Tianyu Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Tianyu Zhang has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jian Guo
Nanyang Technological University
3 shared publications - Shiyao Chen
Digital Trust Centre, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
2 shared publications - Xiaoyang Dong
Tsinghua University
2 shared publications - Danping Shi
State Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication Eik List
1 shared publication- Eran Lambooij
INRIA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 353-373
Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on Full ChiLow
- Open Access
- 18 December 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2024 (4) , 64-96
Chosen-Prefix Collisions on AES-like Hashing
Chosen-prefix collision (CPC) attack was first presented by Stevens, Lenstra and de Weger on MD5 at Eurocrypt 2007. A CPC attack finds a collision for any two chosen prefixes, which is a stronger variant of collision attack. CPCs are naturally harder to construct but have larger practical impact than (identical-prefix) collisions, as seen from the series of previous works on MD5 by Stevens et al. and SHA-1 by Leurent and Peyrin. Despite its significance, the resistance of CPC attacks has not been studied on AES-like hashing.In this work, we explore CPC attacks on AES-like hashing following the framework practiced on MD5 and SHA-1. Instead of the message modification technique developed for MD-SHA family, we opt for related-key rebound attack to construct collisions for AES-like hashing in view of its effectiveness. We also note that the CPC attack framework can be exploited to convert a specific class of one-block free-start collisions into two-block collisions, which sheds light on the importance of free-start collisions. As a result, we present the first CPC attacks on reduced Whirlpool, Saturnin-hash and AES-MMO/MP in classic and quantum settings, and extend the collision attack on Saturnin-hash from 5 to 6 rounds in the classic setting. As an independent contribution, we improve the memoryless algorithm of solving 3-round inbound phase by Hosoyamada and Sasaki at Eurocrpyt 2020, which leads to improved quantum attacks on Whirlpool. Notably, we find the first 6-round memoryless quantum collision attack on Whirlpool better than generic CNS collision finding algorithm when exponential-size qRAM is not available but exponential-size classic memory is available.
- 18 December 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2024 (4) , 64-96
Open AccessChosen-Prefix Collisions on AES-like Hashing
Chosen-prefix collision (CPC) attack was first presented by Stevens, Lenstra and de Weger on MD5 at Eurocrypt 2007. A CPC attack finds a collision for any two chosen prefixes, which is a stronger variant of collision attack. CPCs are naturally harder to construct but have larger practical impact than (identical-prefix) collisions, as seen from the series of previous works on MD5 by Stevens et al. and SHA-1 by Leurent and Peyrin. Despite its significance, the resistance of CPC attacks has not been studied on AES-like hashing.In this work, we explore CPC attacks on AES-like hashing following the framework practiced on MD5 and SHA-1. Instead of the message modification technique developed for MD-SHA family, we opt for related-key rebound attack to construct collisions for AES-like hashing in view of its effectiveness. We also note that the CPC attack framework can be exploited to convert a specific class of one-block free-start collisions into two-block collisions, which sheds light on the importance of free-start collisions. As a result, we present the first CPC attacks on reduced Whirlpool, Saturnin-hash and AES-MMO/MP in classic and quantum settings, and extend the collision attack on Saturnin-hash from 5 to 6 rounds in the classic setting. As an independent contribution, we improve the memoryless algorithm of solving 3-round inbound phase by Hosoyamada and Sasaki at Eurocrpyt 2020, which leads to improved quantum attacks on Whirlpool. Notably, we find the first 6-round memoryless quantum collision attack on Whirlpool better than generic CNS collision finding algorithm when exponential-size qRAM is not available but exponential-size classic memory is available.
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 398-426
Diving Deep into the Preimage Security of AES-Like Hashing
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 398-426
Diving Deep into the Preimage Security of AES-Like Hashing
- Open Access
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2024 (1) , 158-187
Improved Meet-in-the-Middle Nostradamus Attacks on AES-like Hashing
The Nostradamus attack was originally proposed as a security vulnerability for a hash function by Kelsey and Kohno at EUROCRYPT 2006. It requires the attacker to commit to a hash value y of an iterated hash function H. Subsequently, upon being provided with a message prefix P, the adversary’s task is to identify a suffix S such that H(P∥S) equals y. Kelsey and Kohno demonstrated a herding attack requiring O(√n · 22n/3) evaluations of the compression function of H, where n represents the output and state size of the hash, placing this attack between preimage attacks and collision searches in terms of complexity. At ASIACRYPT 2022, Benedikt et al. transform Kelsey and Kohno’s attack into a quantum variant, decreasing the time complexity from O(√n · 22n/3) to O( 3√n · 23n/7). At ToSC 2023, Zhang et al. proposed the first dedicated Nostradamus attack on AES-like hashing in both classical and quantum settings. In this paper, we have made revisions to the multi-target technique incorporated into the meet-in-the-middle automatic search framework. This modification leads to a decrease in time complexity during the online linking phase, effectively reducing the overall attack time complexity in both classical and quantum scenarios. Specifically, we can achieve more rounds in the classical setting and reduce the time complexity for the same round in the quantum setting.
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2024 (1) , 158-187
Open AccessImproved Meet-in-the-Middle Nostradamus Attacks on AES-like Hashing
The Nostradamus attack was originally proposed as a security vulnerability for a hash function by Kelsey and Kohno at EUROCRYPT 2006. It requires the attacker to commit to a hash value y of an iterated hash function H. Subsequently, upon being provided with a message prefix P, the adversary’s task is to identify a suffix S such that H(P∥S) equals y. Kelsey and Kohno demonstrated a herding attack requiring O(√n · 22n/3) evaluations of the compression function of H, where n represents the output and state size of the hash, placing this attack between preimage attacks and collision searches in terms of complexity. At ASIACRYPT 2022, Benedikt et al. transform Kelsey and Kohno’s attack into a quantum variant, decreasing the time complexity from O(√n · 22n/3) to O( 3√n · 23n/7). At ToSC 2023, Zhang et al. proposed the first dedicated Nostradamus attack on AES-like hashing in both classical and quantum settings. In this paper, we have made revisions to the multi-target technique incorporated into the meet-in-the-middle automatic search framework. This modification leads to a decrease in time complexity during the online linking phase, effectively reducing the overall attack time complexity in both classical and quantum scenarios. Specifically, we can achieve more rounds in the classical setting and reduce the time complexity for the same round in the quantum setting.
- 4 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-42
Comprehensive Preimage Security Evaluations on Rijndael-Based Hashing
- 4 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-42
Comprehensive Preimage Security Evaluations on Rijndael-Based Hashing