DRDohyun Ryu

Dohyun Ryu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Dohyun Ryu has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • -Knife: Extracting Neural Network Architecture Through Software-Based Power Side-Channel

    by Dohyun Ryu, Yerim Kim, Junbeom Hur

    Several side-channel attacks exploiting timing, cache, or power side channels have recently been proposed to obtain private information of a neural network. However, the hardware-based attacks require physical access to the system, using high-precision equipment to measure physical system behaviors such as power consumption or electromagnetic emanations, to exploit them as side channels. Whereas, the previous software-based side-channel attacks on neural networks can extract their model information only when the target architecture is known. In this paper, we propose the $\gamma$-Knife attack , a software-based power side-channel attack on a neural network, which can extract its architecture without any physical access or high-precision measuring equipment. Our work demonstrates that side-channels can be formed that leak architecture of neural networks by utilizing statistical metrics without high-resolution power data. The $\gamma$ -Knife attack can reduce the search space of candidate architectures by obtaining private information such as filter size, depth of convolutional layer, and activation functions in the target architecture, as accurately as hardware-based power side-channel attacks even when the target neural network is totally unknown. We demonstrated the efficacy of the $\gamma$ -Knife attack by implementing the attack on the well-known neural networks VGGNet, ResNet, GoogleNet, and MobileNet, using the Pytorch library on Intel CPUs and AMD CPUs. The $\gamma$ -Knife attack could identify the target neural network architecture with an accuracy of approximately 90%, and efficiently extract its private information, by significantly reducing the search space of the target architecture.


  • Neural Network Stealing via Meltdown

    by Hoyong Jeong, Dohyun Ryu, Junbeom Hur

    Deep learning services are now deployed in various fields on top of cloud infrastructures. In such cloud environment, virtualization technology provides logically independent and isolated computing space for each tenant. However, recent studies demonstrate that by leveraging vulnerabilities of virtualization techniques and shared processor architectures in the cloud system, various side-channels can be established between cloud tenants. In this paper, we propose a novel attack scenario that can steal internal information of deep learning models by exploiting the Meltdown vulnerability in a multitenant system environment. On the basis of our experiment, the proposed attack method could extract internal information of a TensorFlow deep learning service with 92.875% accuracy and 1.325kB/s extraction speed.