Eric Scheuch
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Eric Scheuch has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Laura Thomas-Walters
Yale University, New Haven, USA
5 shared publications Matthew H. Goldberg
4 shared publicationsLaura Thomas-Walters
3 shared publicationsAnthony Leiserowitz
2 shared publications- Ganga Shreedhar
Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, England
2 shared publications - Mark Ortiz
Penn State University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
Policing at a Distance: Explaining Suburban Support for Urban Policing
Why would suburban residents use their own tax dollars to fund policing in jurisdictions where they do not live? Two traditions in policing studies generate divergent answers: one treats it as a spatially bounded public good whose support tracks direct benefit, the other as an instrument of racial-spatial hierarchy whose support tracks group-position defense. Through a divide-the-dollar game embedded in a survey of six major U.S. metro areas (N = 6,200), we test the extent to which suburban residents support using their own tax dollars to fund policing in the urban core compared to residents of that core. We find that while suburban residents initially appear as or more willing to pay for metro policing than urban residents, this reverses after controlling for demographics. We test three explanations for this heterogeneity: demographic, material, and symbolic. Suburban willingness to pay for urban policing is partly explained by demographics, particularly ideology and age, but material self-interest, such as commuting to the city for work, is not a significant driver. We find symbolic concerns play a significant role: racial resentment strongly predicts support for police funding among all residents, while fear of neighborhood racial change is a significant driver specifically for white suburbanites. These symbolic variables persist in their predictiveness after controlling for demographics. The coalition funding urban policing extends across municipal boundaries, organized less by exposure to the service than by defense of a racial-spatial boundary, with implications for how state-level fiscal institutions—referenda, grants, preemption—channel those preferences into urban police budgets.
- 7 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
Open AccessPolicing at a Distance: Explaining Suburban Support for Urban Policing
Why would suburban residents use their own tax dollars to fund policing in jurisdictions where they do not live? Two traditions in policing studies generate divergent answers: one treats it as a spatially bounded public good whose support tracks direct benefit, the other as an instrument of racial-spatial hierarchy whose support tracks group-position defense. Through a divide-the-dollar game embedded in a survey of six major U.S. metro areas (N = 6,200), we test the extent to which suburban residents support using their own tax dollars to fund policing in the urban core compared to residents of that core. We find that while suburban residents initially appear as or more willing to pay for metro policing than urban residents, this reverses after controlling for demographics. We test three explanations for this heterogeneity: demographic, material, and symbolic. Suburban willingness to pay for urban policing is partly explained by demographics, particularly ideology and age, but material self-interest, such as commuting to the city for work, is not a significant driver. We find symbolic concerns play a significant role: racial resentment strongly predicts support for police funding among all residents, while fear of neighborhood racial change is a significant driver specifically for white suburbanites. These symbolic variables persist in their predictiveness after controlling for demographics. The coalition funding urban policing extends across municipal boundaries, organized less by exposure to the service than by defense of a racial-spatial boundary, with implications for how state-level fiscal institutions—referenda, grants, preemption—channel those preferences into urban police budgets.
- Open Access
- 22 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
How Do Voters Respond to Gradual Climate Costs? Evidence from the Insurance Crisis
Climate change is transforming the U.S. economy in gradual but increasingly impactful ways. Existing literature on climate shocks and economic transformation is poorly positioned to explain how these gradual costs shape opinions and behavior. I study this through the U.S. home insurance market. Using panel data (2016–2024) and 246 million insurance records, I show voters recognize the insurance crisis and shift away from homeownership in response, but that rate increases do not significantly change climate opinions. With original survey data, I explain why: voters fail to attribute insurance costs to climate change and to connect insurance to climate policy. I trace this gap to the information environment: analysis of posts from 3,000 public officials and 2.9 million news articles shows that neither officials nor media frequently link insurance to climate change. These findings advance understanding of how gradual climate costs are—and are not—reshaping American opinion and behavior.
- 22 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessHow Do Voters Respond to Gradual Climate Costs? Evidence from the Insurance Crisis
Climate change is transforming the U.S. economy in gradual but increasingly impactful ways. Existing literature on climate shocks and economic transformation is poorly positioned to explain how these gradual costs shape opinions and behavior. I study this through the U.S. home insurance market. Using panel data (2016–2024) and 246 million insurance records, I show voters recognize the insurance crisis and shift away from homeownership in response, but that rate increases do not significantly change climate opinions. With original survey data, I explain why: voters fail to attribute insurance costs to climate change and to connect insurance to climate policy. I trace this gap to the information environment: analysis of posts from 3,000 public officials and 2.9 million news articles shows that neither officials nor media frequently link insurance to climate change. These findings advance understanding of how gradual climate costs are—and are not—reshaping American opinion and behavior.
