SWSihan Wang

Sihan Wang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Sihan Wang has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    IMS is Not That Secure on Your 5G/4G Phones

    by Jingwen Shi, Sihan Wang, Min-Yue Chen, Guan-Hua Tu, Tian Xie, Man-Hsin Chen, Yiwen Hu, Chi-Yu Li, Chunyi Peng

    IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) is vital for delivering IP-based multimedia services in mobile networks. Despite constant upgrades by 3GPP over the past two decades to support heterogeneous radio access networks (e.g., 4G LTE, 5G NR, and Wi-Fi) and enhance IMS security, the focus has primarily been on cellular infrastructure. Consequently, IMS security measures on mobile equipment (ME), such as smartphones, lag behind rapid technological advancements. Our study reveals that mandated IMS security measures on ME fail to keep pace, resulting in new vulnerabilities and attack vectors, including denial of service (DoS) across all networks, named SMS source spoofing, and covert communications over Video-over-IMS attacks. All vulnerabilities and proof-of-concept attacks have been experimentally validated in operational 5G/4G networks across various phone models and network operators. Finally, we propose and prototype standard-compliant remedies for these vulnerabilities.


  • Taming the Insecurity of Cellular Emergency Services (9–1-1): From Vulnerabilities to Secure Designs

    by Min-Yue Chen, Yiwen Hu, Guan-Hua Tu, Chi-Yu Li, Sihan Wang, Jingwen Shi, Tian Xie, Ren-Chieh Hsu, Li Xiao, Chunyi Peng, et al.

    Cellular networks, vital for delivering emergency services, enable mobile users to dial emergency calls (e.g., 9-1-1 in the U.S.), which are forwarded to public safety answer points (PSAPs). Regulatory requirements allow anonymous user equipment (UE) without a SIM card or valid mobile subscription to access these services. However, supporting emergency services for anonymous UEs introduces different operations, expanding the attack surface of cellular infrastructure. In this study, we explore the insecurity of cellular emergency services, identifying six security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be exploited for free data service attacks against carriers and data DoS/overcharge and denial of cellular emergency service (DoCES) attacks against mobile users. Experimental validation in networks of three major U.S. carriers and two major Taiwan carriers demonstrates the global impact of our findings. Finally, we propose and prototype standard-compliant remedies to mitigate these vulnerabilities.


  • Dissecting Operational Cellular IoT Service Security: Attacks and Defenses

    by Sihan Wang, Tian Xie, Min-Yue Chen, Guan-Hua Tu, Chi-Yu Li, Xinyu Lei, Po-Yi Chou, Fucheng Hsieh, Yiwen Hu, Li Xiao, et al.

    More than 150 cellular networks worldwide have rolled out LTE-M (LTE-Machine Type Communication) and/or NB-IoT (Narrow Band Internet of Things) technologies to support massive IoT services such as smart metering and environmental monitoring. Such cellular IoT services share the existing cellular network architecture with non-IoT (e.g., smartphone) ones. When they are newly integrated into the cellular network, new security vulnerabilities may happen from imprudent integration. In this work, we explore the security vulnerabilities of the cellular IoT from both system-integrated and service-integrated aspects. We discover several vulnerabilities spanning cellular standard design defects, network operation slips, and IoT device implementation flaws. Threateningly, they allow an adversary to remotely identify IP addresses and phone numbers assigned to cellular IoT devices, interrupt their power saving services, and launch various attacks, including data/text spamming, battery draining, device hibernation against them. We validate these vulnerabilities over five major cellular IoT carriers in the U.S. and Taiwan using their certified cellular IoT devices. The attack evaluation result shows that the adversary can raise an IoT data bill by up to $226 with less than 120 MB spam traffic, increase an IoT text bill at a rate of $5 per second, and prevent an IoT device from entering/leaving power saving mode; moreover, cellular IoT devices may suffer from denial of IoT services. We finally propose, prototype, and evaluate recommended solutions.


  • MPKIX: Towards More Accountable and Secure Internet Application Services via Mobile Networked Systems

    by Tian Xie, Sihan Wang, Xinyu Lei, Jingwen Shi, Guan-Hua Tu, Chi-Yu Li

    Nowadays, both Internet Application Service (IAS) providers and users face various security threats and legal issues. Due to the lack of reliable user information verification mechanisms, adversaries can abuse IASs to launch various cyberattacks, such as misinformation distributing and phishing, by using fake user accounts. IAS providers may thus inadvertently offer inappropriate content to restricted users, thereby suffering a serious risk of prosecution under local or international laws. Also, IAS users may suffer from nefarious ID theft attacks. In this paper, we proposed a novel security framework, ${{\sf MPKIX}}$ , designated as Mobile-assisted PKIX (Public-Key Infrastructure X.509). ${{\sf MPKIX}}$ secures both IAS providers and users by leveraging the broadly used PKIX services and mobile networked systems. It not only provides IAS providers with a reliable user verification mechanism while simultaneously enabling cross-IAS user privacy protection, but also largely mitigates the possibility of ID theft attacks and benefits other involved parties, such as cellular network operators and PKIX service providers. We further conduct a security analysis of ${{\sf MPKIX}}$ and implement an ${{\sf MPKIX}}$ prototype. The evaluation results based on the prototype confirm the effectiveness and efficiency of ${{\sf MPKIX}}$ with low overhead.


  • Exploring the Insecurity of Google Account Registration Protocol via Model Checking

    by Tian Xie, Sihan Wang, Guan-Hua Tu, Chi-Yu Li, Xinyu Lei

    People nowadays use online service accounts (e.g., Google, Facebook, Twitter) to access certain services. Among them, Google accounts have become increasingly important for users. Not only do many Google services (e.g., Gmail, Google Voice, Google Play, etc.) require them, but many online services also trust and rely on them for operational needs (e.g., login based on Google accounts). This trend introduces a new type of attacks that create a large number of fake, but valid, Google accounts. The fake Google accounts allow the adversary to launch various cyber attacks towards Google account-related services. It motivates us to conduct an empirical security study on the Google account registration service. In this paper, we apply model checking techniques to systematically analyze the insecurity of Google account registration service. We develop a model-checking tool, GAcctAnalyzer, which consists of two phases: (1) service screening phase, which generates counterexamples from the violation of desired properties, and (2) experimental validation phase, which validates the counterexamples through real experiments. We use GAcctAnalyzer to discover four security vulnerabilities including design defects, operational slips, etc. Based on the discovered vulnerabilities, we devise two practical attacks against mobile users and Google: fake Google account generation and Google text/voice spamming attack. They can not only threaten the security of mobile applications and online services, but also cause the Google company to receive user complaints and lawsuits. We finally confirm the feasibility of these attacks through experiments, assess the real-world impact, and propose recommended solutions.