warranting further review. Our findings highlight the importance of debris prevention, scalable conjunctionmanagement capabilities, and greater transparency for sustained proximity operations.

  • Open Access

    Locating and Enumerating Anycast: a Comparison of Two Approaches

    by Remi Hendriks, Tim Betzer, Ben Du, Raffaele Sommese, Mattijs Jonker, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij


  • Open Access

    Sublet Your Subnet: Inferring IP Leasing in the Wild

    by Ben Du, Romain Fontugne, Cecilia Testart, Alex C. Snoeren, Kc Claffy

    IPv4 addresses have become a commodity with monetary value since the exhaustion of unallocated IPv4 space. This led to the rise of a secondary market for buying, selling, and leasing IPv4 addresses. While prior work has studied the IPv4 transfer behavior, the IPv4 leasing ecosystem remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we analyze the IPv4 leasing ecosystem by designing a methodology to infer leased address space for all RIRs and study its impact on routing and hosting security. We infer that 4.1% of all advertised IPv4 prefixes (0.9% of routed v4 address space) were leased in April 2024. Our method achieves 98% precision when evaluated against our validated dataset. Finally, we show that leased address space is five times more likely to be abused compared to non-leased space.


  • Open Access

    IRRegularities in the Internet Routing Registry

    by Ben Du, Katherine Izhikevich, Sumanth Rao, Guatam Akiwate, Cecilia Testart, Alex C. Snoeren, Kc Claffy

    The Internet Routing Registry (IRR) is a set of distributed databases used by networks to register routing policy information and to validate messages received in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). First deployed in the 1990s, the IRR remains the most widely used database for routing security purposes, despite the existence of more recent and more secure alternatives. Yet, the IRR lacks a strict validation standard and the limited coordination across different database providers can lead to inaccuracies. Moreover, it has been reported that attackers have begun to register false records in the IRR to bypass operators' defenses when launching attacks on the Internet routing system, such as BGP hijacks. In this paper, we provide a longitudinal analysis of the IRR over the span of 1.5 years. We develop a workflow to identify irregular IRR records that contain conflicting information compared to different routing data sources. We identify 34,199 irregular route objects out of 1,542,724 route objects from November 2021 to May 2023 in the largest IRR database and find 6,373 to be potentially suspicious.


  • Open Access

    Poster: Taking the Low Road: How RPKI Invalids Propagate

    by Ben Du, Cecilia Testart, Romain Fontugne, Alex C. Snoeren, Kc Claffy

    The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) includes no mechanism to verify the correctness of routing information exchanged between networks. To defend against unauthorized use of address space, the IETF developed the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a cryptographically attested database system that facilitates validation of BGP messages. Networks can use RPKI to check whether the Autonomous System (AS) at the origin of the AS path in a BGP announcement is authorized to originate the IP prefixes being announced.