- Open Access
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
The Minimal, Parallel Modern Effect of Courts on Public Opinion: Evidence from 44 Years of Experiments
In an era of polarized judiciaries, re-evaluating the role of courts in shaping public opinion is vital. This study meta-analyses 114 effects from 21 experiments (1981-2025, N=31,523). I find that as average statistical power has risen dramatically over time, experimental estimates of court influence have fallen dramatically, with average effects of just 0.06 standard deviations post-Citizen’s-United. These effects, when they appear, are non-heterogeneous by partisanship, moving Democrats and Republicans in the same direction. These minimal, parallel effects are confined mostly to narrow specific variables, especially specific support and social beliefs. How the court’s decisions are framed in the media is, on average, more consequential for opinion formation than the court decision itself. Encouragingly, I find no evidence of publication bias, overall or in any decade. This paper increases understanding of court influence on public opinion along several dimensions while outlining important directions for future research.
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessThe Minimal, Parallel Modern Effect of Courts on Public Opinion: Evidence from 44 Years of Experiments
In an era of polarized judiciaries, re-evaluating the role of courts in shaping public opinion is vital. This study meta-analyses 114 effects from 21 experiments (1981-2025, N=31,523). I find that as average statistical power has risen dramatically over time, experimental estimates of court influence have fallen dramatically, with average effects of just 0.06 standard deviations post-Citizen’s-United. These effects, when they appear, are non-heterogeneous by partisanship, moving Democrats and Republicans in the same direction. These minimal, parallel effects are confined mostly to narrow specific variables, especially specific support and social beliefs. How the court’s decisions are framed in the media is, on average, more consequential for opinion formation than the court decision itself. Encouragingly, I find no evidence of publication bias, overall or in any decade. This paper increases understanding of court influence on public opinion along several dimensions while outlining important directions for future research.
- Open Access
- 8 August 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Urban Affairs Review
Voters Support and Are Willing to Pay for Local Climate Adaptation Policies
Cities across the United States are increasingly turning to local climate policy as national climate action stalls. Yet, public opinion research on local climate policies remains sparse. I conducted two national surveys ( N = 4,000) measuring respondent willingness to pay (WTP) and policy prioritization for local climate policies. Drawing on a key distinction between adaptation and mitigation policies, I find that respondents are substantially more willing to pay for adaptation policies, contributing to mean WTP estimates of $250–$330 annually. These results replicate across time and survey vendors. A survey experiment further shows that high respondent WTP for adaptation policies is not an artifact of how policies are framed or which level of government administers them. Partisanship, age, and income are the strongest predictors of WTP, though partisan polarization varies considerably across policies. These findings point to local adaptation policy as a promising avenue for climate progress, even amid federal policy retrenchment.
- 8 August 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Urban Affairs Review
Open AccessVoters Support and Are Willing to Pay for Local Climate Adaptation Policies
Cities across the United States are increasingly turning to local climate policy as national climate action stalls. Yet, public opinion research on local climate policies remains sparse. I conducted two national surveys ( N = 4,000) measuring respondent willingness to pay (WTP) and policy prioritization for local climate policies. Drawing on a key distinction between adaptation and mitigation policies, I find that respondents are substantially more willing to pay for adaptation policies, contributing to mean WTP estimates of $250–$330 annually. These results replicate across time and survey vendors. A survey experiment further shows that high respondent WTP for adaptation policies is not an artifact of how policies are framed or which level of government administers them. Partisanship, age, and income are the strongest predictors of WTP, though partisan polarization varies considerably across policies. These findings point to local adaptation policy as a promising avenue for climate progress, even amid federal policy retrenchment.
- 19 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Climatic Change
- Vol. 179 (2) , 18
Racial gaps in rooftop solar cannot be traced to gaps in demand
- 19 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Climatic Change
- Vol. 179 (2) , 18
Racial gaps in rooftop solar cannot be traced to gaps in demand
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
The unique roles of breadth and depth in climate change persuasion
Reducing climate change requires persuading people about climate change and climate solutions. The nearly universal way of evaluating which climate and environmental messages are most effective is to calculate and compare average treatment effects (ATEs). The problem with the ATE, however, is that it does not describe the underlying pattern of persuasion: whether effect size is better predicted by how many people are persuaded (i.e., breadth), or how much they are persuaded (i.e., depth). Here, we investigate this in a preregistered meta-analysis of our experimental data archive, avoiding publication bias (14 experiments; 94 treatments; total N = 41,265). We find that as treatment effects increase, the breadth and depth of persuasion both increase. However, the predictive power of breadth (𝛽 = 0.47, 95% CI [0.29, 0.65]) is far stronger than that of depth (𝛽 = 0.10, 95% CI [0.04, 0.15]). We also find that breadth and depth are only weakly correlated (𝛽 = 0.23, 95% CI [0.003, 0.46]), confirming they are distinct. Additionally, as average treatment effects increase, we also find that negative (i.e., backlash) effects decrease (𝛽 = -0.30, 95% CI [-0.46, -0.15]), suggesting that larger ATEs are a function of increased persuasion and decreased backlash. Through three case studies, we show how these results generalize and when they can be audience-dependent. These results have important implications for both scholars and practitioners of climate and environmental communication.
