Neil Malhotra
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Neil Malhotra has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ali Adam Valenzuela
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
1 shared publication- Laurel Harbridge
Northwestern University
1 shared publication - Melissa R. Michelson
Menlo College
1 shared publication - Stephen A. Jessee
The University of Texas at Austin
1 shared publication Todd Rogers
The Analyst Institute, Washington, DC
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 May 2011
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55 (3) , 494-510
Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments
- 17 May 2011
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 55 (3) , 494-510
Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments
- 20 April 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
- Vol. 39 (4) , 664-681
Text Messages as Mobilization Tools: The Conditional Effect of Habitual Voting and Election Salience
Dale and Strauss’s (DS) noticeable reminder theory (NRT) of voter mobilization posits that mobilization efforts that are highly noticeable and salient to potential voters, even if impersonal, can be successful. In an innovative experimental design, DS show that text messages substantially boost turnout, challenging previous claims that social connectedness is the key to increasing participation. We replicate DS’s research design and extend it in two key ways. First, whereas the treatment in DS’s experiment was a “warm” text message combined with contact, we test NRT more cleanly by examining the effect of “cold” text messages that are completely devoid of auxiliary interaction. Second, we test an implication of NRT that habitual voters should exhibit the largest treatment effects in lower salience elections whereas casual voters should exhibit the largest treatment effects in higher salience elections. Via these two extensions, we find support for NRT.
- 20 April 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
- Vol. 39 (4) , 664-681
Text Messages as Mobilization Tools: The Conditional Effect of Habitual Voting and Election Salience
Dale and Strauss’s (DS) noticeable reminder theory (NRT) of voter mobilization posits that mobilization efforts that are highly noticeable and salient to potential voters, even if impersonal, can be successful. In an innovative experimental design, DS show that text messages substantially boost turnout, challenging previous claims that social connectedness is the key to increasing participation. We replicate DS’s research design and extend it in two key ways. First, whereas the treatment in DS’s experiment was a “warm” text message combined with contact, we test NRT more cleanly by examining the effect of “cold” text messages that are completely devoid of auxiliary interaction. Second, we test an implication of NRT that habitual voters should exhibit the largest treatment effects in lower salience elections whereas casual voters should exhibit the largest treatment effects in higher salience elections. Via these two extensions, we find support for NRT.
- 1 August 2010
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 35 (3) , 361-392
Are Congressional Leaders Middlepersons or Extremists? Yes
Infuential theories of legislative organization predict that congressional leaders will be selected from the center of their parties. Yet previous research has generally rejected the “middleperson hypothesis,” finding leaders to be extremists. We challenged these findings by testing more‐appropriate null hypotheses via Monte Carlo simulation. We found that congressional leaders (and leadership candidates as a whole) tend to be closer to their party's median than would occur by chance, but leaders also tend to be selected from the left of the median for Democrats and to the right for Republicans. Compared to the pool of announced candidates for leadership positions, winners are not ideologically distinctive. This result suggests that factors affecting the ideology of leaders tend to operate more at the candidate emergence stage.
- 1 August 2010
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 35 (3) , 361-392
Are Congressional Leaders Middlepersons or Extremists? Yes
Infuential theories of legislative organization predict that congressional leaders will be selected from the center of their parties. Yet previous research has generally rejected the “middleperson hypothesis,” finding leaders to be extremists. We challenged these findings by testing more‐appropriate null hypotheses via Monte Carlo simulation. We found that congressional leaders (and leadership candidates as a whole) tend to be closer to their party's median than would occur by chance, but leaders also tend to be selected from the left of the median for Democrats and to the right for Republicans. Compared to the pool of announced candidates for leadership positions, winners are not ideologically distinctive. This result suggests that factors affecting the ideology of leaders tend to operate more at the candidate emergence stage.