SRSazzadur Rahaman

Sazzadur Rahaman

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Sazzadur Rahaman has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    "It's not approved, but many, like myself, ignore the rule": Investigating the Landscape and Consequences of Unsanctioned Technology Use in Educational Institutes

    by Easton Kelso, Ananta Soneji, Syed Zami-Ul-Haque Navid, Yan Soshitaishvili, Sazzadur Rahaman, Rakibul Hasan

    Educators regularly use unsanctioned technologies (apps not formally approved by their institutions) for teaching, grading, and other academic tasks. While these tools often support instructional needs, they raise significant privacy, security, and regulatory compliance concerns. Despite its importance, understanding the adoptions and risks from the perspective of educators, who serve as de facto decision makers behind unsanctioned technology use, is largely understudied in existing literature.To address this gap, we conducted two surveys: one with 375 educators who listed 1,373 unsanctioned apps, and another with 21 administrators who either often help educators to set up educational technologies (EdTechs) or observe their security or privacy incidents. Our study identified 494 unique applications used by educators, primarily for pedagogical utility (n=213) and functional convenience (n=155), and the associated risks were often ignored. In fact, despite security and privacy concerns, many educators continued using the same apps (n = 62), citing a lack of alternatives or heavy dependence as barriers to discontinuation. We also found that fewer than a third of educators were aware of any institutional policy on unsanctioned technology use (K12: 30.3%, HEI: 24.8%), and 22 knowingly violated such policies. While 107 received formal warnings, only 33 adjusted their behavior. Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications of our findings and future recommendations to minimize the risks.


  • Open Access

    Investigating the Security & Privacy Risks from Unsanctioned Technology Use by Educators

    by Easton Kelso, Ananta Soneji, Syed Zami-Ul-Haque Navid, Yan Soshitaishvili, Sazzadur Rahaman, Rakibul Hasan

    Educational technologies are revolutionizing how educational institutions operate. Consequently, it makes them a lucrative target for breach and abuse as they often serve as centralized hubs for diverse types of sensitive data, from academic records to health information. Existing studies looked into how existing stakeholders perceive the security and privacy risks of educational technologies and how those risks are affecting institutional policies for acquiring new technologies. However, outside of institutional vetting and approval, there is a pervasive practice of using applications and devices acquired personally. It is unclear how these applications and devices affect the dynamics of the overall institutional ecosystem. This study aims to address this gap by understanding why instructors use unsanctioned applications, how instructors perceive the associated risks, and how it affects institutional security and privacy postures. We designed and conducted an online survey-based study targeting instructors and administrators from K-12 and higher education institutions.


  • Open Access

    An Investigation into Protestware

    by Tanner Finken, Jesse Chen, Sazzadur Rahaman

    Protests are public expressions of personal or collective discontent with the current state of affairs. Although traditional protests involve in-person events, the ubiquity of computers and software opened up a new avenue for activism: protestware. The roots of protestware date back to the early days of computing. However, recent events in the Russo-Ukrainian war has sparked a new wave of protestware. While news and media are heavily reporting on individual protestware as they are discovered, the understanding of such software as a whole is severely limited. In particular, we do not have a detailed understanding of their characteristics and their impact on the community. To address this gap, we first collect 32 samples of protestware. Then, with these samples, we formulate characteristics of protestware using inductive analysis. In addition, we analyze the aftermath of the protestware which has potential to affect the software supply chain in terms of community sentiment and usage. We report that: (1) protestware has three notable characteristics, namely, i) the "nature of inducing protest" is diverse, ii) the "nature of targeting users" is discriminatory, and iii) the "nature of transparency" is not always respected; (2) disruptive protestware may cause substantial adverse impact on downstream users; (3) developers of protestware may not shift their beliefs even with pushback; (4) the usage of protestware from JavaScript libraries has been seen to generally increase over time.

  • SpanL: Creating Algorithms for Automatic API Misuse Detection with Program Analysis Compositions

    by Sazzadur Rahaman, Miles Frantz, Barton Miller, Danfeng (Daphne) Yao

  • Open Access

    Bilingual Problems: Studying the Security Risks Incurred by Native Extensions in Scripting Languages

    by Cristian-Alexandru Staicu, Sazzadur Rahaman, Ágnes Kiss, Michael Backes

    Scripting languages are continuously gaining popularity due to their ease of use and the flourishing software ecosystems that surround them. These languages offer crash and memory safety by design, thus, developers do not need to understand and prevent low-level security issues like the ones plaguing the C code. However, scripting languages often allow native extensions, which are a way for custom C/C++ code to be invoked directly from the high-level language. While this feature promises several benefits such as increased performance or the reuse of legacy code, it can also break the language's guarantees, e.g., crash-safety. In this work, we first provide a comparative analysis of the security risks of native extension APIs in three popular scripting languages. Additionally, we discuss a novel methodology for studying the misuse of the native extension API. We then perform an in-depth study of npm, an ecosystem which is most exposed to threats introduced by native extensions. We show that vulnerabilities in extensions can be exploited in their embedding library by producing reads of uninitialized memory, hard crashes or memory leaks in 33 npm packages, simply by invoking their API with well-crafted inputs. Moreover, we identify six open-source web applications in which such exploits can be deployed remotely by a weak adversary. Finally, we were assigned seven security advisories for the work presented in this paper, most labeled as high severity.

  • Open Access

    Being the Developers’ Friend: Our Experience Developing a High-Precision Tool for Secure Coding

    by Danfeng Daphne Yao, Sazzadur Rahaman, Ya Xiao, Sharmin Afrose, Miles Frantz, Ke Tian, Na Meng, Cristina Cifuentes, Yang Zhao, Nicholas Allen, et al.