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessThe unique roles of breadth and depth in climate change persuasion
Reducing climate change requires persuading people about climate change and climate solutions. The nearly universal way of evaluating which climate and environmental messages are most effective is to calculate and compare average treatment effects (ATEs). The problem with the ATE, however, is that it does not describe the underlying pattern of persuasion: whether effect size is better predicted by how many people are persuaded (i.e., breadth), or how much they are persuaded (i.e., depth). Here, we investigate this in a preregistered meta-analysis of our experimental data archive, avoiding publication bias (14 experiments; 94 treatments; total N = 41,265). We find that as treatment effects increase, the breadth and depth of persuasion both increase. However, the predictive power of breadth (𝛽 = 0.47, 95% CI [0.29, 0.65]) is far stronger than that of depth (𝛽 = 0.10, 95% CI [0.04, 0.15]). We also find that breadth and depth are only weakly correlated (𝛽 = 0.23, 95% CI [0.003, 0.46]), confirming they are distinct. Additionally, as average treatment effects increase, we also find that negative (i.e., backlash) effects decrease (𝛽 = -0.30, 95% CI [-0.46, -0.15]), suggesting that larger ATEs are a function of increased persuasion and decreased backlash. Through three case studies, we show how these results generalize and when they can be audience-dependent. These results have important implications for both scholars and practitioners of climate and environmental communication.
- 14 August 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
- Vol. 54 (2) , 256-267
The Null Impact of Parenthood on Technical Risk Preferences
The transition to parenthood is a highly disruptive experience. Previous research has found that this disruption can change an individual’s political views, but there is a debate in both the academic and popular literature on if parenthood makes individuals more liberal or more conservative, particularly on technical social risks such as climate change and gun control. Taking advantage of recent evolutions in Differences-in-Differences methodology & best practices, I test the impact of parenthood on public opinion toward climate change and gun control in the United States using panel data (N = 9,000) that allows each individual to be used as their own control group. This is the first panel study of climate change and parenthood to take advantage of these methodological improvements and the first panel study to examine the link between parenthood and gun attitudes. Despite expectations that individuals will move their opinions once they become parents, I do not find any evidence that, regardless of subgroup and model selection, parenthood has a significant impact on preferences towards either topic. I find null effects of parenthood on political ideology, but evidence for a conservative effect on social issues. I argue that these results are a reflection of parenthood’s nature as a treatment: individuals self-select with full anticipation into a treatment they know will be risky.
- 14 August 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
- Vol. 54 (2) , 256-267
The Null Impact of Parenthood on Technical Risk Preferences
The transition to parenthood is a highly disruptive experience. Previous research has found that this disruption can change an individual’s political views, but there is a debate in both the academic and popular literature on if parenthood makes individuals more liberal or more conservative, particularly on technical social risks such as climate change and gun control. Taking advantage of recent evolutions in Differences-in-Differences methodology & best practices, I test the impact of parenthood on public opinion toward climate change and gun control in the United States using panel data (N = 9,000) that allows each individual to be used as their own control group. This is the first panel study of climate change and parenthood to take advantage of these methodological improvements and the first panel study to examine the link between parenthood and gun attitudes. Despite expectations that individuals will move their opinions once they become parents, I do not find any evidence that, regardless of subgroup and model selection, parenthood has a significant impact on preferences towards either topic. I find null effects of parenthood on political ideology, but evidence for a conservative effect on social issues. I argue that these results are a reflection of parenthood’s nature as a treatment: individuals self-select with full anticipation into a treatment they know will be risky.
