Qixuan Tang

According to their resource ownership and resource acquisition channels, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of enterprises’ technological innovation investment channels considering managers’ expectations. This results in the strategy of non-alliance firms along the first channel having a significant impact on the evolutionary equilibrium. For non-alliance enterprises, the difference in the amount of investment in the R&D stage has the same impact on the probability of such enterprises following the first channel. The number of active managers, group capacity, the difference in managers’ expectations, and the difference in the amount of technological innovation investment in the R&D stage have significant differences in the possibility of choosing the first channel between the two types of enterprises. The research conclusions can provide valuable references for enterprises to make technological innovation decisions.

Based on various factors in information sharing between innovation alliance groups, this paper analyzes innovation information sharing under the influence of various factors and its evolutionary path to provide a reference for the decision-making of innovation information sharing between innovation alliance groups. Firstly, the paper analyzes the main factors influencing alliance group innovation information-sharing behavior. Secondly, based on the evolutionary game theory, an evolutionary game model of innovative information sharing under the cooperative trust degree of group decision-makers is constructed, and the related stable strategies are given. Finally, the sensitivity of innovative information-sharing strategies to key influencing factors is analyzed with the help of actual case data. The results show that a reasonable amount of innovation information sharing and fair profit distribution can improve the innovation information-sharing behavior among the industry–university–research alliance. Considering the trust degree of vertical partners, the alliance group pays more attention to the profit distribution ratio of collaborative innovation of the innovation alliance than the profit amount. When horizontal partner trust is considered, horizontal cooperation trust can promote information sharing among enterprises, universities, and research institutes in the short term but impedes information sharing among groups in the long term.