- Open Access
- 26 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Repeated Messaging Increases the Durability of Political Persuasion, But Only In the Short Term
What affects the durability of political persuasion? This study evaluates the influence of two factors—the number of times an individual is treated, and the time between treatments—on persuasion around climate change. We conducted a five-wave panel study (N = 2,588), varying exposure to the number of persuasive messages (one versus three messages) and the length of interval between messages (two days or one week). We measure effect durability up to ten weeks after initial exposure. Repeated exposure to persuasive messages more than doubles their durability one week after treatment (from 32% to 83%), however, multiple treatments do not increase absolute persuasion compared to a single treatment. This difference in durability between one and three treatments closes after eight weeks, with 6%-8% of individuals remaining persuaded, with no evidence of backlash or partisan heterogeneity in effects. These findings help explain the role of repetition in the durability of political persuasion messages.
- 26 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessRepeated Messaging Increases the Durability of Political Persuasion, But Only In the Short Term
What affects the durability of political persuasion? This study evaluates the influence of two factors—the number of times an individual is treated, and the time between treatments—on persuasion around climate change. We conducted a five-wave panel study (N = 2,588), varying exposure to the number of persuasive messages (one versus three messages) and the length of interval between messages (two days or one week). We measure effect durability up to ten weeks after initial exposure. Repeated exposure to persuasive messages more than doubles their durability one week after treatment (from 32% to 83%), however, multiple treatments do not increase absolute persuasion compared to a single treatment. This difference in durability between one and three treatments closes after eight weeks, with 6%-8% of individuals remaining persuaded, with no evidence of backlash or partisan heterogeneity in effects. These findings help explain the role of repetition in the durability of political persuasion messages.
- Open Access
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
The Impacts of Climate Activism
We review 50 studies on the impacts of climate activism. We present the existingevidence in a map of what we know about climate activism and its impacts. There isstrong evidence that climate activism shifts public opinion and media coverage in a pro-climate direction, but this varies by context and the tactics employed. There is moremoderate evidence that activism can pressure policymakers to communicate more aboutclimate change, encourage voters to vote in a more pro-climate direction, and financiallypressure carbon intensive companies. We review suggestive evidence that protest caninfluence emissions and environmental policy. Although these studies cover a wide swathof outcome variables, a majority examine intermediate variables, rather than long termimpacts. Generalizability is challenged by a bias towards the U.S. and Western Europe.We call for greater focus outside those geographic areas and more attention to activism'simpact on public policy and emissions.
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessThe Impacts of Climate Activism
We review 50 studies on the impacts of climate activism. We present the existingevidence in a map of what we know about climate activism and its impacts. There isstrong evidence that climate activism shifts public opinion and media coverage in a pro-climate direction, but this varies by context and the tactics employed. There is moremoderate evidence that activism can pressure policymakers to communicate more aboutclimate change, encourage voters to vote in a more pro-climate direction, and financiallypressure carbon intensive companies. We review suggestive evidence that protest caninfluence emissions and environmental policy. Although these studies cover a wide swathof outcome variables, a majority examine intermediate variables, rather than long termimpacts. Generalizability is challenged by a bias towards the U.S. and Western Europe.We call for greater focus outside those geographic areas and more attention to activism'simpact on public policy and emissions.
- Open Access
- 13 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Understanding the policy features that affect Indians' support for India's 2070 net-zero goal
In 2021, the Indian government announced the goal of net-zero carbon emissions in India by 2070. India’s vulnerability to climate impacts and central role in reducing global emissions make it essential to understand the policy features that affect Indians’ support for the 2070 goal. We conducted a conjoint experiment (N = 1,500) to test Indians’ support for the 2070 goal depending on differences among possible policy features including economic programs, allocation of funds collected via coal taxes, policies to mitigate pollution, who participates in the policy-making process, and adaptation policy. We find that Indians express stronger support for the 2070 goal when it includes jobs programs for Indians who lose their job in a coal-fired power plant, policies to mitigate pollution, investment or redistribution of funds collected via coal taxes, and adaptation policies to protect the most vulnerable Indians and critical infrastructure. Support for certain policy features varies depending on income, education, and caste.
- 13 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessUnderstanding the policy features that affect Indians' support for India's 2070 net-zero goal
In 2021, the Indian government announced the goal of net-zero carbon emissions in India by 2070. India’s vulnerability to climate impacts and central role in reducing global emissions make it essential to understand the policy features that affect Indians’ support for the 2070 goal. We conducted a conjoint experiment (N = 1,500) to test Indians’ support for the 2070 goal depending on differences among possible policy features including economic programs, allocation of funds collected via coal taxes, policies to mitigate pollution, who participates in the policy-making process, and adaptation policy. We find that Indians express stronger support for the 2070 goal when it includes jobs programs for Indians who lose their job in a coal-fired power plant, policies to mitigate pollution, investment or redistribution of funds collected via coal taxes, and adaptation policies to protect the most vulnerable Indians and critical infrastructure. Support for certain policy features varies depending on income, education, and caste.